Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-FJWV-JF2V-J499

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:34 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:34

Summary

Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler

Details

Summary

The SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go makes an unvalidated http.Get() call to payload.UnsubscribeURL without any URL restriction. Because UnsubscribeURL is intentionally excluded from the BuildSignature() signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the VerifyPayload() signature check entirely and triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at 169.254.169.254.

### Impact

This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier account can:

Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS
Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet
Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server's network context

Severity

4.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "hatchet-dev/hatchet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.91.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61681"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:34:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T16:17:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n  The SNS `UnsubscribeConfirmation` handler in `internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go` makes an unvalidated\n  `http.Get()` call to `payload.UnsubscribeURL` without any URL restriction. Because `UnsubscribeURL` is intentionally\n  excluded from the `BuildSignature()` signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately\n  AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the `VerifyPayload()` signature check entirely and\n  triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure \u2014 including the EC2 Instance Metadata\n  Service (IMDS) at `169.254.169.254`.\n\n ### Impact\n\n  This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier\n  account can:\n\n  - Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS\n  - Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet\n  - Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server\u0027s network\n  context",
  "id": "GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:34:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:34:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61681"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/2d211bce16e5022afaf95780de82dc30e0bcba98"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler"
}

CVE-2026-61681 (GCVE-0-2026-61681)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-21 15:42 – Updated: 2026-09-24 22:17

Title

Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler

Summary

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.

Severity

4.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-24 22:16 UTC

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/2d2…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
hatchet-dev	hatchet	Affected: < 0.91.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-61681",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-24T22:16:56.469427Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T22:17:06.909Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "hatchet",
          "vendor": "hatchet-dev",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.91.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 4.1,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T15:42:21.803Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/2d211bce16e5022afaf95780de82dc30e0bcba98",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/2d211bce16e5022afaf95780de82dc30e0bcba98"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-61681",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-21T15:42:21.803Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-10T18:36:58.848Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T22:17:06.909Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Action not permitted

GHSA-FJWV-JF2V-J499

Summary

CVE-2026-61681 (GCVE-0-2026-61681)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour