GHSA-5G4W-3VW9-478W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 21:05 – Updated: 2026-07-06 21:05
VLAI
Summary
Coder's subdomain workspace app routing trusts unauthenticated X-Forwarded-Host header, enabling cross-app data access
Details

Summary

The workspace app proxy resolves the target app from httpapi.RequestHost() which prefers the X-Forwarded-Host header over the real Host header. No middleware strips X-Forwarded-Host before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on fetch() calls.

Note: Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled, a victim who visits the attacker's shared app and a deployment whose upstream proxy does not strip X-Forwarded-Host.

Impact

App session cookies are scoped to the wildcard parent domain so the browser attaches them to any app subdomain. An attacker who controls a shared workspace app can serve JavaScript that sends same-site requests with a forged X-Forwarded-Host pointing at a victim's private app. The server routes by the attacker-controlled header but authorizes with the victim's cookie which lets the attacker read the victim's private app responses. Subdomain app routing must be enabled and no upstream proxy may strip X-Forwarded-Host.

Patches

The fix trusts X-Forwarded-Host only from configured trusted proxies and otherwise resolves the routing host from the verified request host.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line Patched version
2.34 v2.34.2
2.33 v2.33.8
2.32 v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR) v2.29.17

Workarounds

Place an upstream reverse proxy that strips or overwrites X-Forwarded-Host on untrusted requests.

Resources

  • Fix: #26204

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22435) for independently disclosing this issue!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.29.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55430"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T21:05:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe workspace app proxy resolves the target app from `httpapi.RequestHost()` which prefers the `X-Forwarded-Host` header over the real `Host` header. No middleware strips `X-Forwarded-Host` before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on `fetch()` calls.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled, a victim who visits the attacker\u0027s shared app and a deployment whose upstream proxy does not strip `X-Forwarded-Host`.\n\n### Impact\n\nApp session cookies are scoped to the wildcard parent domain so the browser attaches them to any app subdomain. An attacker who controls a shared workspace app can serve JavaScript that sends same-site requests with a forged `X-Forwarded-Host` pointing at a victim\u0027s private app. The server routes by the attacker-controlled header but authorizes with the victim\u0027s cookie which lets the attacker read the victim\u0027s private app responses. Subdomain app routing must be enabled and no upstream proxy may strip `X-Forwarded-Host`.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix trusts `X-Forwarded-Host` only from configured trusted proxies and otherwise resolves the routing host from the verified request host.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |\n| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nPlace an upstream reverse proxy that strips or overwrites `X-Forwarded-Host` on untrusted requests.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Fix: #26204\n\n### Credits\n\nCoder would like to thank Anthropic\u0027s Security Team (ANT-2026-22435) for independently disclosing this issue!",
  "id": "GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T21:05:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T21:05:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26204"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Coder\u0027s subdomain workspace app routing trusts unauthenticated X-Forwarded-Host header, enabling cross-app data access"
}



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