GHSA-H9GR-58W4-64CQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:32HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-70375"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T07:16:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || \u0027master\u0027}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as \u0027;\u0027, \u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027|\u0027, backticks, and \u0027$()\u0027 are not filtered. A user able to configure a project\u0027s Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. \u0027master;\u003ccommand\u003e#\u0027) that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file\u0027s git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.",
"id": "GHSA-h9gr-58w4-64cq",
"modified": "2026-08-05T15:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T09:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70375"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cve.turansec.uz/advisories/TRN-B571F773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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