Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-5VG3-C628-VF56

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-21 12:30

Details

Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

9.3 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77776"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T12:16:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Headroom\u0027s LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user\u0027s identifier and read or write that user\u0027s stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-5vg3-c628-vf56",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T12:30:34Z",
  "published": "2026-08-21T12:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77776"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-77776 (GCVE-0-2026-77776)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-21 11:22 – Updated: 2026-08-21 21:44

Title

Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity

Summary

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

9.3 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-21 21:18 UTC

CWE

CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207	issue-tracking
https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/…	technical-description
https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/…	technical-description
https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom	product
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-pro…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Headroom Labs	Headroom	Affected: 0 , < 0.36.1 (semver) Unaffected: 0.36.1 (semver)

Date Public

2026-08-20 00:00

Credits

Gregory Tan (Grg0rry)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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                "id": "CVE-2026-77776",
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                  },
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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