GHSA-M5P4-GVPX-4MVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 14:43 – Updated: 2026-05-11 14:43Summary
GuardDog includes attacker-controlled filenames, file locations, messages, and code snippets in its default human-readable output without escaping terminal control characters. A malicious package can therefore inject ANSI or OSC escape sequences into analyst terminals or CI logs.
Description
The finding formatter stores file paths and snippets from scanned content:
location = file_path + ":" + str(start_line)
finding = {
"location": location,
"code": code,
"message": result["extra"]["message"],
}
The human-readable reporter later prints these values directly:
" * " + finding["message"] + " at " + finding["location"] + "\n " + _format_code_line_for_output(finding["code"])
No escaping is applied for control characters such as \x1b. A malicious package can therefore ship a filename like:
evil\x1b[2J.py
or matched source lines containing terminal escapes, which survive into the final CLI output.
Reproduction summary
- Create a file whose name contains
\x1b[2J. - Feed a semgrep-style result referencing that file into
Analyzer._format_semgrep_response(). - Render the result with
HumanReadableReporter.print_scan_results(). - The output string contains the raw escape bytes, which a terminal may interpret.
Key code paths
guarddog/analyzer/analyzer.py:377-392guarddog/reporters/human_readable.py:36-42guarddog/reporters/human_readable.py:84-91
Practical impact
This can be used to: - clear or rewrite analyst terminal output - inject misleading or spoofed log content in CI - emit clickable OSC 8 hyperlinks or title changes in compatible terminals
Prior public disclosure check
As of 2026-03-18, no matching public GitHub advisory, CVE, or public repo issue was found for this specific bug.
Suggested fix
Escape or strip terminal control characters before rendering any attacker-controlled value in human-readable output. This should cover package names, file paths, messages, and code snippets.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "guarddog"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.6.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44972"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T14:43:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Summary\nGuardDog includes attacker-controlled filenames, file locations, messages, and code snippets in its default human-readable output without escaping terminal control characters. A malicious package can therefore inject ANSI or OSC escape sequences into analyst terminals or CI logs.\n\n# Description\nThe finding formatter stores file paths and snippets from scanned content:\n\n```python\nlocation = file_path + \":\" + str(start_line)\nfinding = {\n \"location\": location,\n \"code\": code,\n \"message\": result[\"extra\"][\"message\"],\n}\n```\n\nThe human-readable reporter later prints these values directly:\n\n```python\n\" * \" + finding[\"message\"] + \" at \" + finding[\"location\"] + \"\\n \" + _format_code_line_for_output(finding[\"code\"])\n```\n\nNo escaping is applied for control characters such as `\\x1b`. A malicious package can therefore ship a filename like:\n\n```text\nevil\\x1b[2J.py\n```\n\nor matched source lines containing terminal escapes, which survive into the final CLI output.\n\n# Reproduction summary\n1. Create a file whose name contains `\\x1b[2J`.\n2. Feed a semgrep-style result referencing that file into `Analyzer._format_semgrep_response()`.\n3. Render the result with `HumanReadableReporter.print_scan_results()`.\n4. The output string contains the raw escape bytes, which a terminal may interpret.\n\n# Key code paths\n- `guarddog/analyzer/analyzer.py:377-392`\n- `guarddog/reporters/human_readable.py:36-42`\n- `guarddog/reporters/human_readable.py:84-91`\n\n# Practical impact\nThis can be used to:\n- clear or rewrite analyst terminal output\n- inject misleading or spoofed log content in CI\n- emit clickable OSC 8 hyperlinks or title changes in compatible terminals\n\n# Prior public disclosure check\nAs of 2026-03-18, no matching public GitHub advisory, CVE, or public repo issue was found for this specific bug.\n\n# Suggested fix\nEscape or strip terminal control characters before rendering any attacker-controlled value in human-readable output. This should cover package names, file paths, messages, and code snippets.",
"id": "GHSA-m5p4-gvpx-4mvr",
"modified": "2026-05-11T14:43:43Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T14:43:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/security/advisories/GHSA-m5p4-gvpx-4mvr"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GuardDog: Unsanitized human-readable scan output allows terminal escape injection from malicious package content"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.