GHSA-7957-WR5G-X2VR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-26 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-26 15:31
VLAI
Details

Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger / check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts app_versions rows whose previous storage_provider is r2-direct, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the /updates endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude r2-direct versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the r2-direct state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through /updates. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-100621"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-26T14:16:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The `enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger` / `check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert` content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts `app_versions` rows whose previous `storage_provider` is `r2-direct`, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the `/updates` endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude `r2-direct` versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the `r2-direct` state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through `/updates`. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-7957-wr5g-x2vr",
  "modified": "2026-09-26T15:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-09-26T15:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-5rg9-rhwj-wj76"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100621"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-app-content-lock-bypass-via-r2-direct-bundle-mutation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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