GHSA-8RWR-F68V-CVW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:38 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:16Summary
The upload-by-URL path did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against either the remote file's advertised Content-Length or the decoded length of a data: URI, allowing an authenticated user to bypass the configured per-file size limit.
Details
The attachments service now checks NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against both the HEAD response's content-length and the decoded length of a data: URI body before fetching. The local storage plugin additionally sets maxContentLength on the axios download so a malicious server cannot stream past the limit.
Impact
Authenticated users with upload permission could attach files larger than the operator-configured limit, defeating storage and bandwidth caps.
Credit
This issue was reported by @bugbunny-research.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nocodb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.301.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46553"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:38:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T21:16:58Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe upload-by-URL path did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against either the remote file\u0027s advertised `Content-Length` or the decoded length of a `data:` URI, allowing an authenticated user to bypass the configured per-file size limit.\n\n### Details\nThe attachments service now checks `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against both the HEAD response\u0027s `content-length` and the decoded length of a `data:` URI body before fetching. The local storage plugin additionally sets `maxContentLength` on the axios download so a malicious server cannot stream past the limit.\n\n### Impact\nAuthenticated users with upload permission could attach files larger than the operator-configured limit, defeating storage and bandwidth caps.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by [@bugbunny-research](https://github.com/bugbunny-research).",
"id": "GHSA-8rwr-f68v-cvw6",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:16:48Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T20:38:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-8rwr-f68v-cvw6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46553"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NocoDB: Attachment Size Limit Bypass via Upload-by-URL"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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