CVE-2026-23194 (GCVE-0-2026-23194)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-14 16:27 – Updated: 2026-02-14 16:27
VLAI?
Title
rust_binder: correctly handle FDA objects of length zero
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: correctly handle FDA objects of length zero Fix a bug where an empty FDA (fd array) object with 0 fds would cause an out-of-bounds error. The previous implementation used `skip == 0` to mean "this is a pointer fixup", but 0 is also the correct skip length for an empty FDA. If the FDA is at the end of the buffer, then this results in an attempt to write 8-bytes out of bounds. This is caught and results in an EINVAL error being returned to userspace. The pattern of using `skip == 0` as a special value originates from the C-implementation of Binder. As part of fixing this bug, this pattern is replaced with a Rust enum. I considered the alternate option of not pushing a fixup when the length is zero, but I think it's cleaner to just get rid of the zero-is-special stuff. The root cause of this bug was diagnosed by Gemini CLI on first try. I used the following prompt: > There appears to be a bug in @drivers/android/binder/thread.rs where > the Fixups oob bug is triggered with 316 304 316 324. This implies > that we somehow ended up with a fixup where buffer A has a pointer to > buffer B, but the pointer is located at an index in buffer A that is > out of bounds. Please investigate the code to find the bug. You may > compare with @drivers/android/binder.c that implements this correctly.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: eafedbc7c050c44744fbdf80bdf3315e860b7513 , < 598fe3ff32e43918ed8a062f55432b3d23e6340c (git)
Affected: eafedbc7c050c44744fbdf80bdf3315e860b7513 , < 8f589c9c3be539d6c2b393c82940c3783831082f (git)
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    Linux Linux Affected: 6.18
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.18 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.10 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.19 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

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        "shortName": "Linux"
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    "datePublished": "2026-02-14T16:27:20.944Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:45.985Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-02-14T16:27:20.944Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-23194\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-02-14T17:15:57.233\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-02-14T17:15:57.233\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nrust_binder: correctly handle FDA objects of length zero\\n\\nFix a bug where an empty FDA (fd array) object with 0 fds would cause an\\nout-of-bounds error. The previous implementation used `skip == 0` to\\nmean \\\"this is a pointer fixup\\\", but 0 is also the correct skip length\\nfor an empty FDA. If the FDA is at the end of the buffer, then this\\nresults in an attempt to write 8-bytes out of bounds. This is caught and\\nresults in an EINVAL error being returned to userspace.\\n\\nThe pattern of using `skip == 0` as a special value originates from the\\nC-implementation of Binder. As part of fixing this bug, this pattern is\\nreplaced with a Rust enum.\\n\\nI considered the alternate option of not pushing a fixup when the length\\nis zero, but I think it\u0027s cleaner to just get rid of the zero-is-special\\nstuff.\\n\\nThe root cause of this bug was diagnosed by Gemini CLI on first try. I\\nused the following prompt:\\n\\n\u003e There appears to be a bug in @drivers/android/binder/thread.rs where\\n\u003e the Fixups oob bug is triggered with 316 304 316 324. This implies\\n\u003e that we somehow ended up with a fixup where buffer A has a pointer to\\n\u003e buffer B, but the pointer is located at an index in buffer A that is\\n\u003e out of bounds. Please investigate the code to find the bug. You may\\n\u003e compare with @drivers/android/binder.c that implements this correctly.\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/598fe3ff32e43918ed8a062f55432b3d23e6340c\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f589c9c3be539d6c2b393c82940c3783831082f\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
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