GHSA-7CVM-G94W-XFG7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-10 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-10 06:30The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the create_support_user() function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — user_login 'groundhogg' and email addresses 'support@groundhogg.io' / 'help@groundhogg.io' — where the in_array() email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose user_login is 'groundhogg' and whose user_email matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds manage_network_options — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the submit_ticket or process_send_support_access entry points to trigger the promotion.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92975"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-10T06:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Groundhogg \u2014 CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants \u2014 `user_login` `\u0027groundhogg\u0027` and email addresses `\u0027support@groundhogg.io\u0027` / `\u0027help@groundhogg.io\u0027` \u2014 where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `\u0027groundhogg\u0027` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator \u2014 and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` \u2014 resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.",
"id": "GHSA-7cvm-g94w-xfg7",
"modified": "2026-10-10T06:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-10-10T06:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/groundhoggwp/groundhogg/commit/4b413aa6e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c355658a-515a-48ed-a114-6a202e23e34b?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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