GHSA-HRR4-3WGR-68X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 00:14 – Updated: 2026-02-05 00:37Summary
Authenticated users can crash the Navidrome server by supplying an excessively large size parameter to /rest/getCoverArt or to a shared-image URL (/share/img/<token>). When processing such requests, the server attempts to create an extremely large resized image, causing uncontrolled memory growth. This triggers the Linux OOM killer, terminates the Navidrome process, and results in a full service outage.
If the system has sufficient memory and survives the allocation, Navidrome then writes these extremely large resized images into its cache directory, allowing an attacker to rapidly exhaust server disk space as well.
Details
Both /rest/getCoverArt and /share/img/<token> accept a size parameter that is passed directly into the image processing routine without any upper bound validation. When a very large integer is provided, Navidrome attempts to generate a resized image of that size. This leads to excessive memory allocation inside the image resizing path.
In the /rest/getCoverArt handler, the value is read as:
size := p.IntOr("size", 0)
imgReader, lastUpdate, err := api.artwork.GetOrPlaceholder(ctx, id, size, square)
Because no limit is enforced, the image subsystem receives the supplied value as-is. When the requested size is extremely large, the process consumes large amounts of RAM until it is killed by the kernel's OOM killer. If the system has enough available memory to complete the resize operation, the resulting oversized image is then written to Navidrome's cache directory, which can quickly fill the server's disk.
The same behavior is reachable through /share/img/<token> as long as the attacker possesses a valid sharing token.
PoC
- Authenticate normally to obtain access to
/rest/getCoverArtor a valid sharing link containing a/share/img/<token>URL. - Send a regular request with a small size value, for example:
/rest/getCoverArt?...&size=300&square=true
- Replace the
sizeparameter with a very large number, such as:
/rest/getCoverArt?...&size=300000&square=true
- The server rapidly allocates memory while attempting to create an oversized image. This leads to the Navidrome process being terminated by the OOM killer.
- The same behavior can be reproduced with a valid shared-image link:
/share/img/<token>?size=300000&square=true
If the system does not run out of memory, the oversized resized image is written to the cache directory, causing disk usage to grow quickly.
Impact
Supplying an excessively large size parameter to /rest/getCoverArt or /share/img/<token> allows any authenticated user to trigger a Denial of Service condition. During image resizing, the server attempts to allocate extremely large amounts of memory, which can cause not only Navidrome itself to be terminated by the OOM killer, but in some configurations may also destabilize or crash the entire host system.
On systems with sufficient memory, the oversized resized images are written to Navidrome's cache directory instead, allowing an attacker to rapidly consume all available disk space. This leads to a second form of Denial of Service, where the host becomes unable to write logs, operate dependent services, or perform basic system tasks due to storage exhaustion.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/navidrome/navidrome"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.60.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25579"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T00:14:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T22:16:01Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAuthenticated users can crash the Navidrome server by supplying an excessively large `size` parameter to `/rest/getCoverArt` or to a shared-image URL (`/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e`). When processing such requests, the server attempts to create an extremely large resized image, causing uncontrolled memory growth. This triggers the Linux OOM killer, terminates the Navidrome process, and results in a full service outage.\n\nIf the system has sufficient memory and survives the allocation, Navidrome then writes these extremely large resized images into its cache directory, allowing an attacker to rapidly exhaust server disk space as well.\n\n### Details\nBoth `/rest/getCoverArt` and `/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e` accept a `size` parameter that is passed directly into the image processing routine without any upper bound validation. When a very large integer is provided, Navidrome attempts to generate a resized image of that size. This leads to excessive memory allocation inside the image resizing path.\n\nIn the `/rest/getCoverArt` handler, the value is read as:\n\n```go\nsize := p.IntOr(\"size\", 0)\nimgReader, lastUpdate, err := api.artwork.GetOrPlaceholder(ctx, id, size, square)\n```\n\nBecause no limit is enforced, the image subsystem receives the supplied value as-is. When the requested size is extremely large, the process consumes large amounts of RAM until it is killed by the kernel\u0027s OOM killer. If the system has enough available memory to complete the resize operation, the resulting oversized image is then written to Navidrome\u0027s cache directory, which can quickly fill the server\u0027s disk.\n\nThe same behavior is reachable through `/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e` as long as the attacker possesses a valid sharing token.\n\n### PoC\n1. Authenticate normally to obtain access to `/rest/getCoverArt` or a valid sharing link containing a `/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e` URL.\n2. Send a regular request with a small size value, for example:\n\n```\n/rest/getCoverArt?...\u0026size=300\u0026square=true\n```\n\n3. Replace the `size` parameter with a very large number, such as:\n\n```\n/rest/getCoverArt?...\u0026size=300000\u0026square=true\n```\n\n4. The server rapidly allocates memory while attempting to create an oversized image. This leads to the Navidrome process being terminated by the OOM killer.\n5. The same behavior can be reproduced with a valid shared-image link:\n\n```\n/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e?size=300000\u0026square=true\n```\n\nIf the system does not run out of memory, the oversized resized image is written to the cache directory, causing disk usage to grow quickly.\n\n### Impact\nSupplying an excessively large `size` parameter to `/rest/getCoverArt` or `/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e` allows any authenticated user to trigger a Denial of Service condition. During image resizing, the server attempts to allocate extremely large amounts of memory, which can cause not only Navidrome itself to be terminated by the OOM killer, but in some configurations may also destabilize or crash the entire host system.\n\nOn systems with sufficient memory, the oversized resized images are written to Navidrome\u0027s cache directory instead, allowing an attacker to rapidly consume all available disk space. This leads to a second form of Denial of Service, where the host becomes unable to write logs, operate dependent services, or perform basic system tasks due to storage exhaustion.",
"id": "GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3",
"modified": "2026-02-05T00:37:07Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T00:14:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome/security/advisories/GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25579"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/navidrome/navidrome/releases/tag/v0.60.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Navidrome affected by Denial of Service and disk exhaustion via oversized `size` parameter in `/rest/getCoverArt` and `/share/img/\u003ctoken\u003e` endpoints"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.