GHSA-992G-9CR3-VM5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:40 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:40Cross-tenant disclosure risk on DurableTask bidi RPC
This is a low-severity, low-risk cross-tenant data exposure vuln caused by blindly accepting a durable task id, in addition to a list of node and branch ids that identify records in that task's event log, and returning them to the caller via the handleWorkerStatus polling path.
Impact
This advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task's external uuid belonging to another tenant. External ids are generated uuid v4s (uuid.New() in Go), so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.
Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:
- Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)
- Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance
- Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker
Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.106.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-88978"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T16:17:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Cross-tenant disclosure risk on `DurableTask` bidi RPC\n\nThis is a low-severity, low-risk cross-tenant data exposure vuln caused by blindly accepting a durable task id, in addition to a list of node and branch ids that identify records in that task\u0027s event log, and returning them to the caller via the `handleWorkerStatus` polling path.\n\n# Impact\n\nThis advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task\u0027s external uuid belonging to another tenant. External ids are generated uuid v4s (`uuid.New()` in Go), so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.\n\n### Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:\n\n* Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)\n* Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance\n* Any deployment where a single tenant\u0027s API token can be obtained by an attacker\n\nSingle-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the \"victim\" and \"attacker\" tenants would be the same).",
"id": "GHSA-992g-9cr3-vm5x",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-992g-9cr3-vm5x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/15bc7923d3a8ebfeb0d88c19160dd24828921e85"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hatchet DurableTask WorkerStatus gRPC resolves caller-supplied durable-task UUIDs via ListSatisfiedEntries with no tenant_id filter"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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