GHSA-HMFX-4V44-9QW9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:02 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:02
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
Details

Summary

The webhook_url field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails (socket.gaierror), enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker's domain can initially resolve to a public IP (passing validation) then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request.

Details

The validator catches socket.gaierror and silently allows the URL:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:55
try:
    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
    if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback:
        raise ValueError("private address")
except socket.gaierror:
    pass  # BUG: DNS failure silently ignored → SSRF bypass

The HTTP call is made later with no re-validation:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:402
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
    await client.post(job.webhook_url, ...)  # no second IP check

Proof of Concept

DNS rebinding flow: 1. Register attacker.com with TTL=1s → resolves to 1.2.3.4 (public IP) 2. Submit job: webhook_url=http://attacker.com/callback 3. Validation passes (public IP) 4. Switch DNS: attacker.com → 127.0.0.1 5. Job completes → server POSTs to 127.0.0.1 → internal SSRF

Unresolvable domain bypass (no DNS rebinding required):

curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -d '{"prompt":"run","webhook_url":"http://unresolvable.internal/cb","agent_yaml":"..."}'
# Validation: gaierror → pass → URL accepted

Impact

SSRF to internal HTTP services: admin panels, databases, and cloud metadata APIs (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/). Exploitable without authentication.

Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.48"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:02:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `webhook_url` field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker\u0027s domain can initially resolve to a public IP (passing validation) then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request.\n\n### Details\nThe validator catches `socket.gaierror` and silently allows the URL:\n\n```python\n# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:55\ntry:\n    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n    ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\n    if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback:\n        raise ValueError(\"private address\")\nexcept socket.gaierror:\n    pass  # BUG: DNS failure silently ignored \u2192 SSRF bypass\n```\n\nThe HTTP call is made later with no re-validation:\n\n```python\n# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:402\nasync with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:\n    await client.post(job.webhook_url, ...)  # no second IP check\n```\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n**DNS rebinding flow:**\n1. Register `attacker.com` with TTL=1s \u2192 resolves to `1.2.3.4` (public IP)\n2. Submit job: `webhook_url=http://attacker.com/callback`\n3. Validation passes (public IP)\n4. Switch DNS: `attacker.com` \u2192 `127.0.0.1`\n5. Job completes \u2192 server POSTs to `127.0.0.1` \u2192 internal SSRF\n\n**Unresolvable domain bypass (no DNS rebinding required):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \\\n  -d \u0027{\"prompt\":\"run\",\"webhook_url\":\"http://unresolvable.internal/cb\",\"agent_yaml\":\"...\"}\u0027\n# Validation: gaierror \u2192 pass \u2192 URL accepted\n```\n\n### Impact\nSSRF to internal HTTP services: admin panels, databases, and cloud metadata APIs (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/`). Exploitable without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-hmfx-4v44-9qw9",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T15:02:04Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T15:02:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-hmfx-4v44-9qw9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation"
}



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