GHSA-3JM4-C6QF-JRH3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-24 17:58 – Updated: 2024-12-04 22:18Summary
Lack of CSRF protection on the preview-expression command means that visiting a malicious website could cause an attacker-controlled expression to be executed. The expression can contain arbitrary Clojure or Python code.
The attacker must know a valid project ID of a project that contains at least one row.
Details
The com.google.refine.commands.expr.PreviewExpressionCommand class contains the following comment:
/**
* The command uses POST but does not actually modify any state so it does not require CSRF.
*/
However, this appears to be false (or no longer true). The expression being previewed (executed) can be written in GREL, Python, or Clojure. Since there are no restrictions on what code can be executed, the expression can do anything the user running OpenRefine can do. For instance, the following expressions start a calculator:
clojure:(.exec (Runtime/getRuntime) "gnome-calculator")
jython:import os;os.system("gnome-calculator")
The lack of restrictions on expressions is arguably not a problem if the user is typing their own expressions into OpenRefine: they could have just as well typed them into Clojure or Python directly. However, since the preview-expression command does not check for a CSRF token, the expression can actually come from a HTML form submitted by a different origin, including arbitrary websites.
Issue #2164 suggested adding CSRF protection to all endpoints, but this endpoint was skipped (and the above comment added) in the associated PR #2182.
PoC
An example "malicious" page is at https://wandernauta.nl/or/ (of course, actual malicious pages would not wait for the victim to press the submit button).
The following curl command (substituting the project ID) also demonstrates the issue:
curl -d project=123456789 -d cellIndex=1 -d rowIndices='[0]' -d 'expression=clojure:(.exec (Runtime/getRuntime) "gnome-calculator")' http://localhost:3333/command/core/preview-expression/
Impact
CSRF into remote code execution, provided the attacker knows at least one project ID in the victim's workspace and can convince the victim to open a malicious webpage.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.openrefine:main"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47879"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-24T17:58:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-24T21:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nLack of CSRF protection on the `preview-expression` command means that visiting a malicious website could cause an attacker-controlled expression to be executed. The expression can contain arbitrary Clojure or Python code.\n\nThe attacker must know a valid project ID of a project that contains at least one row.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `com.google.refine.commands.expr.PreviewExpressionCommand` class contains the following comment:\n```\n/**\n * The command uses POST but does not actually modify any state so it does not require CSRF.\n */\n```\n\nHowever, this appears to be false (or no longer true). The expression being previewed (executed) can be written in GREL, Python, or Clojure. Since there are no restrictions on what code can be executed, the expression can do anything the user running OpenRefine can do. For instance, the following expressions start a calculator:\n\n```\nclojure:(.exec (Runtime/getRuntime) \"gnome-calculator\")\n```\n\n```\njython:import os;os.system(\"gnome-calculator\")\n```\n\nThe lack of restrictions on expressions is arguably not a problem if the user is typing their own expressions into OpenRefine: they could have just as well typed them into Clojure or Python directly. However, since the `preview-expression` command does not check for a CSRF token, the expression can actually come from a HTML form submitted by a different origin, including arbitrary websites.\n\nIssue #2164 suggested adding CSRF protection to all endpoints, but this endpoint was skipped (and the above comment added) in the associated PR #2182.\n\n### PoC\n\nAn example \"malicious\" page is at https://wandernauta.nl/or/ (of course, actual malicious pages would not wait for the victim to press the submit button).\n\nThe following curl command (substituting the project ID) also demonstrates the issue:\n\n```sh\ncurl -d project=123456789 -d cellIndex=1 -d rowIndices=\u0027[0]\u0027 -d \u0027expression=clojure:(.exec (Runtime/getRuntime) \"gnome-calculator\")\u0027 http://localhost:3333/command/core/preview-expression/\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nCSRF into remote code execution, provided the attacker knows at least one project ID in the victim\u0027s workspace and can convince the victim to open a malicious webpage.",
"id": "GHSA-3jm4-c6qf-jrh3",
"modified": "2024-12-04T22:18:02Z",
"published": "2024-10-24T17:58:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/security/advisories/GHSA-3jm4-c6qf-jrh3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47879"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/commit/090924ca923489b6c94397cf1f5df7f7f78f0126"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenRefine\u0027s PreviewExpressionCommand, which is eval, lacks protection against cross-site request forgery (CSRF)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.