GHSA-6FVR-66P3-3QJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 16:05 – Updated: 2026-07-02 16:05Summary
OpenClaw hook ingress can start automated agent runs using a configured hook token. In affected releases, a hook-triggered run could select a bundled CLI backend that received owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of a scope appropriate for hook ingress.
This issue affects the boundary between hook-token automation and owner-only MCP tools. It does not affect deployments with hooks disabled.
Affected configurations
This affects deployments where hooks are enabled, /hooks/agent is reachable with a valid hook token, and a bundled CLI backend can be selected for the hook-triggered run.
Impact
A caller with the hook token could cause the spawned CLI runtime to see or call MCP tools that should have been owner-only. The practical impact depends on which MCP tools are available; the reported proof used persistent cron state as a representative owner-only action.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.20.
Fixed in the 2026.5.20 stable release.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.20 or later. Keep hook tokens secret, restrict network access to hook endpoints, and disable hooks when they are not needed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53814"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-266",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T16:05:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T21:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOpenClaw hook ingress can start automated agent runs using a configured hook token. In affected releases, a hook-triggered run could select a bundled CLI backend that received owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of a scope appropriate for hook ingress.\n\nThis issue affects the boundary between hook-token automation and owner-only MCP tools. It does not affect deployments with hooks disabled.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nThis affects deployments where hooks are enabled, `/hooks/agent` is reachable with a valid hook token, and a bundled CLI backend can be selected for the hook-triggered run.\n\n### Impact\n\nA caller with the hook token could cause the spawned CLI runtime to see or call MCP tools that should have been owner-only. The practical impact depends on which MCP tools are available; the reported proof used persistent cron state as a representative owner-only action.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.20`.\n\nFixed in the `2026.5.20` stable release.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.20` or later. Keep hook tokens secret, restrict network access to hook endpoints, and disable hooks when they are not needed.",
"id": "GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4",
"modified": "2026-07-02T16:05:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T16:05:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53814"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-privilege-escalation-via-hook-triggered-cli-mcp-tool-authority"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Hook-triggered CLI runs could receive owner MCP tool authority"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.