GHSA-CPGJ-F7G3-2PP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:02 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:01Summary
When fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against
--deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname
resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain
name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the
network restriction entirely.
Impact
Code running under --deny-net could reach hosts that the user intended to
block. In practice this means network isolation rules — for example, blocking
access to localhost or internal services — could be silently circumvented by
a malicious or compromised dependency.
A companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API.
Who is affected
Users who:
- run untrusted or third-party code with
deno run, and - rely on
--deny-netto restrict which hosts that code can reach.
If you do not use --deny-net, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are
not affected.
Workaround
No workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not
possible, avoid granting --allow-net to untrusted code that also has
--deny-net restrictions you depend on for security.
Fix
The fetch() DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP
address before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how
Deno.connect already behaved.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49859"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:02:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen `fetch()` was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against\n`--deny-net` rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname\nresolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain\nname that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the\nnetwork restriction entirely.\n\n## Impact\n\nCode running under `--deny-net` could reach hosts that the user intended to\nblock. In practice this means network isolation rules \u2014 for example, blocking\naccess to `localhost` or internal services \u2014 could be silently circumvented by\na malicious or compromised dependency.\n\nA companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API.\n\n## Who is affected\n\nUsers who:\n\n- run untrusted or third-party code with `deno run`, and\n- rely on `--deny-net` to restrict which hosts that code can reach.\n\nIf you do not use `--deny-net`, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are\nnot affected.\n\n## Workaround\n\nNo workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not\npossible, avoid granting `--allow-net` to untrusted code that also has\n`--deny-net` restrictions you depend on for security.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe `fetch()` DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP\naddress before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how\n`Deno.connect` already behaved.",
"id": "GHSA-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:01:14Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T19:02:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49859"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deno: `fetch()` API sandbox bypass via missing DNS resolution check"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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