Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-6HF3-MHGC-CM65

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 22:43 – Updated: 2026-02-20 16:47

Summary

OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback

Details

Vulnerability

In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.

In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account webhookSecret when only the account-level secret was configured.

Typical Use Case Context

Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.

Impact

Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.
Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.
Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: npm openclaw
Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
Patched version: 2026.2.15 (planned next release)

Remediation

Add and enforce tools.sessions.visibility (self | tree | agent | all) across session tools, defaulting to tree.
Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.
Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.

Fix Commit(s)

c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27004"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T22:43:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T00:16:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability\n\nIn some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.\n\nIn Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.\n\n## Typical Use Case Context\n\nMost regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.\n- Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.\n- Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`.\n- Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.\n- Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c`\n\nThanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T16:47:17Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T22:43:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback"
}

CVE-2026-27004 (GCVE-0-2026-27004)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-19 23:18 – Updated: 2026-02-20 15:37

Title

OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback

Summary

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-02-20 15:26 UTC

CWE

CWE-209 - Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
CWE-346 - Origin Validation Error

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c6c53…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
openclaw	openclaw	Affected: < 2026.2.15

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-27004",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-02-20T15:26:55.530069Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-02-20T15:37:31.097Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "openclaw",
          "vendor": "openclaw",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2026.2.15"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "baseScore": 6.9,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-209",
              "description": "CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-346",
              "description": "CWE-346: Origin Validation Error",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-02-19T23:18:47.555Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65",
          "tags": [
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          ],
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        },
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback"
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  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "datePublished": "2026-02-19T23:18:47.555Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-02-17T03:08:23.489Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-02-20T15:37:31.097Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.