GHSA-M3FH-CX4W-XF4M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:13 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:49Universal Robots control box CB 3.1 across firmware versions (tested on 1.12.1, 1.12, 1.11 and 1.10) does not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed from the UR+ platform of hardware and software components (URCaps). These files (*.urcaps) are stored under '/root/.urcaps' as plain zip files containing all the logic to add functionality to the UR3, UR5 and UR10 robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with other flaws) to retrieve and easily exfiltrate all installed intellectual property.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-10267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-311",
"CWE-312"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-04-06T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Universal Robots control box CB 3.1 across firmware versions (tested on 1.12.1, 1.12, 1.11 and 1.10) does not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed from the UR+ platform of hardware and software components (URCaps). These files (*.urcaps) are stored under \u0027/root/.urcaps\u0027 as plain zip files containing all the logic to add functionality to the UR3, UR5 and UR10 robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with other flaws) to retrieve and easily exfiltrate all installed intellectual property.",
"id": "GHSA-m3fh-cx4w-xf4m",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:49:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:13:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD/issues/1489"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.