Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-5PMV-RX8R-WMV5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:45 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:45

Summary

jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms has an out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow

Details

Summary

On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation.

Details & PoC

The test listed below fail under miri with command cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid

Or you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:

RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

The following tests should be appended to crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs:

mod miri_ub {
    use super::*;

    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow
    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.
    #[test]
    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {
        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;
        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::<u8>::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();
        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();
        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;
        std::hint::black_box(grid);
    }
}

This issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:

Huge actual frame A frame such as 65536 x 65536 passes the current frame area limit (2^32 <= 2^40) but overflows usize element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small AlignedGrids in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.
Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary render_frame().

Impact

On 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.

Severity

7.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "jxl-grid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52834"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-122",
      "CWE-131",
      "CWE-190"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:45:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nOn 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation.\n\n### Details \u0026 PoC\n\nThe test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid`\n\nOr you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:\n\n`RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`\n\nThe following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`:\n\n```rust\nmod miri_ub {\n    use super::*;\n\n    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow\n    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.\n    #[test]\n    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {\n        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;\n        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::\u003cu8\u003e::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();\n        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();\n        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;\n        std::hint::black_box(grid);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:\n\n1. **Huge actual frame**\n   A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 \u003c= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.\n\n2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame**\n   This is the more practical \u201csmall payload, huge logical output\u201d case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.\n\n### Impact\n\nOn 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T20:45:59Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T20:45:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms has an out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow"
}

CVE-2026-52834 (GCVE-0-2026-52834)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 14:55 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:19

Title

jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms

Summary

jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.

Severity

7.3 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:03 UTC

CWE

CWE-122 - Heap-based Buffer Overflow
CWE-131 - Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/commit/3986da…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/releases/tag/0.12.6	x_refsource_MISC
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
tirr-c	jxl-oxide	Affected: < 0.12.6
tirr-c	jxl-grid	Affected: < 0.6.2

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-52834",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:03:40.919161Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:19:05.526Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "jxl-oxide",
          "vendor": "tirr-c",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.12.6"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "jxl-grid",
          "vendor": "tirr-c",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.6.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.3,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-122",
              "description": "CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-131",
              "description": "CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-190",
              "description": "CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T14:55:32.138Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/commit/3986dadd3926a95656a642e74a0702d52f5c92e2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/commit/3986dadd3926a95656a642e74a0702d52f5c92e2"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/releases/tag/0.12.6",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/releases/tag/0.12.6"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-52834",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-19T14:55:32.138Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-08T18:11:06.663Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:19:05.526Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

rustsec-2026-0151

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec

Published

2026-05-29 12:00

Modified

2026-07-03 06:12

Summary

Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms

Details

On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation. This could allow arbitrary code execution.

Details & PoC

The test listed below fail under miri with command cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid

Or you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:

RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

The following tests should be appended to crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs:

mod miri_ub {
    use super::*;

    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow
    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.
    #[test]
    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {
        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;
        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::<u8>::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();
        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();
        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;
        std::hint::black_box(grid);
    }
}

This issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:

Huge actual frame A frame such as 65536 x 65536 passes the current frame area limit (2^32 <= 2^40) but overflows usize element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small AlignedGrids in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.
Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary render_frame().

References

URL

Type

	https://crates.io/crates/jxl-grid	PACKAGE
	https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advi…	ADVISORY

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "jxl-grid",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/jxl-grid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52834",
    "GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation. This could allow arbitrary code execution.\n\n### Details \u0026 PoC\n\nThe test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid`\n\nOr you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:\n\n`RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`\n\nThe following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`:\n\n```rust\nmod miri_ub {\n    use super::*;\n\n    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow\n    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.\n    #[test]\n    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {\n        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;\n        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::\u003cu8\u003e::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();\n        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();\n        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;\n        std::hint::black_box(grid);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:\n\n1. **Huge actual frame**\n   A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 \u003c= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.\n\n2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame**\n   This is the more practical \u201csmall payload, huge logical output\u201d case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0151",
  "modified": "2026-07-03T06:12:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/jxl-grid"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-5PMV-RX8R-WMV5

Summary

Details & PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-52834 (GCVE-0-2026-52834)

rustsec-2026-0151

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec

Details & PoC

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour