Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-3PQ3-5FJ3-CG6V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 15:02 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:02

Summary

Axios: HTTP/2 adapter bypasses configured DNS lookup and proxy controls

Details

Summary

Axios for Node.js does not apply configured DNS lookup or proxy controls when a request uses httpVersion: 2. The HTTP/1 adapter path wraps and forwards config.lookup, builds normal request options, and applies proxy routing through setProxy(). The HTTP/2 path builds a session with http2.connect() using only options.http2Options, which drops the top-level lookup, agent, and proxy state.

Applications are affected when they allow a user to influence request destinations, enable axios HTTP/2, and rely on axios lookup or proxy routing to prevent SSRF or enforce outbound network policy.

Impact

In affected server-side deployments, an attacker can cause axios to connect directly to destinations that the configured resolver or proxy would have rejected. Depending on reachable services, this can expose cloud metadata, internal service responses, or allow state-changing requests to internal systems.

This is not an unconditional SSRF in every axios deployment. It requires httpVersion: 2 and an application-level trust boundary where user-influenced URLs are constrained by lookup or proxy policy.

Affected Functionality

Affected:

Node.js HTTP adapter with httpVersion: 2.
config.lookup supplied as a DNS policy.
Explicit config.proxy and environment-derived proxy settings for HTTPS HTTP/2 requests.

Not affected:

Browser adapters.
Node HTTP/1 requests, which pass lookup to the transport and apply proxy handling.
Applications that validate destination hosts independently before calling axios.

Technical Details

In lib/adapters/http.js, the adapter reads lookup, wraps it, stores it on the request options, and applies setProxy() before selecting a transport. For HTTP/2, http2Transport.request() builds an authority from options.protocol, options.hostname, and options.port, then calls:

const { http2Options, headers } = options;
const session = http2Sessions.getSession(authority, http2Options);

lib/helpers/Http2Sessions.js ultimately calls http2.connect(authority, options) with only the http2Options object. The configured DNS lookup and the proxy or tunneling agent installed on the top-level request options are not forwarded into that call.

Local verification on axios 1.18.1 showed lookupCalls: 0 while an HTTP/2 request to a local h2 origin succeeded. A second local HTTPS h2 verification with an explicit rejecting HTTP proxy showed the origin received the request and the proxy observed no traffic.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Local constrained demonstration:

Start an HTTP/2 server on loopback.
Call axios.get("http://localhost:<port>/internal", { httpVersion: 2, lookup }) where lookup throws EPOLICY.
Observe that the request succeeds and the lookup counter remains 0.

For proxy routing:

Start an HTTPS HTTP/2 origin and a local HTTP proxy that rejects every request and CONNECT.
Call axios with httpVersion: 2, http2Options: { rejectUnauthorized: false }, and explicit proxy.
Observe that the origin receives the request and the proxy receives nothing.

Expected safe behavior is that either the lookup policy blocks the request or the proxy observes and rejects the request.

Workarounds

Use the HTTP/1 adapter path for requests that depend on axios lookup or proxy controls. Alternatively, enforce destination allow/deny policy before calling axios, outside the adapter transport path.

Original report

### Summary I found that Axios does not apply the configured `lookup` function or proxy when a request uses `httpVersion: 2`. The HTTP/1 adapter applies both controls, but the HTTP/2 path connects straight to the URL's hostname using `http2.connect()`. This matters for server applications that accept a user-influenced URL and use a custom DNS lookup or mandatory outbound proxy to prevent SSRF. Switching the Axios instance to HTTP/2 silently removes those controls, allowing the request to reach an address the application intended to block. I reproduced this on the current npm release, Axios 1.18.1. ### Details The HTTP adapter reads and wraps the caller's `lookup` function, builds the normal request options, and calls `setProxy()`: - `lib/adapters/http.js`, around lines 530-578: reads and wraps `lookup` - `lib/adapters/http.js`, around lines 895-954: adds `lookup` to `options` and applies `setProxy()` For HTTP/2, however, the adapter selects `http2Transport`. That transport creates an authority from the destination and only passes `options.http2Options` to the session pool:

const { http2Options, headers } = options;
const session = http2Sessions.getSession(authority, http2Options);

`lib/helpers/Http2Sessions.js` then calls:

const session = http2.connect(authority, options);

At this point `options` is only the `http2Options` object. The top-level `lookup`, the proxy tunnelling agent created by `setProxy()`, and the selected `httpAgent`/`httpsAgent` are not forwarded. The request therefore uses the system resolver and opens a direct connection to the origin. The same root cause affects both explicit proxy configuration and environment-derived proxy configuration. I kept the PoC local and used an explicit proxy so the result does not depend on shell environment variables. ### PoC I attached [axios_http2_transport_controls_poc.mjs](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKXBOLDoysOFRmaRyV1tMVLx3P0Ah4gV/view?usp=sharing). The PoC is entirely local and sets up three pieces: 1. An HTTPS origin with HTTP/2 enabled. If reached, it records the request and returns `REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN`. 2. An HTTP proxy that records traffic but rejects every normal request and every CONNECT request with `502 Bad Gateway`. 3. A custom Axios `lookup` callback that rejects every DNS lookup with an `EPOLICY` error. The first request is an HTTP/1 control request. It uses the blocking `lookup` callback and has proxying disabled. Axios calls the callback, receives `EPOLICY`, and does not reach the origin. This confirms that the callback works and that the hostname is blocked through the normal adapter path. The second request targets the same URL with `httpVersion: 2`. It is given both security controls: the same blocking `lookup` callback and the rejecting proxy. If Axios honors either one, this request cannot reach the origin. It should fail with `EPOLICY`, or it should reach the proxy and receive its `502` response. Instead, the request returns HTTP 200 with `REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN`. The lookup counter does not increase, and the proxy records no request or CONNECT attempt. The origin is the only server that records traffic. This shows that the HTTP/2 path skipped both controls and connected directly using the system resolver. To reproduce, run the attachment from the root of an Axios checkout: Run it from the root of an Axios checkout:

git checkout v1.18.1
npm install --ignore-scripts
node /path/to/axios_http2_transport_controls_poc.mjs

Relevant output from my run:

{
  "axiosVersion": "1.18.1",
  "configuredControls": {
    "lookup": "reject every DNS lookup with EPOLICY",
    "proxy": "http://127.0.0.1:<port> (reject every request)"
  },
  "http1Control": "EPOLICY: blocked by application DNS policy",
  "http2Result": {
    "status": 200,
    "data": "REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN"
  },
  "lookupCalls": 1,
  "proxyObservedTraffic": false,
  "events": [
    {
      "server": "origin",
      "protocol": "h2",
      "path": "/internal"
    }
  ]
}

The important parts of the output are: - `http1Control` contains `EPOLICY`, proving the DNS policy blocks the destination under HTTP/1. - `lookupCalls` is still `1` after both requests, proving HTTP/2 never called the configured resolver. - `proxyObservedTraffic` is `false`, proving HTTP/2 did not use the configured proxy. - `http2Result.status` is `200`, and the sole event belongs to the origin, proving Axios connected directly to the blocked destination. ### Impact The vulnerable configuration is a Node.js application that: - enables Axios HTTP/2 using `httpVersion: 2`; - lets an application user influence the request destination; and - relies on Axios's `lookup` option or proxy routing to enforce a destination or egress policy. In that setup, an unauthenticated application user may be able to make the server connect directly to loopback, private-network, or link-local services that the lookup policy or proxy would have rejected. Depending on the reachable service, this can expose cloud credentials or internal data, modify internal services, or affect availability. HTTP/2 support is marked experimental, but neither the HTTP/2 documentation nor the proxy documentation says that `lookup` and proxy controls are ignored. The proxy documentation states that HTTPS requests are sent through a CONNECT tunnel. More importantly, Axios's threat model tells callers that destination validation is their responsibility; this behavior silently bypasses such caller-supplied validation. I did not test against any third-party or production service. The PoC only uses listeners on my own machine.

Severity

7.0 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101898"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:02:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T18:17:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAxios for Node.js does not apply configured DNS lookup or proxy controls when a request uses `httpVersion: 2`. The HTTP/1 adapter path wraps and forwards `config.lookup`, builds normal request options, and applies proxy routing through `setProxy()`. The HTTP/2 path builds a session with `http2.connect()` using only `options.http2Options`, which drops the top-level `lookup`, `agent`, and proxy state.\n\nApplications are affected when they allow a user to influence request destinations, enable axios HTTP/2, and rely on axios `lookup` or proxy routing to prevent SSRF or enforce outbound network policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn affected server-side deployments, an attacker can cause axios to connect directly to destinations that the configured resolver or proxy would have rejected. Depending on reachable services, this can expose cloud metadata, internal service responses, or allow state-changing requests to internal systems.\n\nThis is not an unconditional SSRF in every axios deployment. It requires `httpVersion: 2` and an application-level trust boundary where user-influenced URLs are constrained by `lookup` or proxy policy.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected:\n\n- Node.js HTTP adapter with `httpVersion: 2`.\n- `config.lookup` supplied as a DNS policy.\n- Explicit `config.proxy` and environment-derived proxy settings for HTTPS HTTP/2 requests.\n\nNot affected:\n\n- Browser adapters.\n- Node HTTP/1 requests, which pass `lookup` to the transport and apply proxy handling.\n- Applications that validate destination hosts independently before calling axios.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nIn `lib/adapters/http.js`, the adapter reads `lookup`, wraps it, stores it on the request `options`, and applies `setProxy()` before selecting a transport. For HTTP/2, `http2Transport.request()` builds an authority from `options.protocol`, `options.hostname`, and `options.port`, then calls:\n\n```js\nconst { http2Options, headers } = options;\nconst session = http2Sessions.getSession(authority, http2Options);\n```\n\n`lib/helpers/Http2Sessions.js` ultimately calls `http2.connect(authority, options)` with only the `http2Options` object. The configured DNS lookup and the proxy or tunneling agent installed on the top-level request options are not forwarded into that call.\n\nLocal verification on axios `1.18.1` showed `lookupCalls: 0` while an HTTP/2 request to a local h2 origin succeeded. A second local HTTPS h2 verification with an explicit rejecting HTTP proxy showed the origin received the request and the proxy observed no traffic.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nLocal constrained demonstration:\n\n1. Start an HTTP/2 server on loopback.\n2. Call `axios.get(\"http://localhost:\u003cport\u003e/internal\", { httpVersion: 2, lookup })` where `lookup` throws `EPOLICY`.\n3. Observe that the request succeeds and the lookup counter remains `0`.\n\nFor proxy routing:\n\n1. Start an HTTPS HTTP/2 origin and a local HTTP proxy that rejects every request and CONNECT.\n2. Call axios with `httpVersion: 2`, `http2Options: { rejectUnauthorized: false }`, and explicit `proxy`.\n3. Observe that the origin receives the request and the proxy receives nothing.\n\nExpected safe behavior is that either the lookup policy blocks the request or the proxy observes and rejects the request.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse the HTTP/1 adapter path for requests that depend on axios `lookup` or proxy controls. Alternatively, enforce destination allow/deny policy before calling axios, outside the adapter transport path.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n  \u003csummary\u003e\u003ch3\u003eOriginal report\u003c/h3\u003e\u003c/summary\u003e\n  \n  ### Summary\n\nI found that Axios does not apply the configured `lookup` function or proxy when a request uses `httpVersion: 2`. The HTTP/1 adapter applies both controls, but the HTTP/2 path connects straight to the URL\u0027s hostname using `http2.connect()`.\n\nThis matters for server applications that accept a user-influenced URL and use a custom DNS lookup or mandatory outbound proxy to prevent SSRF. Switching the Axios instance to HTTP/2 silently removes those controls, allowing the request to reach an address the application intended to block.\n\nI reproduced this on the current npm release, Axios 1.18.1.\n\n### Details\n\nThe HTTP adapter reads and wraps the caller\u0027s `lookup` function, builds the normal request options, and calls `setProxy()`:\n\n- `lib/adapters/http.js`, around lines 530-578: reads and wraps `lookup`\n- `lib/adapters/http.js`, around lines 895-954: adds `lookup` to `options` and applies `setProxy()`\n\nFor HTTP/2, however, the adapter selects `http2Transport`. That transport creates an authority from the destination and only passes `options.http2Options` to the session pool:\n\n```js\nconst { http2Options, headers } = options;\nconst session = http2Sessions.getSession(authority, http2Options);\n```\n\n`lib/helpers/Http2Sessions.js` then calls:\n\n```js\nconst session = http2.connect(authority, options);\n```\n\nAt this point `options` is only the `http2Options` object. The top-level `lookup`, the proxy tunnelling agent created by `setProxy()`, and the selected `httpAgent`/`httpsAgent` are not forwarded. The request therefore uses the system resolver and opens a direct connection to the origin.\n\nThe same root cause affects both explicit proxy configuration and environment-derived proxy configuration. I kept the PoC local and used an explicit proxy so the result does not depend on shell environment variables.\n\n### PoC\n\nI attached [axios_http2_transport_controls_poc.mjs](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKXBOLDoysOFRmaRyV1tMVLx3P0Ah4gV/view?usp=sharing). The PoC is entirely local and sets up three pieces:\n\n1. An HTTPS origin with HTTP/2 enabled. If reached, it records the request and returns `REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN`.\n2. An HTTP proxy that records traffic but rejects every normal request and every CONNECT request with `502 Bad Gateway`.\n3. A custom Axios `lookup` callback that rejects every DNS lookup with an `EPOLICY` error.\n\nThe first request is an HTTP/1 control request. It uses the blocking `lookup` callback and has proxying disabled. Axios calls the callback, receives `EPOLICY`, and does not reach the origin. This confirms that the callback works and that the hostname is blocked through the normal adapter path.\n\nThe second request targets the same URL with `httpVersion: 2`. It is given both security controls: the same blocking `lookup` callback and the rejecting proxy. If Axios honors either one, this request cannot reach the origin. It should fail with `EPOLICY`, or it should reach the proxy and receive its `502` response.\n\nInstead, the request returns HTTP 200 with `REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN`. The lookup counter does not increase, and the proxy records no request or CONNECT attempt. The origin is the only server that records traffic. This shows that the HTTP/2 path skipped both controls and connected directly using the system resolver.\n\nTo reproduce, run the attachment from the root of an Axios checkout:\n\nRun it from the root of an Axios checkout:\n\n```bash\ngit checkout v1.18.1\nnpm install --ignore-scripts\nnode /path/to/axios_http2_transport_controls_poc.mjs\n```\n\nRelevant output from my run:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"axiosVersion\": \"1.18.1\",\n  \"configuredControls\": {\n    \"lookup\": \"reject every DNS lookup with EPOLICY\",\n    \"proxy\": \"http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e (reject every request)\"\n  },\n  \"http1Control\": \"EPOLICY: blocked by application DNS policy\",\n  \"http2Result\": {\n    \"status\": 200,\n    \"data\": \"REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN\"\n  },\n  \"lookupCalls\": 1,\n  \"proxyObservedTraffic\": false,\n  \"events\": [\n    {\n      \"server\": \"origin\",\n      \"protocol\": \"h2\",\n      \"path\": \"/internal\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nThe important parts of the output are:\n\n- `http1Control` contains `EPOLICY`, proving the DNS policy blocks the destination under HTTP/1.\n- `lookupCalls` is still `1` after both requests, proving HTTP/2 never called the configured resolver.\n- `proxyObservedTraffic` is `false`, proving HTTP/2 did not use the configured proxy.\n- `http2Result.status` is `200`, and the sole event belongs to the origin, proving Axios connected directly to the blocked destination.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe vulnerable configuration is a Node.js application that:\n\n- enables Axios HTTP/2 using `httpVersion: 2`;\n- lets an application user influence the request destination; and\n- relies on Axios\u0027s `lookup` option or proxy routing to enforce a destination or egress policy.\n\nIn that setup, an unauthenticated application user may be able to make the server connect directly to loopback, private-network, or link-local services that the lookup policy or proxy would have rejected. Depending on the reachable service, this can expose cloud credentials or internal data, modify internal services, or affect availability.\n\nHTTP/2 support is marked experimental, but neither the HTTP/2 documentation nor the proxy documentation says that `lookup` and proxy controls are ignored. The proxy documentation states that HTTPS requests are sent through a CONNECT tunnel. More importantly, Axios\u0027s threat model tells callers that destination validation is their responsibility; this behavior silently bypasses such caller-supplied validation.\n\nI did not test against any third-party or production service. The PoC only uses listeners on my own machine.\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-3pq3-5fj3-cg6v",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T15:02:14Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T15:02:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3pq3-5fj3-cg6v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101898"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: HTTP/2 adapter bypasses configured DNS lookup and proxy controls"
}

CVE-2026-101898 (GCVE-0-2026-101898)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-28 17:10 – Updated: 2026-09-28 17:50

Title

Axios: HTTP/2 adapter bypasses configured DNS lookup and proxy controls

Summary

Axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js. From 1.13.0 until 1.20.0, Axios HTTP/2 request setup does not consistently apply proxy settings and caller-supplied DNS lookup policy. An HTTPS request uses httpVersion: 2 with explicit config.proxy or environment-derived proxy settings, or relies on caller-supplied config.lookup DNS policy. The HTTP/2 path can connect without the configured proxy behavior or without applying the caller-supplied config.lookup policy before http2.connect(). Requests can bypass the intended proxy route or the caller-supplied DNS resolution policy. This issue is fixed in version 1.20.0.

Severity

7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-28 17:49 UTC

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
axios	axios	Affected: >= 1.13.0, < 1.20.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-101898",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-28T17:49:47.061231Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
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          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3pq3-5fj3-cg6v"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "axios",
          "vendor": "axios",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c 1.20.0"
            }
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        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js. From 1.13.0 until 1.20.0, Axios HTTP/2 request setup does not consistently apply proxy settings and caller-supplied DNS lookup policy. An HTTPS request uses httpVersion: 2 with explicit config.proxy or environment-derived proxy settings, or relies on caller-supplied config.lookup DNS policy. The HTTP/2 path can connect without the configured proxy behavior or without applying the caller-supplied config.lookup policy before http2.connect(). Requests can bypass the intended proxy route or the caller-supplied DNS resolution policy. This issue is fixed in version 1.20.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T17:10:16.044Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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      },
      "references": [
        {
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3pq3-5fj3-cg6v"
        },
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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        },
        {
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          "tags": [
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        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0",
          "tags": [
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-3pq3-5fj3-cg6v",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Axios: HTTP/2 adapter bypasses configured DNS lookup and proxy controls"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-101898",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-28T17:10:16.044Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-28T15:55:37.906Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T17:50:05.961Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-3PQ3-5FJ3-CG6V

Summary

Impact

Affected Functionality

Technical Details

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Original report

CVE-2026-101898 (GCVE-0-2026-101898)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour