GHSA-J4H9-WV2M-WRF7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-10 20:29 – Updated: 2025-09-25 23:42
VLAI?
Summary
Claude Code vulnerable to arbitrary code execution caused by maliciously configured git email
Details
At startup, Claude Code constructed a shell command that interpolated the value of git config user.email from the current workspace. If an attacker controlled the repository’s Git config (e.g., via a malicious .git/config) and set user.email to a crafted payload, the unescaped interpolation could trigger arbitrary command execution before the user accepted the workspace-trust dialog. The issue affects versions prior to 1.0.105. The fix in 1.0.105 avoids executing commands built from untrusted configuration and properly validates/escapes inputs.
- Patches: Update to
@anthropic-ai/claude-code1.0.105or later. - Workarounds: Open only trusted workspaces and inspect repository
.git/configbefore launch; avoid inheriting untrusted Git configuration values.
Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!
Severity ?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.105"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59041"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-10T20:29:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-10T16:15:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "At startup, Claude Code constructed a shell command that interpolated the value of `git config user.email` from the current workspace. If an attacker controlled the repository\u2019s Git config (e.g., via a malicious `.git/config`) and set `user.email` to a crafted payload, the unescaped interpolation could trigger arbitrary command execution **before** the user accepted the workspace-trust dialog. The issue affects versions prior to `1.0.105`. The fix in `1.0.105` avoids executing commands built from untrusted configuration and properly validates/escapes inputs.\n\n* **Patches:** Update to `@anthropic-ai/claude-code` `1.0.105` or later.\n* **Workarounds:** Open only trusted workspaces and inspect repository `.git/config` before launch; avoid inheriting untrusted Git configuration values.\n\n\u003e Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!",
"id": "GHSA-j4h9-wv2m-wrf7",
"modified": "2025-09-25T23:42:37Z",
"published": "2025-09-10T20:29:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-j4h9-wv2m-wrf7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59041"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@anthropic-ai/claude-code/v/1.0.105"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Claude Code vulnerable to arbitrary code execution caused by maliciously configured git email "
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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