Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-49H3-CWHJ-4737

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 20:41 – Updated: 2026-07-24 20:41

Summary

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account

Details

Summary

Cloudreve's WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler treats X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on / and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with URI.JoinRaw, which feeds Go's url.JoinPath. url.JoinPath resolves ./.. segments, so a slash-bearing target such as a/../../evil.docx collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (evil.docx), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the resolved ancestor — which is still the same user's drive.

A WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces fileId == session.FileID with a 403 otherwise). PUT_RELATIVE escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account.

Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)

1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped) — middleware ViewerSessionValidation:

fileId := hashid.FromContext(c)
if fileId != session.FileID {           // 403 — token is bound to ONE file
    c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort(); return
}

Route: wopi := noAuth.Group("file/wopi", middleware.HashID(hashid.FileID), middleware.ViewerSessionValidation()); wopi.POST(":id", controllers.ModifyFile) → POST /api/v4/file/wopi/:id?access_token=<token>.

2. PUT_RELATIVE dispatch — routers/controllers/wopi.go:

case wopi.MethodPutRelative:            // X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE
    err = service.PutContent(c, true)

3. SuggestedTarget joined as a path — service/explorer/viewer.go:

fileName, _ := wopi.UTF7Decode(c.GetHeader(wopi.SuggestedTargetHeader)) // X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget
fileUriParsed, _ := fs.NewUriFromString(fileUri)
if strings.HasPrefix(fileName, ".") { /* treat as extension */ }
fileUri = fileUriParsed.DirUri().JoinRaw(fileName).String()             // <-- path join, not basename
...
subService := FileUpdateService{ Uri: fileUri }
res, err := subService.PutContent(c, lockSession)

4. JoinRaw splits on / and normalizes via url.JoinPath — pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go:

func (u *URI) Join(elem ...string) *URI {
    newUrl, _ := url.Parse(u.U.String())
    return &URI{U: newUrl.JoinPath(/* PathEscape each elem */ ...)} // JoinPath cleans ./ and ../
}
func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI {
    return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...)
}

PathEscape leaves . unescaped (it is in the unreserved set), so .. segments survive into JoinPath, which resolves them. URI.Name() returns path.Base(path.Clean(path)) — the cleaned basename.

5. Upload checks ownership of the resolved ancestor and validates only the clean basename — pkg/filemanager/fs/dbfs/upload.go:

ancestor, err := f.getFileByPath(ctx, navigator, req.Props.Uri)        // URI already traversal-normalized
...
if _, ok := ctx.Value(ByPassOwnerCheckCtxKey{}).(bool); !ok && ancestor.OwnerID() != f.user.ID {
    return nil, fs.ErrOwnerOnly                                        // same-user -> passes
}
...
if err := validateNewFile(req.Props.Uri.Name(), req.Props.Size, policy); err != nil { // checks "evil.docx" only
    return nil, err
}

validateFileName rejects / \ : * ? " < > | and bare ./.. — but the traversal is already gone by the time it sees the basename.

Validation performed

Independent validation against commit 26b6b10 in a clean sandbox.

Source-verified (static): the full chain confirmed verbatim — single-file-scoped token (403 on mismatch) → PUT_RELATIVE dispatch → DirUri().JoinRaw(SuggestedTarget) → url.JoinPath normalization → ancestor ownership check (same-user passes) → basename-only validation of the cleaned name.

Dynamic (control-flow executed): the full binary is not buildable offline here (modules behind an unreachable Go proxy, embedded frontend, DB). I built and ran a harness using the real Go net/url stdlib plus the verbatim Join/JoinRaw/DirUri/Path/Name/PathEscape/shouldEscape and the validateFileName gate, driving the same transformation PUT_RELATIVE performs. Source = cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx:

SuggestedTarget            resolved URI                          final basename   validator
"copy.docx"                cloudreve://my/folder/copy.docx       "copy.docx"      ACCEPT
"a/../../evil.docx"        cloudreve://my/evil.docx              "evil.docx"      ACCEPT   <- ESCAPED to /
"a/../../../top.docx"      cloudreve://my/top.docx               "top.docx"       ACCEPT   <- ESCAPED to /
"sub/evil.docx"            cloudreve://my/folder/sub/evil.docx   "evil.docx"      ACCEPT   <- different subdir
".pdf"                     cloudreve://my/folder/current.pdf     "current.pdf"    ACCEPT
"a%2f..%2f..%2fenc.docx"   cloudreve://my/folder/a%252f..%252f.. "a%2f..%2f..%2f" ACCEPT   (NO escape)

The headline payload a/../../evil.docx deterministically resolves to cloudreve://my/evil.docx (account root) with a clean, accepted basename. Output matches the original audit probe exactly. Honest caveat: a leading non-.. segment (e.g. a/) is required to prime the join; a single ../evil.docx does not cleanly escape, and URL-encoded separators (%2f) do not traverse through this path (they are re-escaped into one literal segment). Only literal / separators work.

Confidence tier: source-verified + control-flow dynamically reproduced (no full live HTTP write against a deployed instance).

Deduplication: no existing CVE/GHSA matches. Known Cloudreve advisories are CVE-2022-32167 (XSS, v1–v3.5.3) and CVE-2026-25726 (weak-PRNG ATO, instances initialized < v4.10.0) — both unrelated. SECURITY.md lists "user permissions" as high-impact and in scope for all 4.x, so this qualifies as a vulnerability under the project's own policy.

Steps to reproduce

Setup: user owns cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx; open it in the WOPI editor to obtain <token> (the session is bound to that file's ID).

Send the crafted PUT_RELATIVE: ``` POST /api/v4/file/wopi/?access_token= HTTP/1.1 Host: target X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget: Content-Type: application/octet-stream

`` 2. Cloudreve rewrites the target fromcloudreve://my/folder/current.docxtocloudreve://my/evil.docx, validates the basenameevil.docx` (passes), and writes the content. Expected: the target is rejected or constrained to the source file's directory. Actual: a file is written at the account root, outside the token's single-file scope.

Impact

A WOPI access token scoped to one file can write files to other locations in the same user's account. A malicious or compromised WOPI integration (or a leaked token) can plant or, conditionally, overwrite files at attacker-chosen paths the account owns, defeating the per-file scoping the WOPI session is meant to enforce. Confined to the session user's account (not cross-user).

Remediation

Treat X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget (and X-WOPI-RequestedName) as a filename, not a path: reject /, \, dot segments, and percent-encoded separator variants before joining.
Prefer DirUri().Join(sanitizedBaseName) over JoinRaw, and after constructing the target URI assert it is a direct child of the source file's directory.
Add regression tests for a/../../evil.docx, sub/evil.docx, and encoded-separator variants.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0-20260613023150-7968e50429ef"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55495"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T20:41:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n \nCloudreve\u0027s WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file\u0027s directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go\u0027s `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file\u0027s directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* \u2014 which is still the same user\u0027s drive.\n \nA WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account.\n\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** \u2014 `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`:\n \n```go\nfileId := hashid.FromContext(c)\nif fileId != session.FileID {           // 403 \u2014 token is bound to ONE file\n    c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort(); return\n}\n```\n \nRoute: `wopi := noAuth.Group(\"file/wopi\", middleware.HashID(hashid.FileID), middleware.ViewerSessionValidation())`; `wopi.POST(\":id\", controllers.ModifyFile)` \u2192 `POST /api/v4/file/wopi/:id?access_token=\u003ctoken\u003e`.\n \n**2. `PUT_RELATIVE` dispatch** \u2014 `routers/controllers/wopi.go`:\n \n```go\ncase wopi.MethodPutRelative:            // X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE\n    err = service.PutContent(c, true)\n```\n \n**3. SuggestedTarget joined as a path** \u2014 `service/explorer/viewer.go`:\n \n```go\nfileName, _ := wopi.UTF7Decode(c.GetHeader(wopi.SuggestedTargetHeader)) // X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget\nfileUriParsed, _ := fs.NewUriFromString(fileUri)\nif strings.HasPrefix(fileName, \".\") { /* treat as extension */ }\nfileUri = fileUriParsed.DirUri().JoinRaw(fileName).String()             // \u003c-- path join, not basename\n...\nsubService := FileUpdateService{ Uri: fileUri }\nres, err := subService.PutContent(c, lockSession)\n```\n \n**4. `JoinRaw` splits on `/` and normalizes via `url.JoinPath`** \u2014 `pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go`:\n \n```go\nfunc (u *URI) Join(elem ...string) *URI {\n    newUrl, _ := url.Parse(u.U.String())\n    return \u0026URI{U: newUrl.JoinPath(/* PathEscape each elem */ ...)} // JoinPath cleans ./ and ../\n}\nfunc (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI {\n    return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...)\n}\n```\n \n`PathEscape` leaves `.` unescaped (it is in the unreserved set), so `..` segments survive into `JoinPath`, which resolves them. `URI.Name()` returns `path.Base(path.Clean(path))` \u2014 the cleaned basename.\n \n**5. Upload checks ownership of the resolved ancestor and validates only the clean basename** \u2014 `pkg/filemanager/fs/dbfs/upload.go`:\n \n```go\nancestor, err := f.getFileByPath(ctx, navigator, req.Props.Uri)        // URI already traversal-normalized\n...\nif _, ok := ctx.Value(ByPassOwnerCheckCtxKey{}).(bool); !ok \u0026\u0026 ancestor.OwnerID() != f.user.ID {\n    return nil, fs.ErrOwnerOnly                                        // same-user -\u003e passes\n}\n...\nif err := validateNewFile(req.Props.Uri.Name(), req.Props.Size, policy); err != nil { // checks \"evil.docx\" only\n    return nil, err\n}\n```\n \n`validateFileName` rejects `/ \\ : * ? \" \u003c \u003e |` and bare `.`/`..` \u2014 but the traversal is already gone by the time it sees the basename.\n\n## Validation performed\n \nIndependent validation against commit `26b6b10` in a clean sandbox.\n \n**Source-verified (static):** the full chain confirmed verbatim \u2014 single-file-scoped token (403 on mismatch) \u2192 `PUT_RELATIVE` dispatch \u2192 `DirUri().JoinRaw(SuggestedTarget)` \u2192 `url.JoinPath` normalization \u2192 ancestor ownership check (same-user passes) \u2192 basename-only validation of the cleaned name.\n \n**Dynamic (control-flow executed):** the full binary is not buildable offline here (modules behind an unreachable Go proxy, embedded frontend, DB). I built and ran a harness using the **real Go `net/url` stdlib** plus the **verbatim** `Join`/`JoinRaw`/`DirUri`/`Path`/`Name`/`PathEscape`/`shouldEscape` and the `validateFileName` gate, driving the same transformation `PUT_RELATIVE` performs. Source = `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx`:\n \n```\nSuggestedTarget            resolved URI                          final basename   validator\n\"copy.docx\"                cloudreve://my/folder/copy.docx       \"copy.docx\"      ACCEPT\n\"a/../../evil.docx\"        cloudreve://my/evil.docx              \"evil.docx\"      ACCEPT   \u003c- ESCAPED to /\n\"a/../../../top.docx\"      cloudreve://my/top.docx               \"top.docx\"       ACCEPT   \u003c- ESCAPED to /\n\"sub/evil.docx\"            cloudreve://my/folder/sub/evil.docx   \"evil.docx\"      ACCEPT   \u003c- different subdir\n\".pdf\"                     cloudreve://my/folder/current.pdf     \"current.pdf\"    ACCEPT\n\"a%2f..%2f..%2fenc.docx\"   cloudreve://my/folder/a%252f..%252f.. \"a%2f..%2f..%2f\" ACCEPT   (NO escape)\n```\n \nThe headline payload `a/../../evil.docx` deterministically resolves to `cloudreve://my/evil.docx` (account root) with a clean, accepted basename. Output matches the original audit probe exactly. Honest caveat: a leading non-`..` segment (e.g. `a/`) is required to prime the join; a single `../evil.docx` does not cleanly escape, and **URL-encoded separators (`%2f`) do not traverse** through this path (they are re-escaped into one literal segment). Only literal `/` separators work.\n \n**Confidence tier: source-verified + control-flow dynamically reproduced (no full live HTTP write against a deployed instance).**\n \n**Deduplication:** no existing CVE/GHSA matches. Known Cloudreve advisories are CVE-2022-32167 (XSS, v1\u2013v3.5.3) and CVE-2026-25726 (weak-PRNG ATO, instances initialized \u003c v4.10.0) \u2014 both unrelated. `SECURITY.md` lists \"user permissions\" as high-impact and in scope for all 4.x, so this qualifies as a vulnerability under the project\u0027s own policy.\n \n## Steps to reproduce\n \n**Setup:** user owns `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx`; open it in the WOPI editor to obtain `\u003ctoken\u003e` (the session is bound to that file\u0027s ID).\n \n1. Send the crafted `PUT_RELATIVE`:\n   ```\n   POST /api/v4/file/wopi/\u003cfile-id\u003e?access_token=\u003ctoken\u003e HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target\n   X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE\n   X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget: \u003cUTF-7 of \"a/../../evil.docx\"\u003e\n   Content-Type: application/octet-stream\n \n   \u003cfile bytes\u003e\n   ```\n2. Cloudreve rewrites the target from `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx` to `cloudreve://my/evil.docx`, validates the basename `evil.docx` (passes), and writes the content.\n**Expected:** the target is rejected or constrained to the source file\u0027s directory.\n**Actual:** a file is written at the account root, outside the token\u0027s single-file scope.\n \n## Impact\n \nA WOPI access token scoped to one file can write files to other locations in the same user\u0027s account. A malicious or compromised WOPI integration (or a leaked token) can plant or, conditionally, overwrite files at attacker-chosen paths the account owns, defeating the per-file scoping the WOPI session is meant to enforce. Confined to the session user\u0027s account (not cross-user).\n \n## Remediation\n \n- Treat `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` (and `X-WOPI-RequestedName`) as a **filename**, not a path: reject `/`, `\\`, dot segments, and percent-encoded separator variants before joining.\n- Prefer `DirUri().Join(sanitizedBaseName)` over `JoinRaw`, and after constructing the target URI assert it is a direct child of the source file\u0027s directory.\n- Add regression tests for `a/../../evil.docx`, `sub/evil.docx`, and encoded-separator variants.",
  "id": "GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T20:41:16Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T20:41:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/7968e50429efab40ffa8f57fecdfbd5a73d23630"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.17.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account"
}

CVE-2026-55495 (GCVE-0-2026-55495)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-31 02:58 – Updated: 2026-07-31 19:27

Title

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account

Summary

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-31 19:26 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/796…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
cloudreve	cloudreve	Affected: < 4.17.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-55495",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-31T19:26:39.937907Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T19:27:00.216Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "cloudreve",
          "vendor": "cloudreve",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 4.17.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 4.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T02:58:14.080Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/7968e50429efab40ffa8f57fecdfbd5a73d23630",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/7968e50429efab40ffa8f57fecdfbd5a73d23630"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.17.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.17.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-55495",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-31T02:58:14.080Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-16T22:28:27.062Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T19:27:00.216Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-49H3-CWHJ-4737

Summary

Root cause (verified at 26b6b10)

Validation performed

Steps to reproduce

Impact

Remediation

CVE-2026-55495 (GCVE-0-2026-55495)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour

Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)