GHSA-96FF-GC8G-WPVG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:29 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:19
VLAI
Summary
DeepSeek TUI has SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in fetch_url Tool
Details

Summary

The fetch_url tool validates the initial URL's resolved IP address against a restricted-IP blocklist (is_restricted_ip()) to prevent SSRF attacks against internal services (cloud metadata endpoints, localhost, private networks). However, the HTTP client (reqwest) is configured to automatically follow up to 5 redirects (reqwest::redirect::Policy::limited(5)) without re-validating the redirect target against the same SSRF protections.

PoC

Step 1 — Baseline: Confirm fetch_url blocks direct requests to restricted IPs.

Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Expected: Error — "restricted address (private/loopback/link-local)"

Step 2 — SSRF bypass via redirect: Fetch a public URL that redirects to the restricted IP.

Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&status_code=302

Expected result: The error message says "connection refused" or "request failed: connect error" — NOT "restricted address." This proves the SSRF filter was bypassed; the connection failed only because 169.254.169.254 is unreachable from a non-cloud machine.

Observed result: fetch_url followed the 302 redirect and attempted to connect to 169.254.169.254. The error was a TCP-level connection failure, confirming the application-layer SSRF check was not applied to the redirect target.

Step 3 — Redirect to attacker-controlled host: Confirm attacker-controlled redirect targets are followed.

Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://[collaborator-domain]/ssrf-redirect-bypass&status_code=302
Expected: Collaborator receives HTTP callback at /ssrf-redirect-bypass, confirming the redirect was followed.

Impact

On cloud-hosted instances (AWS, GCP, Azure), an attacker can exfiltrate cloud IAM credentials, instance metadata, and other sensitive internal service data by redirecting fetch_url to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/. The attack is triggered via prompt injection (malicious instructions embedded in files or web content the model processes) that cause the model to call fetch_url with an attacker-controlled URL.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "deepseek-tui-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45310"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:29:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T18:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `fetch_url` tool validates the initial URL\u0027s resolved IP address against a restricted-IP blocklist (`is_restricted_ip()`) to prevent SSRF attacks against internal services (cloud metadata endpoints, localhost, private networks). However, the HTTP client (`reqwest`) is configured to automatically follow up to 5 redirects (`reqwest::redirect::Policy::limited(5)`) without re-validating the redirect target against the same SSRF protections.\n\n### PoC\n**Step 1 \u2014 Baseline:** Confirm `fetch_url` blocks direct requests to restricted IPs.\n```\nPrompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\nExpected: Error \u2014 \"restricted address (private/loopback/link-local)\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 SSRF bypass via redirect:** Fetch a public URL that redirects to the restricted IP.\n\n```\nPrompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\u0026status_code=302\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The error message says \"connection refused\" or \"request failed: connect error\" \u2014 NOT \"restricted address.\" This proves the SSRF filter was bypassed; the connection failed only because `169.254.169.254` is unreachable from a non-cloud machine.\n\n**Observed result:** `fetch_url` followed the 302 redirect and attempted to connect to `169.254.169.254`. The error was a TCP-level connection failure, confirming the application-layer SSRF check was not applied to the redirect target.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Redirect to attacker-controlled host:** Confirm attacker-controlled redirect targets are followed.\n\n```\nPrompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://[collaborator-domain]/ssrf-redirect-bypass\u0026status_code=302\nExpected: Collaborator receives HTTP callback at /ssrf-redirect-bypass, confirming the redirect was followed.\n```\n\n### Impact\nOn cloud-hosted instances (AWS, GCP, Azure), an attacker can exfiltrate cloud IAM credentials, instance metadata, and other sensitive internal service data by redirecting `fetch_url` to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`. The attack is triggered via prompt injection (malicious instructions embedded in files or web content the model processes) that cause the model to call `fetch_url` with an attacker-controlled URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-96ff-gc8g-wpvg",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:19:44Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T20:29:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-96ff-gc8g-wpvg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/security/advisories/GHSA-96ff-gc8g-wpvg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45310"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/releases/tag/v0.8.22"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DeepSeek TUI has SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in fetch_url Tool"
}



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