GHSA-858H-WHJF-MVG5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 23:47 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:47
VLAI
Summary
simple-git: unsafe-operations plugin bypass via git long-option abbreviation (--receive-p/--exe) -> command execution (residual of CVE-2026-28291)
Details

simple-git's blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin blocks dangerous git options (--upload-pack/--receive-pack/--exec/...) unless the consumer opts in via unsafe:{allowUnsafePack:true}. Detection (@simple-git/argv-parser detectVulnerableFlags) matches the parsed flag NAME against literal-spelling patterns: /--(upload|receive)-pack/ (requires the literal '-pack') and the string '--exec'. But git accepts unambiguous prefix abbreviations of long options, and expandToken (token-expander.ts) returns the LITERAL token as flag.name (it uses the spec only for needsNext, never to canonicalize). So git push --receive-p=<cmd> parses with flag.name='--receive-p', which /--(upload|receive)-pack/ does NOT match, yet git expands --receive-p -> --receive-pack and runs (on a local/file remote, locally). The clone side is robust (its '--u' substring rule catches every --upload abbreviation); the push --receive- and --exe* abbreviations have no equivalent rule and slip through.

Proof of concept (latest: simple-git 3.36.0, @simple-git/argv-parser 1.1.1, default unsafe plugin ON): Gate vulnerabilityCheck: 'push --receive-pack=touch...' -> BLOCKED; 'push --receive-pa=touch...' and 'push --receive-p=touch...' -> BYPASS (empty vulns); '--exec=' BLOCKED, '--exe=' BYPASS. End-to-end via simpleGit().push(): CONTROL git.push(['../bare','HEAD:refs/heads/c','--receive-pack=touch /tmp/pwned_ctrl;']) -> throws GitPluginError 'Use of --upload-pack or --receive-pack is not permitted...'; no command runs. BYPASS git.push(['../bare','HEAD:refs/heads/e2e','--receive-p=touch /tmp/pwned_e2e;']) -> NO GitPluginError; /tmp/pwned_e2e CREATED (git executed the injected command); only a later GitError surfaces. Direct git confirms git push ../bare --receive-p='touch X;' HEAD:refs/heads/m and --exe='touch Y;' both execute on a local/path remote.

Impact: any app relying on simple-git's default unsafe-operations protection while passing attacker-influenced options/args into a git push (local/file remote, or attacker-influenced receive-pack target) can be made to execute arbitrary commands -- the exact protection CVE-2026-28291 provided, defeated by an abbreviated spelling. Same class/impact as GHSA-jcxm-m3jx-f287, on the push path.

Remediation: canonicalize git option abbreviations before matching (resolve to the canonical long name via the per-task flag spec in expandToken), or match on the option stem/prefix down to the shortest unambiguous form for push receive-pack/exec (mirroring the clone-side '--u' approach). Also audit --template and -c/config-write detection for the same abbreviation gap.

Credit: anir0y (independent security research).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.36.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "simple-git"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102827"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:47:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T19:17:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "simple-git\u0027s blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin blocks dangerous git options (--upload-pack/--receive-pack/--exec/...) unless the consumer opts in via unsafe:{allowUnsafePack:true}. Detection (@simple-git/argv-parser detectVulnerableFlags) matches the parsed flag NAME against literal-spelling patterns: /--(upload|receive)-pack/ (requires the literal \u0027-pack\u0027) and the string \u0027--exec\u0027. But git accepts unambiguous prefix abbreviations of long options, and expandToken (token-expander.ts) returns the LITERAL token as flag.name (it uses the spec only for needsNext, never to canonicalize). So `git push --receive-p=\u003ccmd\u003e` parses with flag.name=\u0027--receive-p\u0027, which /--(upload|receive)-pack/ does NOT match, yet git expands --receive-p -\u003e --receive-pack and runs \u003ccmd\u003e (on a local/file remote, locally). The clone side is robust (its \u0027--u\u0027 substring rule catches every --upload* abbreviation); the push --receive-* and --exe* abbreviations have no equivalent rule and slip through.\n\nProof of concept (latest: simple-git 3.36.0, @simple-git/argv-parser 1.1.1, default unsafe plugin ON):\nGate vulnerabilityCheck: \u0027push --receive-pack=touch...\u0027 -\u003e BLOCKED; \u0027push --receive-pa=touch...\u0027 and \u0027push --receive-p=touch...\u0027 -\u003e BYPASS (empty vulns); \u0027--exec=\u0027 BLOCKED, \u0027--exe=\u0027 BYPASS.\nEnd-to-end via simpleGit().push():\n  CONTROL git.push([\u0027../bare\u0027,\u0027HEAD:refs/heads/c\u0027,\u0027--receive-pack=touch /tmp/pwned_ctrl;\u0027]) -\u003e throws GitPluginError \u0027Use of --upload-pack or --receive-pack is not permitted...\u0027; no command runs.\n  BYPASS  git.push([\u0027../bare\u0027,\u0027HEAD:refs/heads/e2e\u0027,\u0027--receive-p=touch /tmp/pwned_e2e;\u0027]) -\u003e NO GitPluginError; /tmp/pwned_e2e CREATED (git executed the injected command); only a later GitError surfaces.\nDirect git confirms `git push ../bare --receive-p=\u0027touch X;\u0027 HEAD:refs/heads/m` and `--exe=\u0027touch Y;\u0027` both execute on a local/path remote.\n\nImpact: any app relying on simple-git\u0027s default unsafe-operations protection while passing attacker-influenced options/args into a git push (local/file remote, or attacker-influenced receive-pack target) can be made to execute arbitrary commands -- the exact protection CVE-2026-28291 provided, defeated by an abbreviated spelling. Same class/impact as GHSA-jcxm-m3jx-f287, on the push path.\n\nRemediation: canonicalize git option abbreviations before matching (resolve to the canonical long name via the per-task flag spec in expandToken), or match on the option stem/prefix down to the shortest unambiguous form for push receive-pack/exec (mirroring the clone-side \u0027--u\u0027 approach). Also audit --template and -c/config-write detection for the same abbreviation gap.\n\nCredit: anir0y (independent security research).",
  "id": "GHSA-858h-whjf-mvg5",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T23:47:58Z",
  "published": "2026-10-05T23:47:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/security/advisories/GHSA-858h-whjf-mvg5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102827"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/pull/1193"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/commit/98864c678444d9336357c844efa4fd5a7984c0d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/releases/tag/simple-git@4.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "simple-git: unsafe-operations plugin bypass via git long-option abbreviation (--receive-p/--exe) -\u003e command execution (residual of CVE-2026-28291)"
}



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