Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-4XRF-JV44-H6HH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 19:59 – Updated: 2026-08-03 19:59

Summary

ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks

Details

Summary

Every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target.

An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint.

Details

isInSubnet in src/common.ts opens with a guard that compares the two prefix lengths:

export function isInSubnet(this, address) {
  if (this.subnetMask < address.subnetMask) {
    return false;                                  // <-- reached before any bit comparison
  }

  if (this.mask(address.subnetMask) === address.mask()) {
    return true;
  }

  return false;
}

That guard is correct for the question isInSubnet is named for — whether one network is contained in another, where a /0 network genuinely is not inside a /8. It is wrong for classification, which asks a question about the address itself and must not depend on the prefix the caller happened to write. /0 is shorter than every reference prefix in the special-use tables (loopback /8, link-local /16, CGNAT /10, ULA /7, multicast /4), so for a classification call the bit comparison is never reached and the method returns false.

The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask — the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. Host bits are retained through parsing, so correctForm() still yields the real target and the address remains fully usable for connecting.

/0 is the universal case because it is shorter than every reference prefix, but any suffix shorter than the specific range being tested has the same effect: 10.0.0.5/7 defeats isPrivate() for 10.0.0.0/8.

Affected versions

>= 10.1.1, <= 10.2.1. The is* classification API was introduced for Address4 in 10.1.1 and extended to Address6 in 10.2.0; releases before 10.1.1 do not expose it and are not affected through this vector. The containment guard itself is much older, but isInSubnet alone is a subnet-containment predicate whose behavior here is correct.

This also defeats the fix released in 10.2.1 for GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg: that release classifies IPv4-mapped and NAT64 addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, but the normalization is reached through isInSubnet, so ::ffff:127.0.0.1/0 reverts to being reported as non-internal.

Impact

Every classifier is affected on both Address4 and Address6. The sole exception is Address6.isLinkLocal() for native fe80::/10 addresses, which compares raw bits directly; its IPv4-mapped path is still affected.

Address	Reported as	Actually points at
`127.0.0.1/0`	not loopback	loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`)
`10.0.0.1/0`, `10.0.0.5/7`	not private	RFC 1918 `10/8`
`172.16.5.5/0`	not private	RFC 1918 `172.16/12`
`192.168.1.1/0`	not private	RFC 1918 `192.168/16`
`169.254.169.254/0`	not link-local	link-local / cloud metadata (IMDS)
`100.64.0.1/0`	not CGNAT	CGNAT `100.64/10`
`0.0.0.0/0`, `255.255.255.255/0`	not unspecified / not broadcast	unspecified / broadcast
`::1/0`	not loopback	IPv6 loopback
`fc00::1/0`	not ULA, not private	IPv6 ULA `fc00::/7`
`ff02::1/0`	not multicast	IPv6 multicast
`::ffff:127.0.0.1/0`	not loopback	loopback, via IPv4-mapped
`::ffff:169.254.169.254/0`	not link-local	IMDS, via IPv4-mapped
`64:ff9b::7f00:1/0`	not loopback	loopback, via NAT64

getType() returns Global unicast for all of the IPv6 cases above, and getScope() follows it.

Reachability

A CIDR suffix is not legal in a URL host, so this is not reachable through the most common SSRF shape. new URL('http://127.0.0.1/0') parses hostname as 127.0.0.1 and pathname as /0, and a guard that classifies the extracted hostname is unaffected. Exploitation requires an application that accepts a bare address string that may carry a suffix and passes it to the constructor before classifying — for example an allow/deny field, a webhook target, or a proxy destination taken as a plain host rather than parsed out of a URL.

Proof of concept

npm i ip-address@10.2.1, then:

const { Address4, Address6 } = require('ip-address');

// true => block as internal, false => allow outbound
function isBlocked(host) {
  try {
    const a = new Address4(host);
    return a.isPrivate() || a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isCGNAT()
        || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified() || a.isBroadcast();
  } catch {}
  try {
    const a = new Address6(host);
    return a.isPrivate() || a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isULA()
        || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified();
  } catch {}
  return false;
}

for (const h of ['127.0.0.1', '10.0.0.1', '::1',
                 '127.0.0.1/0', '10.0.0.5/7', '169.254.169.254/0',
                 '::1/0', '::ffff:127.0.0.1/0', '64:ff9b::7f00:1/0']) {
  console.log(isBlocked(h) ? 'BLOCK ' : 'ALLOW ', h, '->', new (h.includes(':') ? Address6 : Address4)(h).correctForm());
}

On affected versions every suffixed internal target is allowed, and correctForm() shows the request would reach the real internal address:

BLOCK  127.0.0.1 -> 127.0.0.1
BLOCK  10.0.0.1 -> 10.0.0.1
BLOCK  ::1 -> ::1
ALLOW  127.0.0.1/0 -> 127.0.0.1
ALLOW  10.0.0.5/7 -> 10.0.0.5
ALLOW  169.254.169.254/0 -> 169.254.169.254
ALLOW  ::1/0 -> ::1
ALLOW  ::ffff:127.0.0.1/0 -> ::ffff:7f00:1
ALLOW  64:ff9b::7f00:1/0 -> 64:ff9b::7f00:1

The first three lines are blocked as expected; the same destinations with a CIDR suffix are allowed through.

Remediation

Upgrade to the patched release. In the fix, classification no longer consults the address's own prefix: a new isHostInSubnet() compares the address's host bits against the reference range only, and every classifier (isLoopback, isPrivate, isLinkLocal, isCGNAT, isMulticast, isUnspecified, isBroadcast, isULA, isMapped4, isTeredo, is6to4, isDocumentation, getType, and the IPv4-mapped/NAT64 normalization behind embeddedIPv4) uses it. isInSubnet keeps its subnet-containment semantics unchanged, including the guard that a wider network is not contained in a narrower one. After upgrading, new Address4('127.0.0.1/0').isLoopback() returns true.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, strip the suffix before classifying by re-parsing addressMinusSuffix:

const parsed = new Address4(userInput);
const host = new Address4(parsed.addressMinusSuffix);   // classify this one

A note on SSRF defense

These methods are address classifiers, not a complete SSRF defense. Regardless of this fix, a robust SSRF guard must resolve the hostname and validate the resolved IP against the socket it connects to, and account for DNS rebinding and redirects. Treat these checks as one layer, not the only one.

Credit

Reported by @hi-im-glitchless.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ip-address"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.1.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69198"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T19:59:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nEvery special-use classification method is built on `isInSubnet`, which short-circuits to `false` whenever the address\u0027s own subnet mask is *shorter* than the reference range\u0027s mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as `/0` suppresses classification entirely: `isLoopback()`, `isPrivate()`, `isLinkLocal()`, `isCGNAT()`, `isMulticast()`, `isUnspecified()`, `isBroadcast()`, `isULA()`, and `getType()` all report an internal address as unremarkable, while `correctForm()` and `address` still return the real internal target.\n\nAn application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint.\n\n### Details\n\n`isInSubnet` in `src/common.ts` opens with a guard that compares the two prefix lengths:\n\n```js\nexport function isInSubnet(this, address) {\n  if (this.subnetMask \u003c address.subnetMask) {\n    return false;                                  // \u003c-- reached before any bit comparison\n  }\n\n  if (this.mask(address.subnetMask) === address.mask()) {\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n```\n\nThat guard is correct for the question `isInSubnet` is named for \u2014 whether one *network* is contained in another, where a `/0` network genuinely is not inside a `/8`. It is wrong for classification, which asks a question about the address itself and must not depend on the prefix the caller happened to write. `/0` is shorter than every reference prefix in the special-use tables (loopback `/8`, link-local `/16`, CGNAT `/10`, ULA `/7`, multicast `/4`), so for a classification call the bit comparison is never reached and the method returns `false`.\n\nThe underlying bit comparison is correct, and `mask(n)` already returns the first `n` bits of the full parsed address independently of `subnetMask` \u2014 the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. Host bits are retained through parsing, so `correctForm()` still yields the real target and the address remains fully usable for connecting.\n\n`/0` is the universal case because it is shorter than every reference prefix, but any suffix shorter than the specific range being tested has the same effect: `10.0.0.5/7` defeats `isPrivate()` for `10.0.0.0/8`.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`\u003e= 10.1.1, \u003c= 10.2.1`. The `is*` classification API was introduced for `Address4` in 10.1.1 and extended to `Address6` in 10.2.0; releases before 10.1.1 do not expose it and are not affected through this vector. The containment guard itself is much older, but `isInSubnet` alone is a subnet-containment predicate whose behavior here is correct.\n\nThis also defeats the fix released in 10.2.1 for GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg: that release classifies IPv4-mapped and NAT64 addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, but the normalization is reached through `isInSubnet`, so `::ffff:127.0.0.1/0` reverts to being reported as non-internal.\n\n### Impact\n\nEvery classifier is affected on both `Address4` and `Address6`. The sole exception is `Address6.isLinkLocal()` for *native* `fe80::/10` addresses, which compares raw bits directly; its IPv4-mapped path is still affected.\n\n| Address | Reported as | Actually points at |\n|---|---|---|\n| `127.0.0.1/0` | not loopback | loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`) |\n| `10.0.0.1/0`, `10.0.0.5/7` | not private | RFC 1918 `10/8` |\n| `172.16.5.5/0` | not private | RFC 1918 `172.16/12` |\n| `192.168.1.1/0` | not private | RFC 1918 `192.168/16` |\n| `169.254.169.254/0` | not link-local | link-local / cloud metadata (IMDS) |\n| `100.64.0.1/0` | not CGNAT | CGNAT `100.64/10` |\n| `0.0.0.0/0`, `255.255.255.255/0` | not unspecified / not broadcast | unspecified / broadcast |\n| `::1/0` | not loopback | IPv6 loopback |\n| `fc00::1/0` | not ULA, not private | IPv6 ULA `fc00::/7` |\n| `ff02::1/0` | not multicast | IPv6 multicast |\n| `::ffff:127.0.0.1/0` | not loopback | loopback, via IPv4-mapped |\n| `::ffff:169.254.169.254/0` | not link-local | IMDS, via IPv4-mapped |\n| `64:ff9b::7f00:1/0` | not loopback | loopback, via NAT64 |\n\n`getType()` returns `Global unicast` for all of the IPv6 cases above, and `getScope()` follows it.\n\n### Reachability\n\nA CIDR suffix is not legal in a URL host, so this is not reachable through the most common SSRF shape. `new URL(\u0027http://127.0.0.1/0\u0027)` parses `hostname` as `127.0.0.1` and `pathname` as `/0`, and a guard that classifies the extracted hostname is unaffected. Exploitation requires an application that accepts a bare address string that may carry a suffix and passes it to the constructor before classifying \u2014 for example an allow/deny field, a webhook target, or a proxy destination taken as a plain host rather than parsed out of a URL.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n`npm i ip-address@10.2.1`, then:\n\n```js\nconst { Address4, Address6 } = require(\u0027ip-address\u0027);\n\n// true =\u003e block as internal, false =\u003e allow outbound\nfunction isBlocked(host) {\n  try {\n    const a = new Address4(host);\n    return a.isPrivate() || a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isCGNAT()\n        || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified() || a.isBroadcast();\n  } catch {}\n  try {\n    const a = new Address6(host);\n    return a.isPrivate() || a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isULA()\n        || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified();\n  } catch {}\n  return false;\n}\n\nfor (const h of [\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u002710.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027,\n                 \u0027127.0.0.1/0\u0027, \u002710.0.0.5/7\u0027, \u0027169.254.169.254/0\u0027,\n                 \u0027::1/0\u0027, \u0027::ffff:127.0.0.1/0\u0027, \u002764:ff9b::7f00:1/0\u0027]) {\n  console.log(isBlocked(h) ? \u0027BLOCK \u0027 : \u0027ALLOW \u0027, h, \u0027-\u003e\u0027, new (h.includes(\u0027:\u0027) ? Address6 : Address4)(h).correctForm());\n}\n```\n\nOn affected versions every suffixed internal target is allowed, and `correctForm()` shows the request would reach the real internal address:\n\n```\nBLOCK  127.0.0.1 -\u003e 127.0.0.1\nBLOCK  10.0.0.1 -\u003e 10.0.0.1\nBLOCK  ::1 -\u003e ::1\nALLOW  127.0.0.1/0 -\u003e 127.0.0.1\nALLOW  10.0.0.5/7 -\u003e 10.0.0.5\nALLOW  169.254.169.254/0 -\u003e 169.254.169.254\nALLOW  ::1/0 -\u003e ::1\nALLOW  ::ffff:127.0.0.1/0 -\u003e ::ffff:7f00:1\nALLOW  64:ff9b::7f00:1/0 -\u003e 64:ff9b::7f00:1\n```\n\nThe first three lines are blocked as expected; the same destinations with a CIDR suffix are allowed through.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to the patched release. In the fix, classification no longer consults the address\u0027s own prefix: a new `isHostInSubnet()` compares the address\u0027s host bits against the reference range only, and every classifier (`isLoopback`, `isPrivate`, `isLinkLocal`, `isCGNAT`, `isMulticast`, `isUnspecified`, `isBroadcast`, `isULA`, `isMapped4`, `isTeredo`, `is6to4`, `isDocumentation`, `getType`, and the IPv4-mapped/NAT64 normalization behind `embeddedIPv4`) uses it. `isInSubnet` keeps its subnet-containment semantics unchanged, including the guard that a wider network is not contained in a narrower one. After upgrading, `new Address4(\u0027127.0.0.1/0\u0027).isLoopback()` returns `true`.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, strip the suffix before classifying by re-parsing `addressMinusSuffix`:\n\n```js\nconst parsed = new Address4(userInput);\nconst host = new Address4(parsed.addressMinusSuffix);   // classify this one\n```\n\n### A note on SSRF defense\n\nThese methods are address classifiers, not a complete SSRF defense. Regardless of this fix, a robust SSRF guard must resolve the hostname and validate the *resolved* IP against the socket it connects to, and account for DNS rebinding and redirects. Treat these checks as one layer, not the only one.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @hi-im-glitchless.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T19:59:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T19:59:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commit/488fe9bc7c35363b4b090494fc38c266d217740d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/releases/tag/v10.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks"
}

CVE-2026-69198 (GCVE-0-2026-69198)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-03 19:59 – Updated: 2026-08-04 17:21

Title

ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks

Summary

ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask; the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. This issue is fixed in version 10.2.2.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/secur…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commi…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/relea…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
beaugunderson	ip-address	Affected: >= 10.1.1, < 10.2.2

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-69198",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-04T17:21:32.083041Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T17:21:59.584Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "ip-address",
          "vendor": "beaugunderson",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 10.1.1, \u003c 10.2.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address\u0027s own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range\u0027s mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask; the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. This issue is fixed in version 10.2.2."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.9,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-20",
              "description": "CWE-20: Improper Input Validation",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-03T19:59:05.731Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commit/488fe9bc7c35363b4b090494fc38c266d217740d",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commit/488fe9bc7c35363b4b090494fc38c266d217740d"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/releases/tag/v10.2.2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/releases/tag/v10.2.2"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-69198",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-03T19:59:05.731Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-03T16:57:50.124Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T17:21:59.584Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

GHSA-4XRF-JV44-H6HH

Summary

Details

Affected versions

Impact

Reachability

Proof of concept

Remediation

A note on SSRF defense

Credit

CVE-2026-69198 (GCVE-0-2026-69198)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature