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GHSA-HRVW-6GVM-9X99

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-19 00:31
VLAI
Details

SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders COMMENT ON ... IS '<description>' for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- '{{ data.description }}' -- instead of passing it through the qtLiteral escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured.

The defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog description field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}') and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where qtIdent escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named foo'bar and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal.

Fix is layered:

  1. Sites: replace every '{{ x.description }}' with {{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }} (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb conn=self.conn through every render_template call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a { % elif Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ::oid::regclass cast (e.g. pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there.

  2. Driver hardening: qtLiteral (in utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its conn argument was falsy. It now raises ValueError -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in schemas/__init__.py, schemas/functions/__init__.py, schemas/tables/utils.py, foreign_servers/__init__.py, and seven sites in roles/__init__.py) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner except block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values.

  3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every *.sql template flagging any '{{ ... }}' single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12044"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T00:16:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS \u0027\u003cdescription\u003e\u0027`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``\u0027{{ data.description }}\u0027`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin\u0027s Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured.\n\nThe defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple(\u0027{{schema}}.{{table}}\u0027)`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo\u0027bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal.\n\nFix is layered:\n\n  1. Sites: replace every ``\u0027{{ x.description }}\u0027`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there.\n\n  2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values.\n\n  3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``\u0027{{ ... }}\u0027`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-hrvw-6gvm-9x99",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T00:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T00:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12044"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10078"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/2ae0d3610"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/658bb585d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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