{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107813"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:08:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIncomplete fix of GHSA-5v7c-xpfp-p65m: the secure-session (OTP step-up) requirement added to the nginx, cert, dns, backup, site, and stream mutation routers was not applied to the parallel api/cluster router, so cluster node management and cluster-wide nginx reload/restart run with only a JWT and no step-up. An authenticated user whose JWT is stolen or persisted, but who does not hold a fresh secure-session, can perform cluster node CRUD (including reading and rewriting a node token secret) and trigger cluster-wide nginx reload/restart. Confirmed at HEAD 2cb7ee9102c9d87274de2fa104db804841d140a0.\n\n## The defect\n\nGHSA-5v7c-xpfp-p65m required a fresh secure session (an OTP step-up beyond the JWT) for sensitive mutation routes. The fix wrapped the nginx, cert, dns, backup, site, and stream mutation handlers in middleware.RequireSecureSession() and added reload/restart to the MCP sensitive-tool list. It did not touch the physically separate api/cluster package, whose router registers the same class of sensitive operations on the bare authenticated group.\n\nThe fixed sibling, api/nginx/router.go:\n\n```go\no := r.Group(\"\", middleware.RequireSecureSession())   // line 28\n{\n    o.POST(\"nginx/reload\", Reload)                     // line 30\n    o.POST(\"nginx/restart\", Restart)                   // line 31\n}\n```\n\nThe missed router, api/cluster/router.go, registers every sensitive operation directly on r with no RequireSecureSession wrapper:\n\n```go\nnodeGroup := r.Group(\"nodes\")                          // line 9, no step-up\n{\n    nodeGroup.POST(\"\", AddNode)                        // line 12\n    nodeGroup.POST(\"/:id\", EditNode)                   // line 13\n    nodeGroup.DELETE(\"/:id\", DeleteNode)               // line 14\n}\nr.POST(\"nodes/reload_nginx\", ReloadNginx)              // line 17\nr.POST(\"nodes/restart_nginx\", RestartNginx)            // line 18\nr.POST(\"namespaces\", AddNamespace)                     // line 22\nr.POST(\"namespaces/:id\", ModifyNamespace)              // line 23\nr.DELETE(\"namespaces/:id\", DeleteNamespace)            // line 24\n```\n\nBoth routers mount on the same group in router/routers.go: `g := root.Group(\"/\", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.Proxy())` (line 87); nginx.InitRouter(g) creates its own RequireSecureSession subgroup, cluster.InitRouter(g) does not. So the cluster routes inherit only AuthRequired and Proxy, exactly the pre-fix posture the advisory closed for the nginx routes. AuthRequired has no role gate, so any authenticated user reaches them.\n\n## Attacker model and impact\n\nAn authenticated, OTP-enabled user who does not present a fresh X-Secure-Session-ID (the parent advisory\u0027s model: a stolen or persisted JWT used without the step-up). Such a user can: add/edit/delete cluster nodes (AddNode/EditNode store an AES-serialized node token, the secret used to control a remote node, so this reads back and rewrites a cross-node credential); trigger nodes/reload_nginx and nodes/restart_nginx across the cluster (the exact reload/restart action class the fix protected on the single-node path); and add/modify/delete/reorder namespaces.\n\nProof of concept: with a valid JWT but no fresh secure session, call POST /api/nodes (AddNode) or POST /api/nodes/reload_nginx. The nginx equivalent POST /api/nginx/reload returns the secure-session challenge; the cluster route succeeds.\n\n## Verification\n\nSource-verified at HEAD: the nginx router wraps reload/restart in RequireSecureSession, the cluster router registers node/namespace/reload/restart directly on the group with no such wrapper, and both mount on the AuthRequired+Proxy-only group. I did not stand up a live nginx-ui.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nWrap the cluster router\u0027s mutation handlers (node CRUD, nodes/reload_nginx, nodes/restart_nginx, namespace CRUD) in middleware.RequireSecureSession(), mirroring api/nginx/router.go. Secondary lower-confidence items worth checking in the same pass: the system/restart handler, the core-upgrade websocket, and the upstream socket PUT also appear to run without the step-up (I did not fully trace these).",
  "id": "GHSA-h246-wpgf-vmq5",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T17:08:06Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T17:08:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-h246-wpgf-vmq5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/a3999bd78a3b97ab22e6b5e9fd478ac57598a954"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nginx UI: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-84315 - the api/cluster router was not -  wrapped in RequireSecureSession, so those sensitive mutations run without OTP step-up"
}