Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-5FXQ-QCF3-244W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 16:33 – Updated: 2026-05-14 16:33

Summary

Portainer has an endpoint security bypass via Swarm service create/update

Details

Summary

Portainer enforces seven EndpointSecuritySettings restrictions that administrators configure to restrict the container configurations non-admin users can launch: privileged mode, host PID namespace, device mapping, capabilities, sysctls, security-opt (Seccomp / AppArmor), and bind mounts.

The vulnerability is exposed when a non-admin Portainer user (Standard User role, or any role granted endpoint-level access) has been given access to a Docker Swarm endpoint via Portainer RBAC. Admins and users without Swarm endpoint access are not affected.

These restrictions are enforced on the standard container creation path, but several of them are not applied on the Docker Swarm service API:

POST /services/create — 1 of 7 checks applied. CapabilityAdd, CapabilityDrop, Sysctls, and Privileges (Seccomp / AppArmor) are not parsed from the request body and are forwarded to the Docker daemon without validation.
POST /services/{id}/update — 0 of 7 checks applied. The route dispatches to the generic restrictedResourceOperation, which validates RBAC ownership but does not inspect the request body or call fetchEndpointSecuritySettings().

The EndpointSecuritySettings checks apply when the administrator has configured any of AllowContainerCapabilitiesForRegularUsers, AllowSysctlSettingForRegularUsers, AllowSecurityOptForRegularUsers, or AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers to restrict standard users.

A regular user with access to a Docker Swarm endpoint can:

Create a service with CapabilityAdd: ["SYS_ADMIN", "NET_ADMIN", "SYS_PTRACE", …] or Privileges.Seccomp.Mode: "unconfined".
Create a benign service that passes ownership checks, then update it to add CapabilityAdd: ["ALL"] plus a bind mount of /, scale to one replica, and access the host filesystem from the running container (e.g. via chroot /host).

In addition, the partial Mounts[] struct used by the bind-mount check inspects only the top-level Type field. A mount with Type: "volume" and VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options: {type: "none", o: "bind", device: "<host path>"} is forwarded to the Docker daemon unchanged; the local volume driver then materialises it as a bind-equivalent mount, bypassing AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers. The same field path is accepted by the standalone POST /volumes/create endpoint, which never had any AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers check on any branch.

This undermines the administrator's configured security policy on Swarm-enabled endpoints.

Affected Versions

The vulnerability exists in every Portainer release with Docker Swarm support — the service-creation path has never checked CapabilityAdd, CapabilityDrop, Sysctls, or Privileges, and the service-update path has never performed any EndpointSecuritySettings validation. The VolumeOptions.DriverConfig field has never been parsed by the partial service struct on any branch, so the volume-driver-bind variant (service create/update and direct /volumes/create) shares the same affected range.

Fixes are included in the next release of each supported branch:

Branch	First vulnerable	Fixed in
2.33.x (LTS)	2.33.0	2.33.8
2.39.x (LTS)	2.39.0	2.39.2
2.40.x (STS)	2.40.0	2.41.0

Portainer LTS branches receive fixes for 6 months plus a 3-month overlap after the next LTS ships. STS releases are supported only until the next STS ships — the 2.40.x STS line ends with the 2.41.0 release. All releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix; users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported LTS branch.

Workarounds

Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure with the following measures. None of these replaces the fix.

Temporarily revoke Swarm endpoint access for non-admin users via Portainer RBAC until the patched release is deployed. This eliminates the attack surface without service disruption for administrators.
Segregate manager and worker nodes with placement constraints so user workloads do not run on manager nodes. This limits the exposure of the Swarm control plane if the bypass is exploited against a worker.
Block creation of local-driver volumes that use type: none / o: bind on untrusted endpoints via a daemon-side allowlist. This closes the volume-driver-bind variant until the patched release is deployed.

Affected Code

Service creation — only `Mounts` inspected (1/7)

// api/http/proxy/factory/docker/services.go (pre-fix)

type PartialService struct {
    TaskTemplate struct {
        ContainerSpec struct {
            Mounts []struct {
                Type string
            }
        }
    }
}

CapabilityAdd, CapabilityDrop, Sysctls, and Privileges are not declared in the struct, so json.Unmarshal does not include them in the validated view. The request body is then forwarded to the Docker daemon without those fields being checked.

Service update — no inspection (0/7)

// api/http/proxy/factory/docker/transport.go (pre-fix)

if match, _ := path.Match("/services/*/*", requestPath); match {
    serviceID := path.Base(path.Dir(requestPath))
    // ... no body inspection, no call to fetchEndpointSecuritySettings ...
    return transport.restrictedResourceOperation(
        request, serviceID, serviceID,
        portainer.ServiceResourceControl, false,
    )
}

fetchEndpointSecuritySettings() is called in three places in the codebase: container creation, service creation (bind-mount check only), and volume browsing. Service update is not among them.

Bind-mount check — driver options ignored

// api/http/proxy/factory/docker/services.go (pre-fix — partial Mounts struct)

Mounts []struct {
    Type string   // only this field was read
}

Because VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options is not declared in the partial struct, a mount of Type: "volume" passes the Type != "bind" check and is forwarded to the daemon. The local volume driver treats {type: "none", o: "bind", device: "<host path>"} as a bind-equivalent mount, so the check is bypassed.

The fix extends the partial struct to carry VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options map[string]string, rejects service create/update requests where that map declares a bind-style driver, and adds a new CheckVolumeBodyRestrictions invocation on POST /volumes/create (which previously had no AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers check on any branch).

Impact

An authenticated, non-admin Portainer user with access to any Docker Swarm-enabled endpoint can configure a service with:

Elevated Linux capabilities including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or ALL — not restricted by AllowContainerCapabilitiesForRegularUsers.
Disabled syscall filtering via Privileges.Seccomp.Mode: "unconfined" — not restricted by AllowSecurityOptForRegularUsers.
Disabled AppArmor confinement via Privileges.AppArmor.Mode: "disabled" — not restricted by AllowSecurityOptForRegularUsers.
Arbitrary sysctl values inside the container namespace — not restricted by AllowSysctlSettingForRegularUsers.
Bind mounts of any host path, including /, /var/run/docker.sock, SSH keys, or Portainer's own database — not restricted by AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers.
Bind-mount-equivalent host filesystem access via volume driver options — a Type: "volume" mount whose VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options describe a local-driver bind, or a direct POST /volumes/create with the same payload, yields the same capability as a direct bind and is not restricted by AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers.

In combination (e.g. CapabilityAdd:["ALL"] + bind mount of /), this gives a user access equivalent to root on the Swarm manager host from a restricted account, overriding the administrator's security policy.

Timeline

2026-03-12 — route2shell privately discloses the volume-driver local-bind variant.
2026-04-05 — JohannesLks disclosure of the Swarm service create/update bypass
2026-04-18 — Fix merged to develop.
2026-04-29 — 2.41.0 released.
2026-05-07 — 2.39.2-LTS and 2.33.8-LTS released.

Credit

route2shell — disclosure of the volume-driver local-bind variant on both Swarm service creation/update and the standalone /volumes/create endpoint.
JohannesLks — independent disclosure of the Swarm service create/update bypass

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/portainer/portainer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/portainer/portainer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.39.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.39.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/portainer/portainer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.40.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.41.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44849"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T16:33:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nPortainer enforces seven `EndpointSecuritySettings` restrictions that administrators configure to restrict the container configurations non-admin users can launch: **privileged mode**, **host PID namespace**, **device mapping**, **capabilities**, **sysctls**, **security-opt (Seccomp / AppArmor)**, and **bind mounts**.\n\nThe vulnerability is exposed when a non-admin Portainer user (Standard User role, or any role granted endpoint-level access) has been given access to a Docker Swarm endpoint via Portainer RBAC. Admins and users without Swarm endpoint access are not affected.\n\nThese restrictions are enforced on the standard container creation path, but several of them are not applied on the Docker Swarm service API:\n\n- `POST /services/create` \u2014 **1 of 7** checks applied. `CapabilityAdd`, `CapabilityDrop`, `Sysctls`, and `Privileges` (Seccomp / AppArmor) are not parsed from the request body and are forwarded to the Docker daemon without validation.\n- `POST /services/{id}/update` \u2014 **0 of 7** checks applied. The route dispatches to the generic `restrictedResourceOperation`, which validates RBAC ownership but does not inspect the request body or call `fetchEndpointSecuritySettings()`.\n\nThe `EndpointSecuritySettings` checks apply when the administrator has configured any of `AllowContainerCapabilitiesForRegularUsers`, `AllowSysctlSettingForRegularUsers`, `AllowSecurityOptForRegularUsers`, or `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers` to restrict standard users.\n\nA regular user with access to a Docker Swarm endpoint can:\n\n- Create a service with `CapabilityAdd: [\"SYS_ADMIN\", \"NET_ADMIN\", \"SYS_PTRACE\", \u2026]` or `Privileges.Seccomp.Mode: \"unconfined\"`.\n- Create a benign service that passes ownership checks, then **update** it to add `CapabilityAdd: [\"ALL\"]` plus a bind mount of `/`, scale to one replica, and access the host filesystem from the running container (e.g. via `chroot /host`).\n\nIn addition, the partial `Mounts[]` struct used by the bind-mount check inspects only the top-level `Type` field. A mount with `Type: \"volume\"` and `VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options: {type: \"none\", o: \"bind\", device: \"\u003chost path\u003e\"}` is forwarded to the Docker daemon unchanged; the local volume driver then materialises it as a bind-equivalent mount, bypassing `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers`. The same field path is accepted by the standalone `POST /volumes/create` endpoint, which never had any `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers` check on any branch.\n\nThis undermines the administrator\u0027s configured security policy on Swarm-enabled endpoints.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nThe vulnerability exists in every Portainer release with Docker Swarm support \u2014 the service-creation path has never checked `CapabilityAdd`, `CapabilityDrop`, `Sysctls`, or `Privileges`, and the service-update path has never performed any `EndpointSecuritySettings` validation. The `VolumeOptions.DriverConfig` field has never been parsed by the partial service struct on any branch, so the volume-driver-bind variant (service create/update and direct `/volumes/create`) shares the same affected range.\n\nFixes are included in the next release of each supported branch:\n\n| Branch              | First vulnerable | Fixed in   |\n|---------------------|------------------|------------|\n| 2.33.x (LTS)        | 2.33.0           | **2.33.8** |\n| 2.39.x (LTS)        | 2.39.0           | **2.39.2** |\n| 2.40.x (STS)        | 2.40.0           | **2.41.0** |\n\nPortainer LTS branches receive fixes for 6 months plus a 3-month overlap after the next LTS ships. STS releases are supported only until the next STS ships \u2014 the 2.40.x STS line ends with the 2.41.0 release. All releases **prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life** and will not receive a fix; users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported LTS branch.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAdministrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure with the following measures. None of these replaces the fix.\n\n- **Temporarily revoke Swarm endpoint access for non-admin users** via Portainer RBAC until the patched release is deployed. This eliminates the attack surface without service disruption for administrators.\n- **Segregate manager and worker nodes** with placement constraints so user workloads do not run on manager nodes. This limits the exposure of the Swarm control plane if the bypass is exploited against a worker.\n- **Block creation of local-driver volumes that use `type: none` / `o: bind`** on untrusted endpoints via a daemon-side allowlist. This closes the volume-driver-bind variant until the patched release is deployed.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### Service creation \u2014 only `Mounts` inspected (1/7)\n\n```go\n// api/http/proxy/factory/docker/services.go (pre-fix)\n\ntype PartialService struct {\n    TaskTemplate struct {\n        ContainerSpec struct {\n            Mounts []struct {\n                Type string\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`CapabilityAdd`, `CapabilityDrop`, `Sysctls`, and `Privileges` are not declared in the struct, so `json.Unmarshal` does not include them in the validated view. The request body is then forwarded to the Docker daemon without those fields being checked.\n\n### Service update \u2014 no inspection (0/7)\n\n```go\n// api/http/proxy/factory/docker/transport.go (pre-fix)\n\nif match, _ := path.Match(\"/services/*/*\", requestPath); match {\n    serviceID := path.Base(path.Dir(requestPath))\n    // ... no body inspection, no call to fetchEndpointSecuritySettings ...\n    return transport.restrictedResourceOperation(\n        request, serviceID, serviceID,\n        portainer.ServiceResourceControl, false,\n    )\n}\n```\n\n`fetchEndpointSecuritySettings()` is called in three places in the codebase: container creation, service creation (bind-mount check only), and volume browsing. Service update is not among them.\n\n### Bind-mount check \u2014 driver options ignored\n\n```go\n// api/http/proxy/factory/docker/services.go (pre-fix \u2014 partial Mounts struct)\n\nMounts []struct {\n    Type string   // only this field was read\n}\n```\n\nBecause `VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options` is not declared in the partial struct, a mount of `Type: \"volume\"` passes the `Type != \"bind\"` check and is forwarded to the daemon. The local volume driver treats `{type: \"none\", o: \"bind\", device: \"\u003chost path\u003e\"}` as a bind-equivalent mount, so the check is bypassed.\n\nThe fix extends the partial struct to carry `VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options map[string]string`, rejects service create/update requests where that map declares a bind-style driver, and adds a new `CheckVolumeBodyRestrictions` invocation on `POST /volumes/create` (which previously had no `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers` check on any branch).\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated, non-admin Portainer user with access to any Docker Swarm-enabled endpoint can configure a service with:\n\n- **Elevated Linux capabilities** including `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`, or `ALL` \u2014 not restricted by `AllowContainerCapabilitiesForRegularUsers`.\n- **Disabled syscall filtering** via `Privileges.Seccomp.Mode: \"unconfined\"` \u2014 not restricted by `AllowSecurityOptForRegularUsers`.\n- **Disabled AppArmor confinement** via `Privileges.AppArmor.Mode: \"disabled\"` \u2014 not restricted by `AllowSecurityOptForRegularUsers`.\n- **Arbitrary sysctl values** inside the container namespace \u2014 not restricted by `AllowSysctlSettingForRegularUsers`.\n- **Bind mounts of any host path**, including `/`, `/var/run/docker.sock`, SSH keys, or Portainer\u0027s own database \u2014 not restricted by `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers`.\n- **Bind-mount-equivalent host filesystem access via volume driver options** \u2014 a `Type: \"volume\"` mount whose `VolumeOptions.DriverConfig.Options` describe a local-driver bind, or a direct `POST /volumes/create` with the same payload, yields the same capability as a direct bind and is not restricted by `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers`.\n\nIn combination (e.g. `CapabilityAdd:[\"ALL\"]` + bind mount of `/`), this gives a user access equivalent to root on the Swarm manager host from a restricted account, overriding the administrator\u0027s security policy.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- `2026-03-12` \u2014 route2shell privately discloses the volume-driver local-bind variant.\n- `2026-04-05` \u2014 JohannesLks disclosure of the Swarm service create/update bypass\n- `2026-04-18`  \u2014 Fix merged to develop.\n- `2026-04-29` \u2014 2.41.0 released.\n- `2026-05-07` \u2014 2.39.2-LTS and 2.33.8-LTS released.\n## Credit\n\n- **route2shell** \u2014 disclosure of the volume-driver local-bind variant on both Swarm service creation/update and the standalone `/volumes/create` endpoint.\n- **JohannesLks** \u2014 independent disclosure of the Swarm service create/update bypass",
  "id": "GHSA-5fxq-qcf3-244w",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T16:33:42Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T16:33:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-5fxq-qcf3-244w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.33.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.39.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.41.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Portainer has an endpoint security bypass via Swarm service create/update"
}

CVE-2026-44849 (GCVE-0-2026-44849)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-28 21:06 – Updated: 2026-05-29 13:55

Title

Portainer: Endpoint security bypass via Swarm service create/update

Summary

Portainer Community Edition is a lightweight service delivery platform for containerized applications that can be used to manage Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes and ACI environments. From 2.33.0 to before 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0, Portainer enforces seven EndpointSecuritySettings restrictions that administrators configure to restrict the container configurations non-admin users can launch: privileged mode, host PID namespace, device mapping, capabilities, sysctls, security-opt (Seccomp / AppArmor), and bind mounts. These restrictions are enforced on the standard container creation path, but several of them are not applied on the Docker Swarm service API. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0.

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/portainer/portainer/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
portainer	portainer	Affected: >= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8 Affected: >= 2.39.0, < 2.39.2 Affected: >= 2.40.0, < 2.41.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-44849",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-29T13:54:58.082787Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-29T13:55:06.837Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "portainer",
          "vendor": "portainer",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.33.0, \u003c 2.33.8"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.39.0, \u003c 2.39.2"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.40.0, \u003c 2.41.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Portainer Community Edition is a lightweight service delivery platform for containerized applications that can be used to manage Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes and ACI environments. From 2.33.0 to before 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0, Portainer enforces seven EndpointSecuritySettings restrictions that administrators configure to restrict the container configurations non-admin users can launch: privileged mode, host PID namespace, device mapping, capabilities, sysctls, security-opt (Seccomp / AppArmor), and bind mounts. These restrictions are enforced on the standard container creation path, but several of them are not applied on the Docker Swarm service API. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 9.4,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-28T21:06:05.256Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-5fxq-qcf3-244w",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-5fxq-qcf3-244w"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-5fxq-qcf3-244w",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Portainer: Endpoint security bypass via Swarm service create/update"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-44849",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-28T21:06:05.256Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-07T21:21:48.353Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-29T13:55:06.837Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-5FXQ-QCF3-244W

Summary

Affected Versions

Workarounds

Affected Code

Service creation — only Mounts inspected (1/7)

Service update — no inspection (0/7)

Bind-mount check — driver options ignored

Impact

Timeline

Credit

CVE-2026-44849 (GCVE-0-2026-44849)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Service creation — only `Mounts` inspected (1/7)