GHSA-CGRJ-W8M6-F297

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-14 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-19 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rust_binder: correctly handle FDA objects of length zero

Fix a bug where an empty FDA (fd array) object with 0 fds would cause an out-of-bounds error. The previous implementation used skip == 0 to mean "this is a pointer fixup", but 0 is also the correct skip length for an empty FDA. If the FDA is at the end of the buffer, then this results in an attempt to write 8-bytes out of bounds. This is caught and results in an EINVAL error being returned to userspace.

The pattern of using skip == 0 as a special value originates from the C-implementation of Binder. As part of fixing this bug, this pattern is replaced with a Rust enum.

I considered the alternate option of not pushing a fixup when the length is zero, but I think it's cleaner to just get rid of the zero-is-special stuff.

The root cause of this bug was diagnosed by Gemini CLI on first try. I used the following prompt:

There appears to be a bug in @drivers/android/binder/thread.rs where the Fixups oob bug is triggered with 316 304 316 324. This implies that we somehow ended up with a fixup where buffer A has a pointer to buffer B, but the pointer is located at an index in buffer A that is out of bounds. Please investigate the code to find the bug. You may compare with @drivers/android/binder.c that implements this correctly.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-14T17:15:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrust_binder: correctly handle FDA objects of length zero\n\nFix a bug where an empty FDA (fd array) object with 0 fds would cause an\nout-of-bounds error. The previous implementation used `skip == 0` to\nmean \"this is a pointer fixup\", but 0 is also the correct skip length\nfor an empty FDA. If the FDA is at the end of the buffer, then this\nresults in an attempt to write 8-bytes out of bounds. This is caught and\nresults in an EINVAL error being returned to userspace.\n\nThe pattern of using `skip == 0` as a special value originates from the\nC-implementation of Binder. As part of fixing this bug, this pattern is\nreplaced with a Rust enum.\n\nI considered the alternate option of not pushing a fixup when the length\nis zero, but I think it\u0027s cleaner to just get rid of the zero-is-special\nstuff.\n\nThe root cause of this bug was diagnosed by Gemini CLI on first try. I\nused the following prompt:\n\n\u003e There appears to be a bug in @drivers/android/binder/thread.rs where\n\u003e the Fixups oob bug is triggered with 316 304 316 324. This implies\n\u003e that we somehow ended up with a fixup where buffer A has a pointer to\n\u003e buffer B, but the pointer is located at an index in buffer A that is\n\u003e out of bounds. Please investigate the code to find the bug. You may\n\u003e compare with @drivers/android/binder.c that implements this correctly.",
  "id": "GHSA-cgrj-w8m6-f297",
  "modified": "2026-03-19T18:31:14Z",
  "published": "2026-02-14T18:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/598fe3ff32e43918ed8a062f55432b3d23e6340c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f589c9c3be539d6c2b393c82940c3783831082f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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