GHSA-9C22-PWXW-P6HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-14 21:47 – Updated: 2022-11-07 21:13Impact
Initializer functions that are invoked separate from contract creation (the most prominent example being minimal proxies) may be reentered if they make an untrusted non-view external call.
Once an initializer has finished running it can never be re-executed. However, an exception put in place to support multiple inheritance made reentrancy possible in the scenario described above, breaking the expectation that there is a single execution.
Note that upgradeable proxies are commonly initialized together with contract creation, where reentrancy is not feasible, so the impact of this issue is believed to be minor.
Patches
A fix is included in the version v4.4.1 of @openzeppelin/contracts and @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable.
Workarounds
Avoid untrusted external calls during initialization.
References
https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3006
Credits
This issue was identified and reported by @chaitinblockchain through our bug bounty on Immunefi.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/contracts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-39384"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-665"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-12-14T19:22:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-04T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nInitializer functions that are invoked separate from contract creation (the most prominent example being minimal proxies) may be reentered if they make an untrusted non-view external call.\n\nOnce an initializer has finished running it can never be re-executed. However, an exception put in place to support multiple inheritance made reentrancy possible in the scenario described above, breaking the expectation that there is a single execution.\n\nNote that upgradeable proxies are commonly initialized together with contract creation, where reentrancy is not feasible, so the impact of this issue is believed to be minor.\n\n### Patches\n\nA fix is included in the version v4.4.1 of `@openzeppelin/contracts` and `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAvoid untrusted external calls during initialization.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3006\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified and reported by @chaitinblockchain through [our bug bounty on Immunefi](https://immunefi.com/bounty/openzeppelin/).\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.\n",
"id": "GHSA-9c22-pwxw-p6hx",
"modified": "2022-11-07T21:13:24Z",
"published": "2021-12-14T21:47:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-9c22-pwxw-p6hx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39384"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3006"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenZeppelin Contracts initializer reentrancy may lead to double initialization"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.