GHSA-HC5P-7RJ2-94G3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 09:32 – Updated: 2026-08-03 09:32
VLAI
Details

FlowIntel is affected by a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability through multiple user-controlled or administrator-controlled fields.

Persisted values—including case titles, ticket identifiers, recurring-case information, user profile attributes, organisation names, and role names—were rendered inside DOM elements subsequently compiled by Vue. Although normal HTML escaping could neutralize direct HTML markup, it did not prevent an attacker from injecting Vue interpolation expressions using the configured [[ ... ]] delimiters.

An authenticated attacker able to modify one of the affected fields could store a malicious Vue expression. When another user viewed an affected case, report, profile, recurring-case page, or navigation component, Vue could evaluate the injected expression in the context of the FlowIntel application.

Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary JavaScript execution in the victim’s browser under the FlowIntel origin. This could expose information available to the victim, perform actions using the victim’s authenticated session, or modify application data within the victim’s privileges.

The patch introduces a dedicated vue_escape filter that escapes HTML-sensitive characters and breaks Vue interpolation delimiters before the values are rendered. The filter is applied to the affected case, account, organisation, role, configuration, and navigation fields.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69075"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T09:17:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "FlowIntel is affected by a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability through multiple user-controlled or administrator-controlled fields.\n\nPersisted values\u2014including case titles, ticket identifiers, recurring-case information, user profile attributes, organisation names, and role names\u2014were rendered inside DOM elements subsequently compiled by Vue. Although normal HTML escaping could neutralize direct HTML markup, it did not prevent an attacker from injecting Vue interpolation expressions using the configured [[ ... ]] delimiters.\n\nAn authenticated attacker able to modify one of the affected fields could store a malicious Vue expression. When another user viewed an affected case, report, profile, recurring-case page, or navigation component, Vue could evaluate the injected expression in the context of the FlowIntel application.\n\nSuccessful exploitation could allow arbitrary JavaScript execution in the victim\u2019s browser under the FlowIntel origin. This could expose information available to the victim, perform actions using the victim\u2019s authenticated session, or modify application data within the victim\u2019s privileges.\n\nThe patch introduces a dedicated vue_escape filter that escapes HTML-sensitive characters and breaks Vue interpolation delimiters before the values are rendered. The filter is applied to the affected case, account, organisation, role, configuration, and navigation fields.",
  "id": "GHSA-hc5p-7rj2-94g3",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T09:32:38Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T09:32:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69075"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/b0e99aa6d2708730bc422ebb6dc0c14d732389fa"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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