GHSA-FH2F-XFXC-Q9CC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 22:20 – Updated: 2026-07-28 22:20
VLAI
Summary
openhole-server vulnerable to path traversal via URL-decoded request path
Details

Summary

openhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (r.URL.Path) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (%2e) and separators (%2f) were decoded to ../ and / before reaching the local service.

Go's ServeMux rejects literal ../ paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as working path traversal.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker could read files outside the published web root on tunneled local services that resolve paths without canonicalization.

Example: - /%2e%2e/secret.txt → file outside web root - /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd → sensitive files

Encoded slashes (/a%2fb) could also bypass path-based access controls.

Fix

v0.1.2 forwards r.URL.EscapedPath() on the server and preserves the request-target on the CLI client.

Users should upgrade both openhole-server and the openhole CLI to v0.1.2 or later.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/bablilayoub/openhole"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54650"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T22:20:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nopenhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (`r.URL.Path`) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (`%2e`) and separators (`%2f`) were decoded to `../` and `/` before reaching the local service.\n\nGo\u0027s ServeMux rejects literal `../` paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as working path traversal.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker could read files outside the published web root on tunneled local services that resolve paths without canonicalization.\n\nExample:\n- `/%2e%2e/secret.txt` \u2192 file outside web root\n- `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` \u2192 sensitive files\n\nEncoded slashes (`/a%2fb`) could also bypass path-based access controls.\n\n## Fix\n\nv0.1.2 forwards `r.URL.EscapedPath()` on the server and preserves the request-target on the CLI client.\n\nUsers should upgrade both openhole-server and the openhole CLI to v0.1.2 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-fh2f-xfxc-q9cc",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T22:20:51Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T22:20:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bablilayoub/openhole/security/advisories/GHSA-fh2f-xfxc-q9cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bablilayoub/openhole/commit/a28c27adde2a7ed0c347b730c8707208c0f78ed3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bablilayoub/openhole"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bablilayoub/openhole/releases/tag/v0.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "openhole-server vulnerable to path traversal via URL-decoded request path"
}



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