GHSA-5M98-CGCR-XX3Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 21:06 – Updated: 2026-09-10 21:06Impact
The GitHub Trigger generated a signing secret when it registered a webhook and verified X-Hub-Signature-256 on each delivery. When GitHub answered the create request with a 422 because a webhook for the URL already existed, the node adopted the remote hook but kept only its id and events, discarding the secret it had generated. Deliveries to that workflow's webhook URL were then accepted from anyone. The patch re-fetches the existing hook by its stored id, re-applies the signing secret, and makes verification fail closed when no secret is stored.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.76, 2.37.7, and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Deactivate and reactivate any GitHub Trigger workflows to force a fresh webhook registration with a new secret, provided the remote GitHub hook has been deleted first so that the 422 reuse path is not taken again.
- Restrict network access to the n8n webhook endpoint to GitHub's published IP ranges only.
- Audit GitHub Trigger workflow static data for entries that contain a webhookId but no webhookSecret, and treat those workflows as unprotected until reactivated successfully.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.123.76"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.38.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.38.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.37.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86080"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T21:06:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T22:19:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThe GitHub Trigger generated a signing secret when it registered a webhook and verified `X-Hub-Signature-256` on each delivery. When GitHub answered the create request with a 422 because a webhook for the URL already existed, the node adopted the remote hook but kept only its id and events, discarding the secret it had generated. Deliveries to that workflow\u0027s webhook URL were then accepted from anyone. The patch re-fetches the existing hook by its stored id, re-applies the signing secret, and makes verification fail closed when no secret is stored.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.76, 2.37.7, and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Deactivate and reactivate any GitHub Trigger workflows to force a fresh webhook registration with a new secret, provided the remote GitHub hook has been deleted first so that the 422 reuse path is not taken again.\n- Restrict network access to the n8n webhook endpoint to GitHub\u0027s published IP ranges only.\n- Audit GitHub Trigger workflow static data for entries that contain a `webhookId` but no `webhookSecret`, and treat those workflows as unprotected until reactivated successfully.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
"id": "GHSA-5m98-cgcr-xx3q",
"modified": "2026-09-10T21:06:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T21:06:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-5m98-cgcr-xx3q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86080"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@1.123.76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.37.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.38.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "n8n: GitHub Trigger 422 Reuse Path Skips Webhook Secret Storage, Causing Signature Verification to Fail-Open"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.