GHSA-9RJW-3GWP-F59V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 20:55 – Updated: 2026-07-06 20:55
VLAI
Summary
Coder's workspace app upsert allows cross-workspace agent rebinding via user-controlled app ID
Details

Summary

UpsertWorkspaceApp overwrites an existing app's agent_id on a primary-key conflict and insertAgentApp accepts the app ID from the provisioner's CompleteJob payload without verifying it belongs to the workspace being built. CompleteJob runs under dbauthz.AsProvisionerd so the authorization layer does not block the cross-workspace upsert.

Note: Exploitation requires elevated access as a template author or external provisioner operator.

Impact

A user with template authorship or external provisioner access can submit a CompleteJob payload with a known victim app UUID and an attacker-controlled agent ID. On completion of the attacker's build the victim's app row is rebound to the attacker's agent so later app traffic such as IDE and terminal sessions is proxied to the attacker's workspace. App UUIDs are discoverable through the public API.

Patches

The fix verifies that any existing workspace_apps row matching the supplied ID belongs to the workspace being built and rejects cross-workspace agent reassignment.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line Patched version
2.34 v2.34.2
2.33 v2.33.8
2.32 v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR) v2.29.17

Workarounds

None. Upgrading is required.

Resources

  • Fix: #26103

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22441) for independently disclosing this issue!

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.29.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55429"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T20:55:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`UpsertWorkspaceApp` overwrites an existing app\u0027s `agent_id` on a primary-key conflict and `insertAgentApp` accepts the app ID from the provisioner\u0027s `CompleteJob` payload without verifying it belongs to the workspace being built. `CompleteJob` runs under `dbauthz.AsProvisionerd` so the authorization layer does not block the cross-workspace upsert.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Exploitation requires elevated access as a template author or external provisioner operator.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user with template authorship or external provisioner access can submit a `CompleteJob` payload with a known victim app UUID and an attacker-controlled agent ID. On completion of the attacker\u0027s build the victim\u0027s app row is rebound to the attacker\u0027s agent so later app traffic such as IDE and terminal sessions is proxied to the attacker\u0027s workspace. App UUIDs are discoverable through the public API.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix verifies that any existing `workspace_apps` row matching the supplied ID belongs to the workspace being built and rejects cross-workspace agent reassignment.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |\n| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrading is required.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Fix: #26103\n\n### Credits\n\nCoder would like to thank Anthropic\u0027s Security Team (ANT-2026-22441) for independently disclosing this issue!",
  "id": "GHSA-9rjw-3gwp-f59v",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T20:55:37Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T20:55:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-9rjw-3gwp-f59v"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26103"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Coder\u0027s workspace app upsert allows cross-workspace agent rebinding via user-controlled app ID"
}


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