GHSA-5WW9-JG6Q-38R7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 21:00 – Updated: 2026-06-12 21:00
VLAI
Summary
File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix
Details

Summary

A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped.

Details

resourceDeleteHandler in http/resource.go cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:

// http/resource.go
err = d.store.Share.DeleteWithPathPrefix(file.Path)

file.Path here is the logical path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g. /a), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:

// storage/bolt/share.go
func (s shareBackend) DeleteWithPathPrefix(pathPrefix string) error {
    var links []share.Link
    if err := s.db.Prefix("Path", pathPrefix, &links); err != nil {
        return err
    }
    for _, link := range links {
        err = errors.Join(err, s.db.DeleteStruct(&share.Link{Hash: link.Hash}))
    }
    return err
}

Why the design contradicts this behavior. share.Link carries a UserID field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. shareDeleteHandler explicitly enforces link.UserID != d.user.ID && !d.user.Perm.Admin → 403. The file-deletion side-effect path is the only location that bypasses this rule.

Impact

  • Integrity: unauthorized deletion of share-link metadata belonging to arbitrary users, including administrators.
  • Availability: effective denial-of-service of the share-link feature — a cooperating (or malicious) low-priv user can wipe the bulk of existing share links by iterating a short set of one- and two-character prefixes.
Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.63.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54097"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T21:00:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with `create` + `delete` permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user \u2014 including the administrator \u2014 by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user\u0027s stored `share.Link.Path`. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim\u0027s share links are irrevocably wiped.\n\n### Details\n`resourceDeleteHandler` in `http/resource.go` cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:\n\n```go\n// http/resource.go\nerr = d.store.Share.DeleteWithPathPrefix(file.Path)\n```\n\n`file.Path` here is the *logical* path from the URL of the deleting user\u0027s request (e.g. `/a`), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:\n\n```go\n// storage/bolt/share.go\nfunc (s shareBackend) DeleteWithPathPrefix(pathPrefix string) error {\n    var links []share.Link\n    if err := s.db.Prefix(\"Path\", pathPrefix, \u0026links); err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n    for _, link := range links {\n        err = errors.Join(err, s.db.DeleteStruct(\u0026share.Link{Hash: link.Hash}))\n    }\n    return err\n}\n```\n**Why the design contradicts this behavior.** `share.Link` carries a `UserID` field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. `shareDeleteHandler` explicitly enforces `link.UserID != d.user.ID \u0026\u0026 !d.user.Perm.Admin \u2192 403`. The file-deletion side-effect path is the only location that bypasses this rule.\n\n\n\n### Impact\n- Integrity: unauthorized deletion of share-link metadata belonging to arbitrary users, including administrators.\n- Availability: effective denial-of-service of the share-link feature \u2014 a cooperating (or malicious) low-priv user can wipe the bulk of existing share links by iterating a short set of one- and two-character prefixes.",
  "id": "GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T21:00:55Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T21:00:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/0231b7ebdfbe77a6c54027d30c4856c3fd81ee4d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.