GHSA-6HPP-RHFJ-HGRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject programs with inlined helpers if JIT is not available
When an architecture (such as LoongArch, ARM64, and RISC-V) implements bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(), the verifier skips rewriting the helper call offset (insn->imm) in bpf_do_misc_fixups(). This is because the helper is expected to be inlined by the JIT compiler later. Therefore, insn->imm remains as the raw helper enum ID.
However, if JIT is disabled at runtime (net.core.bpf_jit_enable=0) or if JIT compilation fails dynamically (e.g., due to OOM), the program falls back to the BPF interpreter.
When the interpreter executes (__bpf_call_base + insn->imm) with the unpatched raw ID, it jumps into an invalid address space, triggering an instruction alignment fault or a kernel panic.
Although these helpers have valid C implementations in the kernel, the omission of offset rewriting makes runtime interpreter fallback fatal.
Fix this by setting 'prog->jit_required = 1' when helper call rewriting is skipped for JIT inlining. This ensures that such programs are safely rejected if JIT is not available, preventing the runtime kernel panic.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93135"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject programs with inlined helpers if JIT is not available\n\nWhen an architecture (such as LoongArch, ARM64, and RISC-V) implements\nbpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(), the verifier skips rewriting the helper\ncall offset (insn-\u003eimm) in bpf_do_misc_fixups(). This is because the\nhelper is expected to be inlined by the JIT compiler later. Therefore,\ninsn-\u003eimm remains as the raw helper enum ID.\n\nHowever, if JIT is disabled at runtime (net.core.bpf_jit_enable=0) or\nif JIT compilation fails dynamically (e.g., due to OOM), the program\nfalls back to the BPF interpreter.\n\nWhen the interpreter executes (__bpf_call_base + insn-\u003eimm) with the\nunpatched raw ID, it jumps into an invalid address space, triggering\nan instruction alignment fault or a kernel panic.\n\nAlthough these helpers have valid C implementations in the kernel, the\nomission of offset rewriting makes runtime interpreter fallback fatal.\n\nFix this by setting \u0027prog-\u003ejit_required = 1\u0027 when helper call rewriting\nis skipped for JIT inlining. This ensures that such programs are safely\nrejected if JIT is not available, preventing the runtime kernel panic.",
"id": "GHSA-6hpp-rhfj-hgrp",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21c6445366795fa3a89954e1d318e7c8afdef843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1c27922576edccb99d0257827d09bd05c0304a6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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