{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.41.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35219"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-14T19:18:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nBudibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### Automation Steps (No Blacklist)\n\nAll automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation:\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:**\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts` line 34:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, {method: \"post\", ...})  // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts` line 53:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts` line 20:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, {method: \"post\", ...})  // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts` line 29:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, {method: \"post\", ...})  // No blacklist check\n```\n\n### REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)\n\n**`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` line 684:**\n```typescript\nif (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {\n  throw new Error(\"Cannot connect to URL.\")\n}\n```\n\nBut `BLACKLIST_IPS` env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:\n\n**`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts` lines 39-45:**\n```typescript\nif (blackListArray?.length === 0) {\n  return false  // Always passes when no IPs configured\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Automation steps**: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module\n- **REST API**: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.\n- **Cloud metadata**: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` accessible via any automation step\n- **Internal services**: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps\n2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)\n3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct `fetch()` calls\n4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable",
  "id": "GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7",
  "modified": "2026-08-14T19:18:47Z",
  "published": "2026-08-14T19:18:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.41.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist"
}