GHSA-68F8-9MHJ-H2MP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 18:41 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:45Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Summary
The OpenAI-compatible HTTP endpoint /v1/models accepts bearer auth but does not enforce operator method scopes.
In contrast, the WebSocket RPC path enforces operator.read for models.list.
A caller connected with operator.approvals (no read scope) is rejected for models.list (missing scope: operator.read) but can still enumerate model metadata through HTTP /v1/models.
Confirmed on current main at commit 06de515b6c42816b62ec752e1c221cab67b38501.
Details
The WS control-plane path enforces role/scope checks centrally before dispatching methods. For non-admin operators, this includes required method scopes such as operator.read for models.list.
The HTTP compatibility path for /v1/models performs bearer authorization and then returns model metadata; it does not apply an equivalent scope check.
As reproduced, a caller with only operator.approvals can:
- connect successfully,
- fail
models.listover WS withmissing scope: operator.read, - fetch
/v1/modelsover HTTP with status 200 and model data.
This is a cross-surface authorization inconsistency where the stricter WS policy can be bypassed via HTTP.
Impact
- Callers lacking
operator.readcan still enumerate gateway model metadata through HTTP compatibility routes. - Breaks scope model consistency between WS RPC and HTTP surfaces.
- Weakens least-privilege expectations for operators granted non-read scopes.
Patch Suggestion
1) Enforce read scope on /v1/models routes
Apply a scope gate equivalent to models.list before serving /v1/models or /v1/models/:id.
2) Reuse centralized scope-authorization helper for HTTP compatibility endpoints
Use the same operator scope logic used by WS dispatch (authorizeOperatorScopesForMethod(...)) to prevent policy drift.
3) Add regression tests
Keep this PoC and add explicit negative/positive controls:
operator.approvalswithout read is rejected on HTTP/v1/models.operator.readis accepted on both WSmodels.listand HTTP/v1/models.
Credit
Reported by @zpbrent.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35619"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T18:41:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe OpenAI-compatible HTTP endpoint `/v1/models` accepts bearer auth but does not enforce operator method scopes.\n\nIn contrast, the WebSocket RPC path enforces `operator.read` for `models.list`.\n\nA caller connected with `operator.approvals` (no read scope) is rejected for `models.list` (`missing scope: operator.read`) but can still enumerate model metadata through HTTP `/v1/models`.\n\nConfirmed on current `main` at commit `06de515b6c42816b62ec752e1c221cab67b38501`.\n\n## Details\n\nThe WS control-plane path enforces role/scope checks centrally before dispatching methods. For non-admin operators, this includes required method scopes such as `operator.read` for `models.list`.\n\nThe HTTP compatibility path for `/v1/models` performs bearer authorization and then returns model metadata; it does not apply an equivalent scope check.\n\nAs reproduced, a caller with only `operator.approvals` can:\n\n1. connect successfully,\n2. fail `models.list` over WS with `missing scope: operator.read`,\n3. fetch `/v1/models` over HTTP with status 200 and model data.\n\nThis is a cross-surface authorization inconsistency where the stricter WS policy can be bypassed via HTTP.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Callers lacking `operator.read` can still enumerate gateway model metadata through HTTP compatibility routes.\n- Breaks scope model consistency between WS RPC and HTTP surfaces.\n- Weakens least-privilege expectations for operators granted non-read scopes.\n\n## Patch Suggestion\n\n### 1) Enforce read scope on `/v1/models` routes\n\nApply a scope gate equivalent to `models.list` before serving `/v1/models` or `/v1/models/:id`.\n\n### 2) Reuse centralized scope-authorization helper for HTTP compatibility endpoints\n\nUse the same operator scope logic used by WS dispatch (`authorizeOperatorScopesForMethod(...)`) to prevent policy drift.\n\n### 3) Add regression tests\n\nKeep this PoC and add explicit negative/positive controls:\n\n- `operator.approvals` without read is rejected on HTTP `/v1/models`.\n- `operator.read` is accepted on both WS `models.list` and HTTP `/v1/models`.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @zpbrent.",
"id": "GHSA-68f8-9mhj-h2mp",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:45:08Z",
"published": "2026-03-30T18:41:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-68f8-9mhj-h2mp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/06de515b6c42816b62ec752e1c221cab67b38501"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-http-v1-models-endpoint"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a Gateway HTTP /v1/models Route Bypasses Operator Read Scope"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.