GHSA-722M-4RR5-CVFH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-18 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-18 18:30
VLAI?
Details

Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco Discovery Protocol and Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) implementations for Cisco IP Phone Series 68xx/78xx/88xx could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute code remotely or cause a reload of an affected IP phone. These vulnerabilities are due to missing checks when the IP phone processes a Cisco Discovery Protocol or LLDP packet. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a malicious Cisco Discovery Protocol or LLDP packet to the targeted IP phone. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute code on the affected IP phone or cause it to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.Note: Cisco Discovery Protocol is a Layer 2 protocol. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker must be in the same broadcast domain as the affected device (Layer 2 adjacent).Cisco has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-1379"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-18T16:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco\u0026nbsp;Discovery Protocol and Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) implementations for Cisco\u0026nbsp;IP Phone Series 68xx/78xx/88xx could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute code remotely or cause a reload of an affected IP phone.\nThese vulnerabilities are due to missing checks when the IP phone processes a Cisco\u0026nbsp;Discovery Protocol or LLDP packet. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a malicious Cisco\u0026nbsp;Discovery Protocol or LLDP packet to the targeted IP phone. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute code on the affected IP phone or cause it to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.Note: Cisco\u0026nbsp;Discovery Protocol is a Layer 2 protocol. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker must be in the same broadcast domain as the affected device (Layer 2 adjacent).Cisco\u0026nbsp;has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-722m-4rr5-cvfh",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T18:30:57Z",
  "published": "2024-11-18T18:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1379"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ipphone-rce-dos-U2PsSkz3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-webex-distupd-N87eB6Z3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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