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GHSA-GWQP-9QGW-C5PV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 03:30 – Updated: 2026-09-11 06:31
VLAI
Details

The nscd service in the GNU C Library 2.3.4 onwards may crash due to a stack overflow when a malicious DNS server returns too large a response for a DNS query, resulting in degraded DNS resolution for the system.

Exploitation of this bug needs a system that has nscd enabled and using an untrusted DNS server for name resolution, with the compromised DNS server being capable of processing records large enough to result in a stack overflow in an nscd thread stack.  During experimentation, bind 9 was unable to handle large records, but that could change in future or with a different name server.  In typical installations, nscd is executed in an isolated context as its own user without a shell, due to which any compromise of that service is isolated.

There is a remote possibility of nscd cache corruption if an attacker manages to get the stack pointer into a desired point in the heap, potentially resulting in other caches in nscd being overwritten with corrupt data through the stack overflow, until the buggy code path eventually results in a crash.

Finally, a crash in nscd may result in performance degradation when resolving names, but it does not result in a denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89092"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T02:18:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The nscd service in the GNU C Library 2.3.4 onwards may crash due to a \nstack overflow when a malicious DNS server returns too large a response \nfor a DNS query, resulting in degraded DNS resolution for the system.\n\n\n\nExploitation of this bug needs a system that has nscd enabled and using \nan untrusted DNS server for name resolution, with the compromised DNS \nserver being capable of processing records large enough to result in a \nstack overflow in an nscd thread stack.\u00a0 During experimentation, bind 9 \nwas unable to handle large records, but that could change in future or \nwith a different name server.\u00a0 In typical installations, nscd is \nexecuted in an isolated context as its own user without a shell, due to \nwhich any compromise of that service is isolated.\n\n\n\nThere is a remote possibility of nscd cache corruption if an attacker \nmanages to get the stack pointer into a desired point in the heap, \npotentially resulting in other caches in nscd being overwritten with \ncorrupt data through the stack overflow, until the buggy code path \neventually results in a crash.\n\n\n\nFinally, a crash in nscd may result in performance degradation when \nresolving names, but it does not result in a denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-gwqp-9qgw-c5pv",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T06:31:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T03:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=34624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob_plain;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/11/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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