GHSA-8P34-64R3-MWG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:36 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:36
VLAI
Summary
Net::IMAP: Command Injection via non-synchronizing literal in "raw" argument
Details

Several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals.

Details

Raw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing. Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities. But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-synchronizing literals prior to sending.

Servers without support for non-synchronizing literals could handle them in several different ways: If a server sees a "}\r\n" byte sequence but can't parse the literal bytesize, it may cautiously decide to close the connection, blocking any command injection attacks. However, a server without support for non-synchronizing literals may instead interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed.

This affects the following commands' string arguments: * criteria for #search and #uid_search * search_keys for #sort, #thread, #uid_sort, and #uid_thread * attr for #fetch and #uid_fetch

Prior to net-imap v0.6.4, v0.5.14, and v0.4.24, raw data arguments were not validated in any way, so they were also vulnerable to this attack. See CVE-2026-42257 (GHSA-hm49-wcqc-g2xg).

Impact

Fortunately, LITERAL- is supported by most modern IMAP servers. Even without support for non-synchronizing literals, cautious servers may handle invalid literal bytesize by closing the connection . However, servers which handle a non-synchronizing literal just like any other malformed command will enable this vulnerability.

If a developer passes an unvalidated user-controlled input for one of these method arguments, an attacker can append CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system's attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application's installed response handlers.

Mitigation

Update to a version of net-imap which validates server support for non-synchronizing literals before sending them.

If upgrading net-imap is not possible: * Explicitly validate user-controlled inputs to prevent embedded non-synchronizing literals unless the server supports them. * For a simpler, more cautious approach: all embedded literals can be unconditionally prohibited, by checking that string inputs do not contain any CR or LF bytes. * Verify that the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities before using untrusted string inputs for the affected "raw data" arguments.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "net-imap"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "net-imap"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47240"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-09T18:36:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Several Net::IMAP commands accept a \"raw data\" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection.  However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals.\n\n### Details\n\nRaw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing.  Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the `LITERAL+`, `LITERAL-`, or `IMAP4rev2` capabilities.  But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-synchronizing literals prior to sending.\n\nServers without support for non-synchronizing literals could handle them in several different ways:  If a server sees a `\"}\\r\\n\"` byte sequence but can\u0027t parse the literal bytesize, it _may_ cautiously decide to close the connection, blocking any command injection attacks.  However, a server without support for non-synchronizing literals may instead interpret the `\"+}\\r\\n\"` as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged `BAD`.  In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed.\n\nThis affects the following commands\u0027 string arguments:\n* `criteria` for `#search` and `#uid_search`\n* `search_keys` for `#sort`, `#thread`, `#uid_sort`, and `#uid_thread`\n* `attr` for `#fetch` and `#uid_fetch`\n\nPrior to `net-imap` v0.6.4, v0.5.14, and v0.4.24, raw data arguments were not validated in _any_ way, so they were also vulnerable to this attack.  See CVE-2026-42257 (GHSA-hm49-wcqc-g2xg).\n\n### Impact\n\nFortunately, `LITERAL-` is supported by most modern IMAP servers.  Even without support for non-synchronizing literals, cautious servers may handle invalid literal bytesize by closing the connection .  However, servers which handle a non-synchronizing literal just like any other malformed command will enable this vulnerability.\n\nIf a developer passes an unvalidated user-controlled input for one of these method arguments, an attacker can append CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system\u0027s attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application\u0027s installed response handlers.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpdate to a version of `net-imap` which validates server support for non-synchronizing literals before sending them.\n\nIf upgrading `net-imap` is not possible:\n* Explicitly validate user-controlled inputs to prevent embedded non-synchronizing literals unless the server supports them.\n* For a simpler, more cautious approach: all embedded literals can be unconditionally prohibited, by checking that string inputs do not contain any CR or LF bytes.\n* Verify that the server advertises any of the `LITERAL+`, `LITERAL-`, or `IMAP4rev2` capabilities before using untrusted string inputs for the affected \"raw data\" arguments.",
  "id": "GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T18:36:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-09T18:36:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.6.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Net::IMAP: Command Injection via non-synchronizing literal in \"raw\" argument"
}


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